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Abstract
The re-manufacturing of used products has become more important in literature and prac-
tice. Governmental legislation forces manufacturers to take care of their end-of-life products.
Additionally, re-manufacturing may increase a companies’ revenue through direct savings in
production costs by the recovery of valuable material. With these external and internal devel-
opments, there is a growing interest of manufacturers in determining an optimal channel for the
collection of used products. The overall objective of this optimisation lies in the maximisation of
the companies’ profit. Therefore, the problem of increasing waste streams of end-of-life products
need to be addressed by identifying the most profitable reverse channel structure to collect and
re-manufacture used products.
Three different collection channel options are modelled as decentralised decision-making sys-
tems. Therefore, a game theory approach is applied. The first channel is the manufacturer
carrying out the collection. The retailer making use of the retail store network to collect from
customers and sell back to the manufacturer describes the second channel. A third-party lo-
gistics service provider acts as a third channel for collecting and selling returns. The thesis
focuses on the detailed cost of collection that each potential collecting agent accommodates.
A non-cooperative game between the three collecting agents is modelled first, followed by the
extension to a cooperative game. The cooperation can be caused by external influences like
legislative regulations or by a change in perspective. The stability of both versions of the game
is evaluated by changing single parameters. Additionally, by changing the market scenario, the
influence of the market environment on the channel choice is investigated in particular.
The benchmark scenario of the non-cooperative and cooperative version of the game is stable in
its parameters. In general, changes in single parameters influence the level of the highest payoff
achievable by each player. In the non-cooperative version of the game the manufacturer gains
the highest payoffs followed by the retailer, as both benefit from the sales of new products. If
the market scenario is changed, this ranking only shifts with a change in the market area size.
Therefore, the retailer obtains a profit higher than the manufacturer. The third-party is able
to work with different clients, turning the collection of returns into a successful business. The
results of the cooperative version of the game are consistent with the observations in the non-
cooperative game. Forming the grand coalition is the best option to obtain the highest payoffs
if collection rate fees are imposed externally. With a change of perception to the manufacturer,
the same customer density identifies the retailer as an optimal collection channel. However,
subcontracting the third-party obtains the highest payoff in the benchmark scenario as well
as in the larger market areas. In conclusion, a cooperation between different options should
be taken into account while designing optimal reverse channel structures for every scenario.
Additionally, the point of view is crucial in choosing the partner to obtain the highest payoff.
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Opsomming
Die hervervaardiging van gebruikte goedere word al hoe noodsaakliker in sowel die literatuur as in
die praktyk. Regeringswetgewing dwing vervaardigers om produkte te verwerk wat die einde van
hul raklewe bereik het. Die hervervaardiging van produkte kan tot voordeel van ’n maatskappy
se inkomste wees deur direkte besparing in vervaardigingskoste wanneer waardevolle materiale
herwin kan word. Met hierdie eksterne en interne ontwikkeling is daar ’n toenemende belang-
stelling van vervaardigers om ’n optimale kanaal vir die versameling van gebruikte produkte te
skep. Die algemene doelwit van hierdie optimering leˆ in die maksimering van die maatskappy se
wins. Daarom is dit noodsaaklik dat die probleem van toenemende afvalhope van produkte aan
die einde van hul raklewe aangespreek word deur die mees winsgewende tru-kanaalstruktuur te
skep waardeur hierdie produkte versamel en hervervaardig kan word.
Daar is drie verskillende versamelingskanale wat as modelle kan dien vir gedesentraliseerde
besluitnemingsisteme. ’n Model wat op ’n speleteorie benadering gebaseer is, word gebruik.
Die eerste kanaal is die vervaardiger wat die versameling behartig. Die tweede kanaal is die
kleinhandelaar wat gebruik maak van die winkelnetwerk om die produkte van die klie¨nte te
versamel en terug te verkoop aan die vervaardiger. Die derde kanaal is ’n onbetrokke logistieke
diensverskaffer wat die produkte wat teruggegee is, versamel en herverkoop. Hierdie tesis fokus
op die gedetailleerde koste van die versameling van elke potensie¨le versamelingsagent. ’n Nie-
samewerkingspel tussen die drie versamelingsagente is die eerste model, gevolg deur ’n uitbrei-
ding na ’n samewerkingspel. Die samewerking kan veroorsaak word deur eksterne invloede soos
wetgewende bepalings of deur ’n verandering in perspektief. Die stabiliteit van beide weergawes
vanuit ’n speleteorie benadering word getoets deur enkele parameters te verander. Deur die
mark scenario telkens te verander, word die invloed van die markomgewing op die keuse van die
tipe kanaal ook ondersoek.
Die scenario wat die maatstaf vorm vir die nie-samewerkings en die samewerkings weergawe
van die spel is stabiel in terme van die invoer parameters. Oor die algemeen word die vlak
van die hoogste wins wat elke speler kan bereik, deur veranderinge in enkele van die parame-
ters be¨ınvloed. In die nie-samewerking weergawe van die spel word die meeste wins deur die
vervaardiger gemaak, gevolg deur die kleinhandelaar, aangesien albei voordeel trek deur die
verkope van nuwe produkte. As die mark-scenario verander, verander die rangorde slegs met ’n
verandering in die grootte van die markgebied, en word die verkoper se wins meer as die van die
vervaardiger. Die derde party kan met verskillende klie¨nte werk en die versameling van goedere
in ’n suksesvolle besigheid verander. Die uitslag van die samewerkings weergawe van die spel is
konsekwent met die´ van die nie-samewerkings weergawe. Die omvattende koalisie is die beste
keuse om die hoogste wins te maak, indien die koste van die versameling ekstern gehef word.
Ter samevatting, ’n samewerking tussen verskillende moontlikhede moet in berekening gebring
word wanneer die optimale tru-kanaal struktuur vir elke scenario geskep word. Voorts is hierdie
standpunt van uiterste belang wanneer ’n vennoot gekies word om die hoogste wins te verseker.
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Glossary
Closed-loop supply chain can be defined as “the design, control, and operation of a system
to maximize value creation over the entire life cycle of a product with dynamic recovery
of value from different types and volumes of returns over time” [42, p. 10].
Diseconomies of scale factors rise the average costs in the long-run with an increase in the
scale of production. Even though the unit cost may fall with an increase in output due to
economies of scale, there are reasons that reverse this process eventually. There is a growth
of bureaucracy with a growth of production to manage the difficulties in coordination and
administration. If the market area of a company becomes too large, the transport cost may
offset a large companies’ scale economies of production. Even transporting full-truck-loads
do not minimize the cost of transport per unit to an acceptable level if the customer is
too far from the facility. Besides these internal factors, there are also external factors that
can lead to diseconomies of scale such as traffic congestion in the geographic region of the
production plant [4].
Economies of scale are factors that cause the cost of producing a unit to decrease as the
output of units increases. There are internal and external economies of scale. Generally
factors within the company ensure an optimal production size that is large. Especially with
high fixed cost of operating a facility it is profitable to produce many units to distribute the
cost over the units. Additionally, larger companies can invest in research and development
and specialise in machinery and labour to increase the overall productivity. There are also
non-technological factors that can lead to economies of scale such as discounts for buying
in bulk from the supplier amongst others. Especially the cost of transport per unit can be
cut down if the fixed cost of operating a vehicle is distributed amongst as many units as
possibly fit in the truck. External economies arise due to the development of an industry.
This development can lead to services that benefit all firms. Economies of scope on the
other hand do not originate in a higher output but in the production of a range of related
units [5, 6].
Game is any social situation involving two or more individuals [56]. It is described by the
totality of the pre-defined rules of the game. A sequence of moves by the individuals make
up a game. [91].
Move is the event of a choice between various alternatives made by either one of the players of
a game or by some device subject to chance. The choice is made under the conditions of
the pre-described rules of the game. All moves are the element components of a game [91].
Choice describes the specific alternative that is chosen in a concrete play. A sequence of choices
make up one play whereas a game consists of a sequence of moves. The element components
of a play are the choices [91].
xiii
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xiv Glossary
Payoff is received by each player after each play. A negative number can be interpreted as a
loss while a positive as a win. Payoffs do not necessarily need to be monetary, but can
also be of a specific utility value [56].
Play describes every instance at which a game is played. The game is played, in a particular
way, from the beginning to the end. A sequence of choices make up a play [91].
Player is every individual involved in a game. The two basic assumptions are that players act
rational and intelligent [56].
Reverse logistics is “the process of planning, implementing and controlling backward flows of
raw materials, in process inventory, packaging and finished goods, from a manufacturing,
distribution or use point, to a point of recovery or point of proper disposal” [15, p. 5].
Rules are absolute commands. If the pre-defined rules are violated, then the game ceases to
be the game defined by the rules [91].
Stackelberg duopoly model is a model with one company that has most market power acting
as the price leader and another company as the price follower. Therefore, it is a sequential
game where the Nash equilibrium is identified by backward induction [71].
Strategy is freely chosen by each player. Only general principles influence the choice of strategy.
Therefore, it is within each player’s responsibility to use or reject strategies [91].
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Parameters
α` A parameter used to fit real data for the correctional factor with distance.
αq A parameter used to fit real data for the correctional factor with quantities.
b A parameter for the average speed on the back-haul tour.
β A positive parameter of the demand function.
c The average unit cost of manufacturing.
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d The average tour distance.
dL The average local tour distance per customer.
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Pi The payoff per unit of player i.
φ A positive parameter of the demand function.
ϕi The density constant of player i.
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T The transport cost per distance per unit.
TD The direct shipping transport cost per unit.
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U The transit time.
UL The transit time of local transport.
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Vmax A full truck load.
w The wholesale price per unit.
z A parameter describing non-desirable variations of the cost-ratio.
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P The set of players in the grand coalition.
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2w The width of a pick-up zone.
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bi The transfer price per unit for player i.
C The total cost of collection.
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The establishment of trade transfers the ownership of goods or services in exchange for some
form of currency. A network in which this exchange can be executed is constituted by a market.
The demand created by a market can only be satisfied if requested items can be supplied.
Therefore, some form of manufacturing need to transform raw materials into products. The
transformation can only be carried out, if the raw materials are available at the plant, while
the market can only be supplied if the products are shipped to the potential customers. The
supply chain describes the steps of transport from one point of demand to the next, beginning
with the supplier providing the raw material and ending at the customer in the market area.
Throughout the years not only manufacturing processes have been optimised, but also supply
chains became more and more efficient. With the rising efficiency, the supply of the markets
increase. Additionally, items become more affordable to a larger section of the world-wide
growing population that is creating a higher demand. However, the high rates of product supply
creates a new problem: The increasing level of consumption results in an enormous waste stream
of end-of-life-products.
This problem is addressed by replacing the one-way perception of a company turning raw ma-
terial into goods that are sold to customers by the more holistic view of product life cycles.
Therefore, the entire process from manufacturing to recovery is taken into consideration. Be-
sides, legislation as well as customers expect companies to set the environmental impact of their
products to a minimum. Especially the sustainable use of finite resources and the limited avail-
ability of disposal capacity together with the ecological impacts of waste trigger this change in
perception.
1
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1.1 Forward and reverse logistics
The change in perception goes hand in hand with a change in companies’ processes. Not only
facilities to manufacture but also to re-manufacture used products have to be included in the
design of a plant. Besides, the design of the product itself has to allow the possibilities of
recovery. In this context, traditional forward logistics are extended by the introduction of
reverse logistics (RL). While forward logistics define the process flows from raw material that is
being transformed into products and shipped to customers, reverse logistics describe the flows
of material and information of used products from the customer back to the recovery facilities of
the company or an external service provider. Forward combined with reverse flows result in the
so-called closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Therefore, the CLSC is responsible for all process
flows in the life cycle of a product that is traded in a market.
1.2 Motivation
The motivation behind re-manufacturing used products and thus introducing reverse logistics
to the traditional transport and manufacturing processes are two-fold. On the one hand, in-
corporating reverse logistics and product recovery into the manufacturing process can lead to
financial benefits for a company. On the other hand, in certain countries the legislative imposes
regulations that companies have to follow to reduce the waste stream created.
1.2.1 Economic reasons
The annual costs of commercial returns are, as estimated by Stock et al. [81], in excess of
100 billion US dollar. Two other examples, describing the experiences of Guide et al. [42],
show that more than 700 million US dollar of functional recovered products of a computer
network manufacturer were destroyed without taking advantage of the possibilities of recycling.
Furthermore, the return cost of Hewlett-Packard mounts up to 2% of the total outbound sales
with less than half of the values of these products being recovered. These examples show that
most of the economic potential of recovery of used products and closed-loop supply chains is
currently dumped on landfill sites all over the globe.
There are exceptions. Xerox, for example, turns end-of-life electronic equipment into new prod-
ucts containing recycled material. Therefore, Xerox implemented a programme that enables
the re-use of complete end-products, the re-manufacturing or conversion into updated products,
the re-use of major modules or subcomponents of products as well as the recycling of material.
According to Xerox, the re-use of material, especially with toner cartridges, saves several million
US dollar of raw material cost every year [94]. Moreover, Canon as well as Hewlett Packard
undertake similar re-manufacturing activities to benefit from the economic potential of re-use.
The total volume of goods in the reverse flows of IBM sums up to 10 000 metric tons worldwide.
IBM decided to offer different re-use options to recover the maximum of this value. With the
help of the product recovery strategies that had been introduced, a financial benefit of several
hundred US dollar as well as a reduction of land-filling and incineration to less than 4% are
achieved by IBM’s activities [28].
In general, re-manufacturing is more efficient on energy than other forms of recycling. The
amount of energy needed can be reduced drastically, since products do not have to be broken
up or processed chemically. More importantly, re-manufacturing is, according to Ginsburg [35],
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between 40% and 65% cheaper than manufacturing new products as material cost can be saved
on a large scale. All these numbers only give a glimpse at the enormous economic potential of
re-manufacturing activities incorporating CLSCs.
1.2.2 Legislative regulations
In the US, the total quantity of municipal solid waste grew from 88 million tons in 1960 to 256
million tons in 2006, according to the United States Environmental Protection Agency [89]. In
1960, 94% of the waste was landfilled or disposed, while only 6% was recovered. However, in
the last decades the recovery and composting efforts have increased due to several regulations
imposed on the manufacturers.
In Europe, the waste of electrical and electronic equipment was 9 million tonnes in 2005 and is
expected to be 12 million tonnes by 2020. Therefore, it is one of the fastest growing waste streams
in Europe [22]. The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment directive (WEEE) became law
in Europe in 2003 to address this problem. The directive contains mandatory requirements
with regards to the collection of end-of-life products to increase re-use and recycling. Similar
legislations have been introduced in Canada, Japan and China [38].
The US and Europe seems to engage the strongest in environmental legislations. Therefore,
manufacturers having their facilities located in one of those continents need to pose the question
on how to deal with their end-of-life products in an early stage of the product development.
1.3 Problem description and thesis scope
Choosing the reverse channel structure that is optimal arises from the core of operations research
with its overall aim of optimisation. With the application of operations research to the topic of
re-manufacturing and reverse logistics, scientific methods are applied to provide a comprehensive
decision support with a quantitative basis and objective perspective. Therefore, decisions con-
trolling the operations of a system, such as choosing a particular structure for reverse logistics
activities, is the subject matter of this project. The overall objective of the optimisation lies in
the maximisation of a company’s profit. A model that describes the system in a realistic way
serving as a benchmark scenario will be modelled. Applying game theory, the variables that can
be manipulated to maximise the objective are identified. Constraints set by market mechanisms
build a framework for the investigation of this project.
The optimality of the reverse channel structure is influenced by the two-fold motivation. Eco-
nomic reasons as well as legislative regulations result in a financial impact for the manufacturing
company. While the economic reasons bring direct savings in material cost, the monetary aspect
of the legislative regulations lies in avoiding fines that need to be paid if predefined collection
rates are not reached. Therefore, the optimality of the reverse channel structure will be evaluated
by the monetary effects of the implementation.
The effect of logistics on the choice of the optimal reverse channel structure will be evaluated.
By modelling different transport network alternatives through different players, the options will
be tested. Versions were these players cooperate or not, as well as various environments are
investigated. The purpose of this thesis is to highlight the importance of reverse logistics by
emphasising monetary benefits of re-manufacturing. On a theoretical basis, it will be shown
that it is vital for manufacturers to engage into the design of reverse channel structures.
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1.4 Thesis objectives
Towards the aim of choosing an optimal reverse channel, the following objectives will be pursued
throughout the thesis.
Objective I: Perform a literature review on the current body of scientific knowledge.
Objective II: Model different reverse logistic options with a game theory approach.
Objective III: Test the stability of the modelled game.
Objective IV: Investigate different scenarios and versions of the modelled game.
Objective V: Interpret the results.
Objective VI: Draw conclusions on the choice of an optimal reverse logistics structure.
1.5 Thesis outline
Many real-world problems demand mathematical descriptions and solution approaches. There
are several stages a problem needs to pass through to successfully apply mathematical theory.
As a first step after the introduction of the topic in this chapter, the problem is identified in
Chapter 2. An analysis of the current state of scientific knowledge characterises the problem and
reveals gaps for further investigations. In Chapter 3 the problem is formulated as a mathematical
model. In this second step, the problem is thus translated into mathematical terms. There
are opposing elements that need to be balanced out in the formulation. On the one hand,
to successfully analyse the problem the model has to work with simplifying assumptions to
overlook minor details. On the other hand, to apply the conclusions of the study to the original
problem, the model has to reflect the real-world situation adequately. The third step carried out
in Chapter 4 is finding a solution to the problem. The solution of the problem is computed in
various environments to reveal information about the different elements that can be influenced
within the mathematical model. Therefore, the stability of the model as well as different market
scenarios are tested. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 the results are translated back into the
original context as the final step. Extensions help to create a more realistic picture of the
problem as the two-fold motivation is taken into account by applying different perspectives.
Conclusions are drawn in the final chapter. Additionally, a possible outlook on the future is
given in Chapter 7 [85].
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The following sections will describe the body of scientific knowledge of the two topics that will
be combined in this project: Reverse logistics and game theory. Game theory approaches are
applied to the field of reverse logistics to change the point of view from a centralised planer that
carries out all tasks arising from a closed-loop supply chain to a decentralised decision-maker [73].
This incorporation emphasises the characteristics of reverse logistics.
First of all, the topic of closed-loop supply chains and reverse logistics will be described in detail,
followed by an overview over the tools of game theory. The combination of the two topics in
selected articles serves as a basis for the description of the problem this thesis is going to address.
2.1 Closed-loop supply chains and reverse logistics
Background information on closed-loop supply chains and reverse logistics are described to
illustrate the current body of knowledge available in literature. Future research opportunities
will also be outlined to serve as a foundation for the research of this thesis.
2.1.1 Attempts to close the loop
Taking back used products from customers and re-using the entire product, modules, parts and
components to recover the value added is the focus of closed-loop supply chains. Therefore,
5
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CLSCs include not only activities from traditional forwards supply chains but also activities
from reverse supply chains. The additional activities are the acquisition of products from the
customers, the shipment of returns to the service facilities, the determination of the return’s
quality condition, the re-manufacturing and the re-marketing [40].
All these process steps are displayed in Figure 2.1. Raw-materials are manufactured to final
products at the plant. Afterwards, the products are either directly or indirectly distributed via
a retailer to the customers. The forward supply chain incorporates these tasks. The reverse
supply chain collects the used products from the customers and ships them to the recovery
facility. The recovery facility, that can be included in the plant, supplies the manufacturing
with recovered raw materials and disposes waste.
Raw materials Manufacturing Distribution Customers
Recovery
facility
Disposal
Forward flow
Reverse flow
Figure 2.1: A generic model of a closed-loop supply chain. Source: [38]
The different phases in the life cycle of a product can be used to classify the type of closed-loop
supply chain. There exists a manufacturing phase, a distribution phase, a phase of use and a
end-of-life phase [26]. The supply chain closing at of the end-of-life phase will play the main part
in this thesis. The actors involved in the recovery process, the type of units that are recovered
and the form of re-use characterise a closed-loop supply chain. There is a difference whether
the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) carries out the re-manufacturing or a third-party
becomes the re-manufacturer. Additionally, the collection process can be undertaken by various
agents such as the manufacturer, a retailer or a third-party logistics service provider. This thesis
will focus on the manufacturer carrying out the recovery process and the three actors as possible
collecting agents. The type of product to be recovered can be either packaging, rotatable spare
parts or consumer goods. The latter will be dealt with in this thesis [31]. Products that are
returned within 30, 60 or 90 days after they had been purchased are classified as commercial
returns. The replacement of a functional product by a technological upgrade, on the other
hand, is an end-of-use return. A product that is technologically obsolete or of no utility to
the customer any longer is referred to as an end-of-life return. The classification influences
how time critical the collection process is, hence this thesis focuses on end-of-use or end-of-life
returns [42]. Within the product recovery process there are five different options. Depending on
the degree of disassembly that is required for the product, these options are repair, refurbishing,
re-manufacturing, cannibalisation and recycling. In re-manufacturing used products are brought
back to the quality standards of new products, in cannibalisation a small portion of the return is
re-used and in recycling the material of the return is used again [86]. Therefore, re-manufacturing
is a form of recovery that adds value whereas recycling focuses on the recovery of the material
that had been part of the product. By rather re-using than discarding, re-manufacturing avoids
waste [39]. This thesis deals with the options of re-manufacturing as the products brought back
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to the manufacturer will be turned into new products using the return’s material.
According to Guide et al. [42] research on CLSC evolved from investigating on individual oper-
ations to take the entire closed-loop supply chain with a focus on reverse logistics into consid-
eration. The evolution is described with the help of five phases of which each phase adds a new
perspective to the topic.
In phase one, re-manufacturing and reverse logistics are treated as a technical problem. Re-
manufacturing expensive assets was a critical concern to the US military that sponsored the
early research in the 1990s. Increasing profitability of the re-manufacturing workshops by mak-
ing operations work more efficiently was the main focus. Directives of the EU on end-of-life
products as for example the directive on Waste of electrical and electronic equipment, the pa-
per recycling directive and the end-of-life vehicle directive lead to companies searching for new
ways to minimise the financial impact of compliance. Therefore, researchers investigated on the
design for disassembly, design of networks for minimum-cost recycling and approaches to reduce
the environmental impact. On one hand, the research on CLSCs focused on profit maximisation
and thus was market-driven, on the other hand it centred around cost minimisation and hence
resulted in a approach driven by the waste stream. Xerox pro-actively introduced a green-line
of re-manufactured copiers leading to changes in the manufacturing-distribution network. This
example pointed out the issue of value-creation within CLSCs. With this introduction Thierry
et al. [86] identified the strategic importance of product recovery management. Future liabilities
could be reduced by producing recyclable products. Moreover, discarded products now became
the source of valuable components and material. Every company should analyse the oppor-
tunities and threats of the recovery of their product to uncover hidden potentials. Therefore,
information needed to be gathered on the composition of the product, the return flow’s magni-
tude and uncertainty, possible markets for re-used products and the current product recovery
installations. Finally, eight managerial implications are highlighted. However, obtaining the
necessary information stays difficult. Based on the technological feasibility, resources of returns
that are sufficient, the existence of markets for recovered products and legislative prerequisites,
the most profitable option is selected for the company. Setting re-use targets helps to measure
performance of the actions taken. In most cases a redesign of the product is necessary. The
cooperation between different actors of the supply chain is a requirement. In the development of
reverse supply chains, opportunities to cooperate with competing actors exist. This conclusion
should be emphasised as it already shows tendencies towards the application of a game theo-
retical approach in the context of reverse logistics. Additionally, manufacturing, operations and
logistics management are influenced by product recovery management [2]. In conclusion, the
developments of the first phase mainly centred around particular activities. However, prospects
on future developments had already been present.
In phase two, the perspective started to shift towards process orientation. On the one hand,
a classic operations research activity optimisation approach that is described in Dekker et al.
[16] is applied. The topics of inventory control, reverse logistics networks, lot-sizing for re-
manufacturing and the design of re-manufacturing processes are addressed, amongst others, in
the new context of reverse logistics. Operations-research based tools for planning and control
techniques within this field of research are introduced. On the other hand, the topic is explored
through a business management view that connects the sub-processes to the topic. In 2000,
Guide [39] emphasises the difference between re-manufacturing and traditional manufacturing
operations. The characteristics are the uncertainty in quantity and timing, the uncertainty in
quality, the necessary balance between returns and demand, the disassembly that is needed,
the requirement for a network that can carry out the collection, the material matching restric-
tions and the variable processing time for re-manufacturing returns. Especially the challenge
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of greater variety demands different processes. With the help of a survey developed to assess
manufacturing planning and control activities, the topic of defining an optimal channel choice
between the re-manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party is identified as a future research issue.
In 2001, Guide et al. [43] merges the general management perspective of Thierry et al. [86] and
the aspects on operations research of Guide [39] into a business point of view on CLSCs that
focuses on profitability [2]. Thereby, a framework that emphasises the economic potential of re-
manufacturing activities is created. Bottlenecks in the process steps must be eliminated to access
the profitability of CLSCs. The acquisition of a product determines whether re-manufacturing
creates value or even increases profits. The Economic Value Added approach is applied to deter-
mine the potential profitability of re-manufacturing activities. Additionally, the facility design
can be influenced by product acquisition and potential markets for re-manufactured products
can be revealed. That is why, the perspective shifts from minimising cost to maximising profits
in regards to product returns. The business perspective should explore the drivers for economic
profitability and show managers how to influence these drivers. In 2003, Guide et al. [40] points
out that a business approach needs to be adapted to the entire process. Practices that are
suitable for forward supply chains can then be applied to reverse supply chains. A successful
integration of the steps of the reverse supply chain forms a closed-loop supply chain creating op-
portunities for maximising profits. Hence, a life cycle approach for handling products is created.
Thereby, the second phase introduced a duality to the operations research activity optimisation
that is further investigated in Guide et al. [41] covering operations research based modelling
approaches and the business economics perspective.
Phase three deals with the coordination of the reverse supply chain processes. The business
economics approach connects to other aspects of operations research like game theoretical ap-
proaches. Typically, reverse supply chains are not controlled by a single actor. The different
independent players involved in the reverse supply chain create an additional complexity in de-
signing and coordinating the entire CLSC. Thus, game theory explores the strategic implications
of the recovery processes. Contracting helps to coordinate the actions of the different players.
With this new perspective, research started taking on a broader scope. Savaskan et al. [73] in-
vestigated in finding an optimal reverse channel structure. Game theory is applied to determine
the best way to access the used products. That is why, the article of Savaskan et al. [73] as well
as the articles following up on this approach create the foundation for the thesis. The analysis
of Savaskan et al. [73], Savaskan et al. [74], Atasu et al. [3] and Chuang et al. [12] are described
in detail in Section 2.3. Topics dealing with the improvement of component durability, the
reduction of false failure returns, the effects of competition from third-party re-manufacturers
and the reciprocity between new and re-manufactured products are addressed amongst others.
Phase three moved CLSC from an extension of the supply chain knowledge to an acknowledged
field of research.
In phase four the system is designed dynamically over the whole product life cycle. Aspects of
volume, time sensitivity and quality of the returned products influence system design signifi-
cantly. Depending on how time sensitive the product is, the CLSC has to be responsive to a
high time sensitivity or cost-effective for a low time sensitivity. The interactions between the
rate of collection, the durability and the life cycle of a returned product determine the design of
the system by taking a look at the bigger picture of a CLSCs. The design requires an integrated
perspective that also recognizes the different independent actors involved to make use of the
full potential business value. The information on the various return types and the different
time sensitivities need to be merged to create the maximum value over the entire life cycle of a
product. The success of a business system is dependent on the right perspective at the time the
system is designed.
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Phase five additionally takes the valuation of the re-manufactured products and the behaviour
of the customers in the market into consideration. In reality there are not only perfect product
substitutes or secondary markets but a mixture of both extremes. Therefore, the fear of product
cannibalisation might block recovery activities. Acknowledging this fact, research results show
that re-manufactured products do not seem to cannibalise the sale of new products but can
discourage low-cost product competitors. With the danger of cannibalisation the timing of
introducing re-manufactured products into the market as well as the sales promotion become
strategic decisions. Taking on an accounting point of view, re-manufactured products can either
be regarded as a loss or as a potential source of profit. This view determines the willingness of a
company to invest in recovery activities. In conclusion, other business disciplines like marketing
and accounting are integrated in this fifth phase of the evolution of research on CLSCs [42].
Flapper et al. [26] describes different phases in the life cycle of a product. In each of these
phases a closed-loop supply chain can be implemented. Aspects of business drivers, engineer-
ing, organisation, planning and control, information systems, environment and economics have
to be taken into consideration to be able to choose in which phase the loop should be closed.
Direct and indirect economic profits are identified as the major driver for future CLSC develop-
ments. Opportunities lie in enablers such as technical developments through increased design
for re-usability as well as tracking and tracing of the location of products through RFID chips.
However, these technological developments may also result in new challenges. An example is
the use of lighter but less durable materials such as plastics to achieve a reduction in the fuel
consumption of cars. CLSCs needs to focus on the business economics perspective to make
further improvements. This will result in a greater recognition throughout the industry [42].
Souza [80] addresses strategical, tactical and operational issues in his review. The strategic
decisions a manufacturer has to take is whether to re-manufacture or not. The manufacturer
has to choose whether to use the strategic source of returns of trade-ins or leasing as well as how
to respond to take-back directives imposed by legislation. Additionally, the manufacturer has
to design the CLSC network and coordinate and incentive the members. A minor aspect deals
with the impact on the design of new products. Tactical decisions are the strategy to collect
products and the disposition of returns. These tactical issues are specified in the operational
approach.
In a more recent review on the topic of closed-loop supply chains and reverse logistics provided by
Govindan et al. [38] papers published from 2007 to 2013 are reviewed, categorised and analysed
to create a foundation of past research and light on future directions. The article organises the
diverse topics into designing and planning, price and coordination, the business perspective on
CLSC and RL, manufacturing planning and inventory control, decision making and performance
evaluation and the vehicle routing problem amongst others. Surveys try to find practical answers
to scientific questions and different studies that analyses conceptually as well as qualitatively in
subjects such as product life cycle management. Especially the consideration of uncertainties is
pointed out. Different parameters chosen as non-deterministic are analysed in non-deterministic
approaches. Thereby, the importance of analysing different data sets of CLSC and RL networks
is emphasised.
Looking at different publications the connection can be drawn that game theory approaches are
usually applied to pricing and coordination problems. The methods used in game theory ap-
proaches are mainly analytical. Additionally, simulation techniques seem to be applied in many
different cases. Linear modelling approaches dominantly solve design and planning problems.
Future opportunities are highlighted in particular. Studies should integrate green aspects and
sustainability into CLSC and RL research and not solely try to prove which aspect covers the
topic. A comprehensive view on the topic combining all the special subjects previous studies
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have concentrated on should be worked out. Regarding the topic of considering uncertainties,
non-deterministic approaches should be modified by including approaches such as fuzzy logic,
interval approaches and chaos theory. Staying with stochastic approaches to face uncertainties,
these should be extended to two-stage approaches with robust optimisation techniques. Addi-
tionally, the technique of forecasting should be included to address uncertainty issues. In general,
it is important to investigate on all parameters that may lead to uncertainty. Furthermore, there
are opportunities to improve modelling approaches. Non-linear programming approaches as well
as convex optimisations are changes that can to lead towards realistic models in the future, since
linear programming models do not reflect the complexity of real-world problems. Not only the
modelling approaches but also the methodology behind them can be extended. Especially as
the problem becomes more complex, heuristics or meta-heuristics become an effective way to
find good feasible solutions. A combination between exact and heuristic could show a future
direction for research in the CLSC and RL environment, since analytical solution approaches
are closer to theoretical solution methodologies. The incorporation of simulation into analyti-
cal game theory approaches can be a step towards this direction to create a realistic but still
solvable situation. Operational decision variables could be integrated with tactical and strategic
variables. The decision variables should be constantly updated to reflect the current develop-
ment. Finally, single-objective approaches should be turned into multi-objectives to resemble
the real-world. Therefore, green, sustainable, environmental and resilience objectives need to be
included. These outlooks given by Govindan et al. [38] on the future will provide ideas for the
research of this thesis.
2.1.2 Characteristics of reverse logistics network
Comparing forward to reverse logistics, the general assumption that moving parts from A to B
is similar to moving them from B to A is more true if the collection is outsourced to a third-
party logistics service provider. Small differences between distribution and collection as well as
inbound and outbound transport may be observed. Taking back end-of-life returns is less time-
critical than new product deliveries and thus leaves more time for optimisation of vehicle routes
and full truck shipments. Depending on the collection network, a great number of stops per
tour may occur in reverse channels as the number of simultaneous sources is much smaller than
the number of demand locations in forward channels. As the differences seem rather limited,
the challenge of a combination of both channels arises [27].
Various approaches lead from complete integration to total separation. Even in a closed-loop
environment different volumes, different timing and different requirements of handling are ar-
guments towards a separation of forward and reverse transport. Additionally, vehicle loading
restrictions of rear-loaded trucks that require first-in-first-out load access may lead to delivery
and collection stops that cannot be mixed. Therefore, expected benefits of combination may be
traded off against investment in specialised vehicles. Due to these reasons, this thesis focuses on
the transport of returns. Nevertheless, the question whether to integrate reverse logistics into
the design phase of a closed-loop supply chain or extend the existing forward supply chain after
the implementation will be addressed in the following paragraphs [27].
Over time, the definition of reverse logistics has been changing. In the beginning, the meaning
simply expressed going the other way. An emphasis of the environmental aspect followed with
the definition of the Council of Logistics Management [15, p. 4] in 1992 as “the term often
used to refer to the role of logistics in recycling, waste disposal, and management of hazardous
materials; a broader perspective includes all relating to logistics activities carried out in source
reduction, recycling, substitution, re-use of materials and disposal.” Afterwards the focus on
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direction was introduced again. With the overall goal and the processes of RL pointed out, RL
was defined according to Rogers et al. [70, p. 2] as “the process of planning, implementing, and
controlling the efficient, cost effective flow of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods
and related information from the point of consumption to the point of origin for the purpose
of recapturing value or proper disposal”. Finally, leading to today’s definition that keeps the
essence of the definition of Rogers et al. [70] without specifying on a point of consumption or
origin to give it a wider scope [15].
In 1997, Fleischmann et al. [31] reviewed the first developments in the topic of reverse logistics
from a quantitative point of view. The motivation for recovery can be ecologically as mainly
found in European countries but also economically as in the US’ focus. The concept of sustain-
ability tries to combine these motivations. The first category deals with distribution planning
aspects that describe the collection and transport from customers back to the manufacturer.
Therefore, this category is the most applicable to give a background to this research. Inventory
management and manufacturing management create the second and the third category. For the
distribution of returns in the forward channel, a separate reverse channel or a combination of
both channels can be used. The actors of the reverse channel have to be identified, the func-
tions have to be described and the relation between the forward and the reverse channel has
to be taken into consideration to determine the best option. An integration of forward and
reverse channels was still a direction for future research at that point in time. Although some
approaches towards this direction had been made already in the network design stage.
The paper by Kroon et al. [51] promotes a separate modelling of reverse flows. The practical
application considered in this paper is the re-use of secondary packaging material. Methods
to create a return logistics network for returnable containers is created and applied to a case
study. Therefore, a first quantitative model to plan a reverse logistics network is presented.
The system is simulated at first, followed by an optimisation approach. The dependence of the
system’s success on economic implications is emphasised especially as some investments have to
be made.
The Reverse Logistics Executive Council [70] examined practices and determined trends of re-
verse logistics by companies about their RL. Not only the return of products but also the return
of packaging is analysed. The activities examined are the process of collecting end-of-use prod-
ucts from the customer and choose from a variety of options such as re-sell, re-manufacture or
recycle according to the condition of the product. For packaging, there are the options of re-use
and salvage amongst others. The most important question is how to get the returns from the
customer to the facility. Recognizing the strategic potential of reverse logistics is a future trend.
However, there are many problems specific to reverse logistics like the lengthy cycle times for
processing. Approaches to overcome these difficulties are standardising processes, outsourcing
to a third-party with expertise as well as a combination of different strategies to handle returns.
Dowlatshahi [17] identifies five streams of research in a review on the topic. The first group
of papers focuses on global concepts of reverse logistics. Important factors that are identified
are the compatibility of current manufacturing and re-manufacturing processes, an analysis
of the cost and benefits of recovery, a bill-of-material that is restructured according to the
new requirements, the effective management of organisational procedures of RL, an integration
of transportation modes and a thought-through packaging for RL. Quantitative models are
addressed in the second group of articles. Papers dealing with transport, warehousing and
distribution are grouped together to describe a third stream. Company profiles form the forth
group. The fifth group concentrates on applications for RL. In conclusion, most of the articles
are practitioner-orientated and lack in describing the basic structure of a reverse logistics system.
Reverse logistics creates a link between the supply of returns and the demand for re-usable
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 Chapter 2. The current state of scientific knowledge
products. This link includes the collection, the testing and sorting, the re-manufacturing and the
redistribution. A closed-loop network may evolve from the coincidence of two market interfaces
for used and re-usable products [30]. But how does the reverse channel differ in detail from the
traditional forward channel?
According to Tibben-Lembke et al. [87] reverse logistic flows are more difficult to forecast than
forward flows. However, trends that are applicable to forward flows can also be used for reverse
flows to some extend. Therefore, information based on forward supply chains benefits reverse
supply chains as well. Instead of a one-to-many distribution, RL has to deal with a many-to-one
distribution for the various actors involved. A combination of forward and reverse flows should
be taken into consideration to make use of the full capacity of a truck. While products and
packaging are of uniform quality in forward supply chains, they may vary significantly in the
reverse channel. Additionally, the importance of time is another difference. However, whether a
return is time-critical or not is determined by the product itself. These factors amongst others
highlight the differences between forward and reverse logistics. Especially the enormous cost of
collection and transport is a major obstacle in RL. A group of businesses take ownership of the
returns. After the collection from the customer different actors sell the products back to the
manufacturer. Depending on the channel members’ abilities to recover the returns, the reverse
logistics network can take on different structures [23].
Strategic decisions on the choice of collection, the operating facilities and the transport links
need to be taken. In contrast to traditional forward logistics, the factors of supply uncertainty
and interdependence between forward and reverse flows are fundamental to RL. Not the demand
of new products but the supply of used products is the main unknown in RL. The returns form
a less standardised input than raw materials or component supplies. The major challenge lies
in effectively matching this supply to the demand for used products that directly influences
manufacturing cost. Incorporating the synergy effects of forward and reverse flows is a great
potential in the creation of closed-loop supply chains. An opportunity to attain economies of
scale is the transport as distribution of products can be combined with collection of returns to
reduce empty truck rides. However, closed-loop supply chains are generally realised by sequen-
tially adding reverse channels to the existing distribution structure. This approach might raise
compatibility issues. Therefore, it should be evaluated whether to redesign the entire closed-loop
supply chain network or not to achieve optimal performance.
The comparison realised by Fleischmann et al. [30] between the two-stage approach of designing
the forward and the reverse network sequentially and the integral design of optimising both parts
of the network simultaneously reveals that the integral approach leads to a completely different
network structure. Nevertheless, the cost of both approaches are almost similar in the numerical
example that was carried out to compare the two cases. Even changes in the set of parameters
lead to similar results. The fact that in terms of volumes and cost the forward supply chain
outweighs the reverse channel explains this outcome. That is why, the overall optimal solution
is close to an optimal solution of the forward channel. From a business perspective this means
that including a reverse channel does not necessarily mean redesigning the existing logistics
network fundamentally. The integration of a reverse channel becomes less complex, hence easier
to implement into the organisational structures and less costly. Only if the reverse supply chain
has a major impact on the supply of material, the existing supply chain might move towards the
reverse flows. Additionally, differences in labour cost might change the overall logistics network
as new products are substituted by re-manufactured ones with different cost drivers.
At the moment, the choice of the strategy of collection is further examined. There are two
collection strategies as pointed out by Aras et al. [1]. On the one hand, in the pick-up strategy
products are directly collected from the customers. On the other hand, the customers undertake
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the travel effort to bring their returns to a collection point in the drop-off strategy. The fixed
cost associated with operating a facility and the variable cost for collection and transport must
be carefully assessed to choose the strategy that is most suitable. Additionally, the metrics of
the goods as well as their nature has to be taken into consideration. In the drop-off system, the
incentive for the customer needs to be high enough to enhance the customer to travel to the next
collection point. Thereby, the customer creates a reverse logistics network. Nevertheless, both
strategies of collection have to answer the question of the cost of collection that originates from
shipping the used product from the customers to the recovery facility. With direct collection,
the costs and influencing parameters can be observed. In indirect collection the cost has to be
incorporated into the customers incentive, thus making an investigation on the logistics network
difficult. That is why, this thesis will focus on the strategy of directly collecting used products
from customers through different reverse logistics channels.
2.2 Theory of games
“Game Theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation
between intelligent rational decision-makers” according to Myerson [56, p. 1]. Choices made
by individuals within a group can affect the entire group of people. Game theory thus focuses
on the interdependence between the individuals. It provides a tool to analyse the interactions
between strategically acting agents [18]. The study of conflict uses abstract common strategic
features to analyse theoretical models. The field of research is given the name “Game Theory”,
since the patterns that are applied originate from actual games such as poker [49].
A pioneering analysis of imperfectly competitive markets is the publication of Cournot in 1838.
Cournot studied the problem of companies in a market competing simultaneously over the
amount of output to be produced. The model is defined by the number of decision-makers in-
volved in the competition. The generalisation of this model deals with a small number of sellers
dominating a market called oligopoly for which Cournot developed a method of analysis. In
1913, the development was followed by Zermelo who looked into the game of chess. Zermelo
stated that one of the two players playing chess has a winning strategy from any position on
the board. That is why, chess has always a solution. In addition, the procedure of backward
induction was introduced by Zermelo. Borel followed by actually defining the games of strategy
for the first time in 1921. However, the publication “Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele” of
the mathematician Von Neumann [63] that investigates on an approach to achieve optimal re-
sults playing parlour games in 1928 and the subsequent book “Theory of Games and Economic
Behaviour” [91], released in collaboration with economist Morgenstern in 1944, mark the begin-
ning of the interdisciplinary field of game theory. For the first time, the mathematical theory
of games of strategy was applied in economics. The formalisation of the concept of a game as
well as three other important contributions were made. The first one is the expected-utility
maximisation theorem based on axioms. This was followed by an optimal solution of two-player
zero-sum games. In a zero-sum game one player’s gain is the other players loss. Therefore,
the zero-sum game is used as a foundation of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s mathematical
analyses. Extending this analysis further leads to the introduction of cooperative games. This
extension is the final contribution, yet only acts as a starting point in the analysis of cooperative
games in general [18].
In 1950, Nash [58] introduced his concept of equilibrium in non-cooperative games. The idea of
a Nash equilibrium results from every player acting on the correct assumptions of the opponent’s
action. Therefore, strategy choice depends on the behaviour of the opponent. If no player has
an incentive to change the choice of action, the game is in equilibrium. Given this strategy
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choice background, the Nash equilibrium approach advanced the analysis of games from a focus
on zero-sum games to non-zero-sum games. Additionally, Selten [75, 76, 77] generalised the
Nash equilibrium approach to dynamic games in 1965 and 1975. In Selten’s paper from 1967,
he deals with the problem that changes in pricing do not necessarily result in time synchronised
reactions in demand. Reactions might be delayed, since the market position of a company
does influence the demand for a product in the same way. Therefore, the present actions of a
player become increasingly important for future consequences. Taking these conclusions into
consideration, the paper from 1975 re-exams the definition of a perfect equilibrium point from a
general point of view to a subgame perfect equilibrium perspective. Furthermore, from 1967
to 1968, Harsanyi [44, 45, 46] applied the Nash equilibrium approach to settings in which
players have incomplete information about the opponents’ preferences or choices. The first
part of Harsanyi’s deliberations describes a basic model in which players are uncertain about
the payoff functions of the opponents. The idea of a Nash equilibrium is then transferred to the
newly described situation. Finally, the third part of the article investigates on the probability
distributions over the alternative possibilities of the uncertainties. Game theory moved another
step further towards formulation of real-world problems with this more realistic underlying
assumption of incomplete information [18].
Generally, there are two basic assumptions about the players of a game. The first one is that
players are rational and the second one is that players are intelligent. If a player constantly makes
decisions in pursuit of the own objectives, the player acts rational. The assumed objective of
each player is the maximisation of the expected value of profit measured in some utility scale.
Building on fundamental results of decision theory with an extension to several assumptions, Von
Neumann and Morgenstern developed the Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem. According to
Myerson [56, p. 3] the key assumption is that “if a decision-maker would prefer option one
over option two when event A occurs, and he would prefer option one over option two when
event A does not occur, then he should prefer option one over option two even before he learns
whether event A will occur or not”. The theorem states that under certain weak consistency
axioms of rational behaviour there exists a way to assign utility numbers to various possible
outcomes in to choose the option that maximises a player’s expected utility. As utility values
do not need to be measured in a currency, maximising the expected utility payoff has not
necessarily monetary value. Problems of the interaction between rational decision-makers must
be analysed simultaneously, since the rational solution of an individual’s problem can only be
solved by taking the solution of the other individual’s problem into consideration. If a player
knows everything about a game and can make inferences about the situation of the opponents,
the player is considered to be intelligent. Therefore, each player in the game needs to understand
the theory that describes the behaviour of intelligent players in a certain game and must make
predictions about it [56].
The analysis of games has two goals. The first one is the description of the competitive situation.
The second goal lies in advising the players on the best way of playing a game [55]. Thereby,
different solution concepts are presented to the arising conflict. Both goals will be described
next to be addressed in the analysis of the situation of conflict modelled in this thesis.
The analysis of a game begins with the specification of a model that describes the situation of
conflict. With increasing levels of abstraction the extensive and the strategic (or normal) form
are the most important representations of a game.
The extensive form of a game is a literal translation of the rules, thus forming the first level of
abstraction [49]. The rules of a game specifies the group of players, the actions and alternatives
available to each player, the order in which each actor gets to play and the gain or loss derived
by the player’s choice of action [18].
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The definition of the extensive form introduced by Kuhn [52] is now a standard in most of the
game theory literature and defines a general n-person game Γe in extensive form as a game tree
K with the subsequent specifications.
1. The player partition P refers to dividing the moves up into n+1 indexed sets P0, P1, . . . , Pn.
The moves in P0 are called chance moves, whereas the moves in Pi are called personal moves
of player i for i = 1, . . . , n.
2. The information partition is defined by a separation of the moves into sets U which is a
refinement of the player and alternative partitions (each U is part of Pi ∩ Aj for some i
and j) such that no U contains two moves in the same play. The sets of the information
partition are called information sets.
3. For each U ⊂ P0 ∩ Aj a probability distribution over 1, . . . , j is introduced, assigning a
positive probability to p. These information sets are assumed to be of one element.
4. The payoff function h assigns a n-tuple of real numbers h(W ) = [h1(W ), . . . , hn(W )] to
each play W .
It can be effectively used to translate a verbal description into a game, since the extensive
form is a pictorial representation of the rules. It has the form of a game tree that is made
up of a root and branches resembling the players, the choice of actions and the payoffs. The
combination of one pure strategy from each player’s list leads to the strategic or normal form
of a game. Especially with two-player games, a game can be represented as a matrix. This
representation is conceptually simpler and thus more convenient for the purpose of mathematical
analysis. However, most real-world problems deal with more than two players and can involve
mixed instead of pure strategies assigning probabilities to certain outcomes. The strategic form
provides a general description to enable the analysis of these games. The specification of the set
of players, the set of options per player and the link between a player’s payoff and the options
the players may chose from is needed to define a game in strategic form [18, 49].
According to Myerson [56] a game in strategic form is a general n-person game Γs of the form
Γs = (N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) , (2.1)
where N is the set of players in the game Γs. For each player i ∈ N , Ai is the set of all available
strategies to the player. That means each player i must choose one of the strategies in the set
Ai when the strategic form game Γs is played. A combination of strategies that the players in N
might choose is a strategy profile. The number Ui represents the expected utility payoff for any
strategy profile a = {aj}j∈N in A that player i would get if a was the combination of strategies
that had been played.
In contrast to the extensive form, the strategic form is a static approach to model a game. It is
assumed that all players choose their strategies simultaneously and that the question of timing
is being ignored. However, with repeated games for example, each repetition can be presented
as a play of the game in strategic form. Additionally, more alternative actions can be added to
the strategic form of a game, if for example pre-game communication between players becomes
available. Therefore, the strategic from will be used to analyse conflict situation between the
players in the course of the thesis [56].
So far the players with their payoffs as the gains and losses that can be attained by choosing
an action have been explained, now the focus falls on the strategies. At each decision point, a
player must make a choice. Thus, the strategy of a player determines what to do. A decision
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based exactly on one action is called pure strategy. Mixed strategies, on the other hand, are
a probability distribution over pure strategies. Regulated by chance, a player might decide
between pure strategies to make a game solvable. Therefore, the mixed strategy for a player is
a probability vector [18, 49].
All games are classified by the sum payments the players receive at the end of a game. No
manufacturing or destruction of goods is involved. If the sum of all payments is zero, the type of
game is called zero-sum game providing a general understanding of a game. However, the sum
of all payments is generally not zero or sometimes not even constant in economically significant
schemes. Therefore, this type of game, that will also be described in this thesis, is referred to
as a non-zero-sum game [91].
The thesis deals with different actors that compete over carrying out the collection of used
products from the customer to the recovery facility. Therefore, the game will be described in
strategic form. The rate of collection can take on many different levels, hence the players do not
only decide between “collection” or “no collection”, but can set the rate of collection according
to each player’s needs. Finally, as in most economic situations, the sum of payoffs will not
equal zero. The profit made by collecting returns will determine the outcome of the n-player
non-zero-sum game. The following subsections are dedicated to solution concepts for these types
of games, since the game can exclude or include cooperation amongst players.
2.2.1 Non-cooperative games
Zero-sum games are always non-cooperative, since cooperation does not benefit any of the play-
ers. Therefore, the element of cooperation is not present in zero-sum games. In contrast, the
possibility to cooperate with any or all of the opponents is present in non-zero-sum games.
Nevertheless, if both players make their decisions independently and simultaneously before each
play, a non-zero-sum game can also be non-cooperative. Without cooperation, pre-play commu-
nication is forbidden and payoffs are distributed amongst all players according to the predefined
rules of the game. Examples for non-cooperative games are bitter rivals in a business com-
petition or large companies in a market competition with antitrust legislation restricting any
cooperation [49, 55, 85].
The solution concepts for non-cooperative non-zero-sum games differ slightly. Zero-sum games
and non-cooperative non-zero-sum games are similar as both incorporate the aims to maximise
the security level and tend towards strategies that result in equilibrium. However, especially the
fact that non-zero-sum games can have more than one equilibrium point, requires an extension
of the concepts solving non-cooperative non-zero-sum games. Therefore, these solution concepts
will be analysed carefully next [85].
The well-known prisoner’s dilemma introduced by Tucker [88] is used as an example to explain
the characteristics of non-cooperative non-zero-sum games. Two men held separately by the
police are suspected of a joint violation of law. The district attorney believes that these two men
committed an armed robbery that he has been unable to clear up so far. However, his suspicions
are not proven adequately by the evidence. Therefore, the district attorney approaches each
suspect to confess and give evidence against each other. He states that if one confesses and the
other one rejects, the former will be rewarded with zero years in prison and the latter will be
charged with six years. The two prisoners know that if both of them confess, they will serve five
years in prison and if both of them deny, the robbery charge will be dropped but each of them
will get one year in prison for carrying a concealed weapon.
Generally, the normal form of a two-person game can be represented by a matrix of pairs.
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Each entry of the bi-matrix is an ordered pair of numbers. The payoffs of Player 1 (P1) and
Player 2 (P2) are the numbers of the ordered pairs. P1 is referred to as the row player, while P2
plays the columns. The situation of the prisoner’s dilemma translates to the following bimatrix
of a two-person game.
Player 1
Confess Defect
Player 2
Confess (5, 5) (0, 6)
Defect (6, 0) (1, 1)
For each prisoner the pure strategy “confess” clearly dominates the pure strategy “defect”. A
strategy pair is in equilibrium if none of the players can gain by deviating from this particular
strategy as long as the strategy of the opponent remains fixed. Therefore, a unique equilibrium
point is given by the pure strategy “confess”. Individual rationality implies that both players
should confess the crime. Any deviation from this strategy might result in a six year sentence,
while the partner gets released immediately. However, both prisoners would be better off, if
they would deny simultaneously. The payoff pair (1, 1) dominates the payoff pair (5, 5) from the
viewpoint of collective rationality. Whether to trust the other player or not is the dilemma of
this game. That is why, the way the game is played depends on whether a player operates on
individual or collective rationality [18, 49].
Games with pure strategies are solvable through determining the dominant strategies. A pes-
simistic estimate of how much a player can attain can be computed with the help of the “maximin
value” in games with pure and mixed strategies. In a two-person game, the maximin value v1
for player P1 is calculated under the assumption that player P2 will make a choice trying to
minimise P1’s payoff pi1. With the probability vector p as P1’s mixed strategy and q as the
mixed strategy of P2, the maximin value v1 of P1 is computed by
v1 = max minpi1(p, q). (2.2)
In the case of a non-zero sum game, player P2 rather tries to maximise the own payoff. Hence
the action chosen might not be the one that minimises P1’s payoff. However, the procedure
puts a lower bound or security level on P1’s payoff and is easy to calculate as P1’s payoff matrix
is regarded as a zero-sum game. If P2 minimises P1’s payoff, P2 would try to maximise the
negatives of those payoffs and thus acts as the column player of the game. After eliminating
dominated rows and columns, this procedure easily reveals an optimal strategy for P1. Besides,
P2’s maximin value v2 can be computed by solving the game of the transposed matrix that
carries the negative entries of the original matrix game [55].
In general, computing equilibrium pairs is rather difficult. A payoff pair is in equilibrium, if
no player has an incentive to change the action based on the correct assumption about the
opponent’s behaviour. In non-cooperative two-person non-zero-sum games, the pair of mixed
strategies p1 and q1 is in equilibrium given that
pi1(p, q1) ≤ pi1(p1, q1) ∀ p for player P1
pi2(p1, q) ≤ pi2(p1, q1) ∀ q for player P2 .
(2.3)
In addition, there exists a graphical method that is yet only applicable for two-person games in
which the players only have two pure strategies [55].
A non-cooperative payoff region takes all possible pairs of mixed strategies of a two-person game
into consideration. The responding payoffs pairs can be plotted in a Cartesian coordinate system
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with pi1 as the horizontal and pi2 as the vertical axis. Thereby, the dominance between payoff
pairs can be read from such a plot as the dominating payoff pair is north-east of the dominated
pair. A payoff pair (u, v) dominates another payoff pair (u′, v′) given that u ≥ u′ and v ≥ v′. A
payoff pair that is not dominated by any other pair is Pareto optimal.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, the payoff pair (5, 5) is not Pareto optimal since it is dominated by
(1, 1). However, the equilibrium pair is where both players confess the crime. If equilibrium
pairs are interchangeable and equivalent a game is solvable in the Nash sense. As the prisoner’s
dilemma only has one equilibrium pair it is solvable in the Nash sense. The Nash equilibrium is
one of the widely used solution concepts in non-cooperative game theory [55].
There is a great range of situations of conflict that are similar to the prisoner’s dilemma. The
situation of conflict in this thesis will also be modelled as a non-cooperative game. The common
features of these games are that players would do well if they would cooperate, but neither player
trusts each other. If only one player cooperates and the opponent does not, the cooperator does
badly and the defector benefits from choosing the non-cooperative strategy. So far the prisoner’s
dilemma was only played once. What would happen if the game was played repeatedly? Is it
more likely for cooperation to arise in repeated games?
2.2.2 Games with cooperation
In non-cooperative non-zero-sum games, the value of a game may differ for a player, since
the player might obtain different payoffs for different equilibria. Therefore, each player can
have a preferred equilibrium. However, the choice of equilibrium of one player might have
consequences for all other players. Therefore, the possibility to harmonise the decisions of
the players arises, especially if a game is played repeatedly. This other type of non-zero-sum
game is a game with cooperation amongst the players. Before the game starts, the players are
allowed to make binding agreements on how to play during the game. The strategies can be
coordinated to increase payoffs, hence players decide whether to take part in a coalition or not.
Another agreement specifies how players divide the jointly acquired payoffs among members of
a coalition. These agreements should induce other players to join a coalition. If the payoffs are
non-transferable, side-payments in form of monetary units are a feasible alternative. Especially
pre-play communication provides agreements on the coordination of strategies and the sharing
of payoffs [49, 55].
If games are played repeatedly, players might behave differently towards their opponents then
when a game is only played once. Collective rationality becomes more likely to operate. In a
repeated game, there is a finite or infinite sequence of rounds in which players get information
and make their decisions. A player needs to take the effects of the current move in the future and
the information about the other players into consideration, since no move is necessarily the last
one. Therefore, the previous stage of a game can be used to determine the move of the player
in the following stage, since the repeated encounters give players the opportunity to cooperate.
Reputations can be developed by players in repeated games. Additionally, threats can be used
to influence the action of other players in case of dependency [54, 56].
Every repeated game consists of a component game, the stage game G, that is repeated a number
of times T . A finitely repeated game has a fixed end T , whereas an infinitely repeated game
does not. In strategic form, the stage game G = (N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) includes N as the set of
players, the set of strategies Ai available to player i and the payoff functions ui [18, 50].
The prisoner’s dilemma is analysed exemplary to explain the dynamics of repeated games. The
choice to either “confess” (C) or “defect” (D) is taken by the prisoners simultaneously. If the
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game is repeated once, the choices are revealed and the prisoners have to make another decision.
The payoffs are computed by the sum of the payoffs in both stages of the game.
The finitely repeated game used in the first example has five subgames described by four round-
two interactions. Within each subgame of the original game, the subgame perfect equilibrium
strategies must locate a pair of actions that form a Nash equilibrium. That is why, each player’s
strategy must specify the action (C) in round two, if we look at the second game through
backward induction. In round one there are only two strategies to play, either choose (C) or (D)
respectively, followed by no matter what but (C) in the second stage. Choosing between these
two actions is as if the players would only play the game once. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium
of the first example is (C,C). Due to the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies, the players will
always choose (C,C) if the prisoner’s dilemma is only repeated once.
The second example works with a slightly modified version of the prisoner’s dilemma. Assuming
the prisoners had the opportunity to communicate. Therefore, a third strategy, the strategy to
partly confess denoted trough (P), arises. The stage game G is played T times allowing every
player to take one of the three actions (C), (D) and (P) in every round. After each stage game
the choices are revealed to the prisoners and they get to make a new decision for the next round.
The sum of the payoffs gained in every stage game G forms the payoff per player.
The players continue making their decisions according to the rules of prisoner’s dilemma, but
the game is repeated an unlimited number of times in the third example. The game is referred
to as the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, since it has no fixed end. The probability that
the same players play the stage game again is expressed through δ and the probability that the
current game is the last one is denoted by the normalisation factor (1 − δ). At the t-th stage
every player i gets a payoff piit. The chance that the t-th stage of the game ever gets played is
δt. Therefore, the expected payoff at the t-th stage is δtpiit. The total expected payoff is the
sum of the expected payoffs per stage game.
In conclusion, the number of repetitions of a stage game G can either be finite or infinite. The
total payoff of a finitely repeated game is computed as the sum of payoffs at every stage, whereas
the total payoff of a infinitely repeated game is worked out by summing up the discounted
expected payoffs. Players start to take long-term gains in addition to short-term payoffs into
consideration. Players might even be willing to sacrifice short-term gains, if a player is convinced
that the action will result in a reciprocal reward in the future. Hence, these developments induce
the communication and maybe even cooperation between different decision-makers [18].
If expected payoffs can be increased by a correlated or jointly randomized strategy the players
might want to communicate with each other and coordinate their moves. The players might even
introduce contractual agreements to transform a game. A contract of the undersigned promising
that player P1 chooses action one and player P2 chooses action two, if the contract is signed
by both players or that player P1 chooses action three or four if the contract is only signed by
player P1. This is an example of contractual agreement. Another example is the specification of
a contract that, if signed by both players, a coin will be tossed to determine the implementation
of the player’s actions. The great variety of bargaining and signing contracts as explicit options
in a strategic-form game would make the list of actions unmanageably complicated. Solution
concepts that express the impact of implicit communication opportunities can be added to the
strategic options to facilitate the illustration of possible agreements between the players [56].
In two-person cooperative non-zero sum games, binding agreements are made before the game
begins. The players choose a joint strategy to increase the individual payoff, but do not share
payoffs or side-payments amongst each other. The nature of the games restricts the sharing
of payoffs. In the prisoner’s dilemma for example, each suspect has to serve his own sentence.
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The joint strategy of the prisoner’s dilemma would be to make a binding agreement on denying
together. The joint strategy assigns a probability to each pair of pure strategies. In comparing
the cooperative payoff region to the non-cooperative, a larger set becomes available to the
players. Hence, more payoff pairs become obtainable to players that cooperate. A cooperative
payoff region is always a convex set that is closed when plotted in a Cartesian coordinate system.
Each player considers the payoff from the joint strategy to be at least as high as the payoff from
the maximin value to make an agreement on which joint strategy to apply. In addition, the
joint strategy should be Pareto optimal. Therefore, the bargaining set of a cooperative game
contains the Pareto optimal pairs (u, v) such that
u ≤ v1 and v ≤ v2 , (2.4)
where the maximin values of P1 is v1 and v2 denotes the maximin value of P2 [55].
A bargaining situation between two actors evolves if both individuals have the opportunity to
cooperate, although only one player might actually gain from the cooperation. Examples for
such situations are state trading between two nations or negotiations between an employer and
a labour union. The bargaining model introduced by Nash [57] attempts to establish a fair
method of choosing a payoff pair in the bargaining set. Presented with a payoff region R and a
status quo point (u0, v0) ∈ R the arbitration procedure Ψ produces a payoff pair, the so-called
arbitration pair, that is fair to both players. The six axioms of individual rationality, Pareto
optimality, feasibility, independence of irrelevant alternatives, invariance with respect to utility
transformations and symmetry need to be satisfied. The arbitration procedure Ψ can be divided
into three sub-processes. Firstly, for a given pair of threats the players agree to an outcome
that satisfies the six axioms. The payoff region is described by the player’s payoffs. Each player
computes the maximin values resulting in the status quo point. The threat strategy leading
to the status quo point is chosen next. Therefore, the payoffs that satisfy the six axioms are
determined in the third and last step. The arbitration pair is among the payoff regions’ points
that dominate the status quo point. Finally, the maximum of the function on this line segment
determines the arbitration point [49, 55].
What if players are able to fully cooperate amongst each other resulting in a share of payoffs?
Then coalitions of players cannot only make binding agreements on the coordination of strategies
but also on pooling the individual payoffs and redistributing the total of payoffs in a specific
way. The set of players do not necessarily have to be greater than two. However, in the case
of a two-person game this analysis may be trivial. The theory on cooperation in games can be
applied to non-zero-sum as well as zero-sum games.
A coalition is a subset of the set of players that forms to agree on coordination and division
of payoffs. The set consisting of all players N is denoted by P and called the grand coalition.
The counter-coalition of a given coalition S ⊆ P is Sc = P −S. Hence, the counter-coalition to
P is the empty coalition Ø. In a game with N players, generally 2N coalitions can form. The
questions that arise from the possibility of cooperation deals with which coalitions are likely
to form and on how to divide the payoff amongst the members of the coalition. The game
can be analysed as a two-player non-cooperative game, since it is a competition between the
coalition S and the counter-coalition Sc. Even with the formation of the grand coalition and the
empty coalition, this is applicable. This abstraction does not only simplify the description of
the situation of conflict, but also facilitates the analysis. The members of each coalition would
choose a joint strategy that allows them to gain at least the maximin value. Therefore, the
characteristic function form denoted by v(S) consist of the maximin value of the coalition S.
The largest payoff that all players can achieve is the characteristic function form of the grand
coalition with the value of v(P) = 1. By definition, the value of the characteristic function
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form of the empty coalition is v(Ø) = 0. In general, a game in characteristic function form
must consist of all players P, defined for all subsets so that v(Ø) is empty and superadditivity
holds that describes the gain from cooperation. With the help of these definitions, the relative
strength of a coalition can be estimated [55].
How should the payoffs be divided amongst all members of a coalition? An imputation is a
possible distribution of the payoffs available. Two solution concepts are widely discussed. The
first one is a stable method named the Core and the second one is the Shapley value that is a
fair method of payoff division.
The Core holds all imputations that are not dominated by any other imputation through any
other coalition. Problems with the Core are that most of the time it is either empty or has so
many imputation that it becomes difficult to evaluate which ones are likely to occur. Therefore,
the solution concept of the Shapley value is described in detail.
The concept introduced by Shapley [78] takes the player’s contribution to the success of the
coalition into account. If S is the coalition a player belongs to and the characteristic function
of the game is denoted by v, then the measure of the amount that Pi has contributed by joining
S is expressed by
δ(Pi,S) = v(S)− v(S − {Pi}). (2.5)
It is assumed that the grand coalition forms, since the players collectively agree on an imputation.
The process of formation starts with one player being joined by a second player, they are later
joined by a third player and so on. An ordered list of players with the k-th player in the list being
the k-th player to join characterises this process. Various orders are possible. In general, there
are N ! possibilities, since the order is assumed to happen at random. Therefore, a probability of
1
N ! is assigned to each of the possibilities. A general definition of the Shapley value φi for Pi is to
make the same sort of calculations for every possible order of players. Thereafter, each player is
weighted by the probability 1N ! of the order that occurs. Finally, the results are summed up and
each player gets a payoff reflecting the amount of contribution. There are (N−k)! permutations
of players coming after Pi and (k − 1)! permutations coming before. The number of players in
coalition S is denoted by |S| together with the ordering and the contribution per player resulting
in the Shapley value φi calculated by
φi =
∑
Pi∈S
(N − |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
N !
δ(Pi,S). (2.6)
The Shapley vector for v is an imputation and thus serves as a feasible tool for further analy-
sis [55].
This thesis will describe a non-cooperative as well as a cooperative model of a situation of conflict.
The first attempts to combine the theory of games with reverse logistics will be analysed next.
2.3 Game theory approaches in reverse logistics
Closely related to the research of this thesis are three papers that focus on the evaluation of
different reverse channel structures from a manufacturer’s point of view towards an overall profit
optimisation. The papers combine the field of research on reverse logistics with game theoretical
approaches. That is why, in the following section these papers are presented and their limitations
are pointed out.
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2.3.1 Closed-loop supply chain models with product manufacturing
Savaskan et al. [73] focus on the manufacturer’s problem of choosing an optimal reverse chan-
nel structure to supply returns for the re-manufacturing process that are incorporated in the
plant to lower manufacturing cost. After the manufacturer distributes the products through
a retailer network to the costumer, three different decentralised options of collecting the used
products involving the manufacturer (M), a retailer (R) and a third-party (3P) as reverse lo-
gistics channel members are investigated. The three reverse channel structures are illustrated
in Figure 2.2. The channel members of the structures are modelled as decentralised decision-
makers with the manufacturer acting as the Stackelberg leader by taking the first decision on
the rate of collection [73].
Manufacturer
Retailer
Customer
(1) Model M
Manufacturer
Retailer
Customer
(2) Model R
Manufacturer
Retailer
Customer
Third-party
(3) Model 3P
Forward flow
Reverse flow
Figure 2.2: The three reverse channel options: Model M, Model R and Model 3P. Source: [73]
The first option is that the manufacturer collects the used products. Thereby, the manufacturer
decides on the return rate as well as wholesale price of the product to maximise the overall profit
of this supply chain model [73].
The retailer that sells the manufacturer’s products to the customer, additionally collects the
returns in the second option. By carrying out the collection effort the retailer decides on the
return rate and the retail price per product. The manufacturer has to pay a self-determined
transfer price per unit to buy the used product back, since the ownership of the used products
lies with the retailer after collection. The manufacturer uses the wholesale price to maximise
profits in this channel. With the retailer being the collecting agent, the marginal profitability
from a unit increase in demand is higher than through manufacturer collection, because the
purchase of a new product also contributes to retrieve the value of its return. Increased profits
can be obtained by an investment in the collection of used-products, since scale effects make a
larger market size more profitable or by an increase in demand through reduced retail prices
if savings are passed on to the retailer. It is beneficial to the manufacturer to pass on savings
to raise product demand and thereby increase profits instead of suffering from the problem of
double marginalisation by internalise unit cost savings directly. This model shows that for the
manufacturer and the retailer pricing decisions in the forward channel are influenced by the way
of sharing cost savings from the reverse channel. The final demand of the products also reflects
savings from re-manufacturing [73].
The third option is that the manufacturer subcontracts the collection of returns to a third-party
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logistics service provider and determines the transfer price that buys back the returns. Therefore,
the manufacturer distributes products through the retailer but neither of them takes part in the
collection effort. The third-party uses the value of the return rate to maximise profits. The
retailer decides on the retail price per product, since the retailer only takes part in the forward
channel. According to the first two options the manufacturer tries to maximise overall profits
by setting the wholesale price. The transfer price incentives the third-party directly to invest in
the collection of returns to increase profits. The manufacturer’s profit is at balance when both
equally share the savings. However, in this channel the transfer price can be seen as a direct
cost to the manufacturer [73].
Savaskan et al. [73] observed from their model that the closer a collecting agent is to the market,
the more efficient the collection of used products can be carried out. Hence, the manufacturer’s
overall channel profit is the greatest in the retailer collection, followed by the manufacturer being
the collecting agent and is the lowest with the third-party engaging in the collection. Through
decentralised collection the demand can be influenced more directly as in central collection.
Savaskan et al. [73] provide the idea of a simple two-part tariff between manufacturer and retailer
to further improve the profits of the decentralised retailer collection. Therefore, an increase in
the collection rate increases the variable part of the two-part tariff.
2.3.2 The case of competing retailers in reverse channel design
Depending on the product characteristics, the forward channel structure and the industry experi-
ence, the set up of the channel for collecting used products varies greatly. That is why, Savaskan
et al. [74] carried on with their research, trying to evaluate when a manufacturer would make
use of competing retailers for the collection of returns.
Savaskan et al. [74] formulate two decentralised closed-loop supply chain channel structures.
In the direct collection structure, the manufacturer distributes products via retailers, but col-
lects returns from the customers. The immediate effect of cost savings through product re-
manufacturing results in an increase in demand and a maximisation of the manufacturer’s profit.
In indirect collection, the manufacturer distributes and collects returns via two competing re-
tailers. In this channel a different set of factors influence profitability. Low retail prices due to
retailers competing over the collection activity increase demand and the manufacturer’s profit.
However, if the products of retailers are highly substitutable, the retailers compete more in-
tensely. That is why, the forward channel faces the problem of double marginalisation to a
smaller extend. This favours the direct collection structure from a manufacturer’s point of view.
The conclusions of Savaskan et al. [73] are extended to a competitive retailer environment. In
direct manufacturer-managed collection, cost savings through re-manufacturing drive invest-
ment in collection. Retailers prefer the direct option, since they benefit from lower wholesale
prices without having to invest. In indirect retailer-managed collection, on the other hand, the
manufacturer does not have to invest. Additionally, the manufacturer benefits from an increase
in sales volume as the retailers compete through a reduction of retail prices. The manufac-
turer prefers the indirect option, due to this interaction and especially if the retailers can make
independent pricing decisions while their products are not direct substitutes. However, if substi-
tutability of the products is high, direct collection is preferable again. Both, manufacturer and
retailer prefer the indirect channel structure if the proximity to the market has a cost advantage.
The manufacturer requires a lower cost advantage in this channel than the retailers. In the re-
verse channel, buy-back payments introduced to coordinate wholesale prices across retailers of
different market sizes benefit the manufacturer [74].
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2.3.3 How collection cost structure drives a manufacturer’s channel choice
Atasu et al. [3] extend the research of Savaskan et al. [73] by incorporating two components into
the collection cost. One component is the reverse logistics cost that is dependent on the volume
of returns and thereby reflects the effects of economies and diseconomies of scale. The other
component is the investment cost that captures the influence of the return rate analysed over
a broader set of parameter values than in Savaskan et al. [73]. Due to these extensions, Atasu
et al. [3] state that a manufacturer’s reverse channel should be shaped according to an analysis
of the collection cost structure. Additionally, the model is extended to differentiable new and
re-manufactured products.
Similarly to Savaskan et al. [73], the manufacturer sells products through a uncoordinated de-
centralised two-echelon supply chain made up of a manufacturer and a retailer in the forward
channel. In the reverse channel the collection is carried out by the collecting options of the
manufacturer, a retailer or a third-party [3].
By analysing the influence of the newly introduced components, there are different observations
for scenarios with economies and diseconomies of scale. Under economies of scale in the volume
of collection, a linear increase in revenue can be obtained. Hence, profit is convex increasing
with the volume of collection in the reverse channel. An optimal solution, in case that the
collecting agent finds collection for any quantity profitable, lies in choosing the largest volume
of collection or no collection. If the manufacturer manages collection, benefits from economies
of scale encourage the manufacturer to increase sales volumes. Unfortunately, lowering the
wholesale price to incentive the retailer to sell more is no powerful mechanism any more. The
same effect occurs with the collection being subcontracted to a third-party. Additionally, the
manufacturer has to share the profits from the reverse channel with the third-party making it the
least profitable channel option. If the retailer manages collection and achieves an optimal return
channel profits by collecting as many units as possible, the manufacturer can motivate the retailer
to sell more by increasing the transfer price. That is why, in economies of scale the manufacturer
yields the highest profits with retailer-managed collection. Under diseconomies of scale in the
volume of collection, the profits in the reverse channel increases with a decrease in collection
rate. In the retailer-managed option the manufacturer’s tool of increasing the transfer price only
leads to a moderate increase in sales and thus is less effective since it cannot compensate the
manufacturer’s reduced margin caused by raising the transfer price. The manufacturer would
carry out the collection and not pass them on to either the retailer or the third-party, since
the manufacturer receives the full benefit of re-manufacturing cost savings. The investment in
collection cost function performs basically in the same way as the economies of scale because
the average collection cost decreases as sales volumes increase with a rising collection rate.
Nevertheless, a distinction lies in the fact that this scale effect has to be strong enough to make
the retailer-managed option preferable over the manufacturer-managed reverse channel. In case
the investment cost coefficient becomes too high and thereby the absolute cost of collection is
too great, the manufacturer collection is an optimal choice. The third-party reverse channel is
always dominated by either retailer or manufacturer as it cannot pass on scale effects [3].
Atasu et al. [3] conclude that scale effects within either reverse logistics cost or investment cost
are the key to identify an optimal reverse channel choice for a manufacturer. The manufacturer
would prefer the retailer to collect returns in case of economies of scale in reverse logistics cost
as well as a sufficient scale effect in the investment cost that incentives the retailer to increase
sales volume. With diseconomies of scale and a weak scale effect in the investment cost the
manufacturer would choose to manage collections. Finally, the manufacturer would not prefer
the third-party-managed option in one of the analysed cases. That is why, the optimal choice
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depends on the three factors of whether there are economies or diseconomies of scale expressed
through a scale economies coefficient as well as the magnitude of reverse logistic cost denoted
by a reverse logistics cost coefficient and the investment cost described by an investment cost
coefficient.
2.3.4 Closed-loop supply chain models for a high-tech product
Chuang et al. [12] make use of a stochastic news vendor modelling framework to analyse a
short life cycle high-tech product facing an uncertain demand instead of focusing on a long
life cycle product that has a deterministic demand. Additionally, to overcome the tragedy
of the commons dilemma that states that manufacturers choose a low collection rate, since
re-manufactured products only sell at a low margin, they introduce a collection rate that is
exogenously mandated through take-back legislation.
The conclusions of the research are consistent with Savaskan et al. [73] and Atasu et al. [3] with
no difference in an endogenous or exogenous mandated collection rate. However, if there are
diseconomies of scale and a legislator imposes a collection rate that lies above the threshold
level exogenously, the manufacturer’s overall profit declines leading to a decrease in product
availability for customers. The threshold quantity in the retailer option is half the quantity
in the manufacturer collection. Secondly, asymmetric collection cost structures can turn the
favour towards the collecting agent, in this case either manufacturer or retailer, with the lowest
collection cost. The collection cost per agent can be asymmetric, due to differences in collection
technologies as expertise and networks amongst other factors. If the third-parties’ collection cost
is significantly low at an optimal order quantity, the manufacturer can choose the third-party
as an operating agent [12].
With economies of scale that can be achieved through a drop-off collection method for example,
the manufacturer’s optimal order quantity is the same for every decentralised collecting agent as
the manufacturer’s economic trade-off stays the same. In diseconomies of scale that might occur
with a pick-up collection method for example, the manufacturer’s optimal order quantity is lower
with the retailer carrying out the collection. The manufacturer’s marginal cost then is higher
with the retailer operating the reverse channel. The conclusions on the effect of economies and
diseconomies of scale on the manufacturer’s profit match the results of Savaskan et al. [73] and
Atasu et al. [3] even though they focus on long-life cycle products with deterministic demand [12].
In case where the collecting agent chooses the rate of collection endogenously, the return rates
of the manufacturer and the retailer are the same and both agents try to collect as many returns
as possible under economies of scale. Nevertheless, under diseconomies of scale the channel
choice depends on the profitability of the product. The tragedy of commons dilemma results
in the manufacturer choosing no or a very low collection rate within the manufacturer’s collect-
ing channel. Nevertheless, there are cases in which the return rate is exogenously mandated
through different forms of take-back legislation such as individual or collective manufacturer
responsibility, manufacturer- or customer-pay and manufacturer-run or state-run collection for
example [12].
2.4 Literature evaluation
The following section highlights the main focus of this project by drawing a conclusion from the
literature on the application of game theory on reverse logistics design decisions. It combines
the developments in research on closed-loop supply chain and game theory.
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Different approaches to deal with problems arising from the integration of reverse logistics to
create closed-loop supply chains have been applied. Game theory seems to be a promising
approach to analyse the various interdependences, since one of the major differences towards
traditional supply chains is the amount of individual decision-makers dealing with reverse flows.
Especially as game theory does not only provide solution concepts for non-cooperative conflict
situations but also allows to incorporate a cooperative point of view. Specifically the articles of
Savaskan et al. [73], Savaskan et al. [74], Atasu et al. [3] and Chuang et al. [12] develop the idea
of this application further.
Savaskan et al. [73] model a single-period game where the different channel members are de-
scribed through a single manufacturer, a single retailer and a single third-party collector monopoly
with the manufacturer having enough market power to act as a Stackelberg leader. The rate of
collection is endogenous mandated by the channel members. They assume perfect substitution
between new and re-manufactured long-life cycle products. The deterministic demand for these
products decreases linearly with price. Additionally, the collection cost structure is modelled
independent of the collecting agent and does not exhibit economies of scale as it increases linear.
By carrying on with their research to investigate the model in an environment of competing
retailers, Savaskan et al. [74] break up the assumption of a retailer’s monopoly. Besides this ex-
tension, the assumptions stay the same. The results attained in the earlier article that closeness
to the market is crucial to find an optimal reverse channel structure are supported by the new
conclusions [2].
Atasu et al. [3] extend the work of Savaskan et al. [73] by modelling a volume-dependent reverse
logistics cost under different operating environments. Therefore, the effects of economies and
diseconomies of scale are taken into account. The extension favours the collection through the
retailer’s channel, as scale effects can be passed on easily to the members of this channel. Besides,
similar results are attained by introducing differentiable products into the model. Nevertheless,
all three channel members still facing the same collection cost structure even though scales are
likely to tip in favour of the party with the lowest reverse logistic cost.
Even though Chuang et al. [12] focus on short-life cycle products with an exogenous mandated
collection rate their results are consistent with Savaskan et al. [73] and Atasu et al. [3]. Addi-
tionally, the influence of asymmetric reverse logistic costs due to differences per agent are briefly
discussed in the course of the paper.
All articles develop an analytical model to address the question of who should carry out the
collection of returned products. Even though most of the assumptions taken from the research
of Savaskan et al. [73] are validated and the following conclusions show consistency, the important
impact of reverse logistic cost individual to each of the collecting agent has not been analysed yet.
That is why, this thesis will focus on the impact of reverse logistics cost. The interactions between
the players will be simulated to generate cost that are as realistic as possible. Additionally,
the interrelations of the three independent decision-makers of manufacturer, retailer and third-
party that incorporate different reverse logistics costs will be analysed in a non-cooperative and a
cooperative model of the game. Reasons for cooperation can be either economic or laws imposed
by the legislative.
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A description of a game must include the elements of a set of individual decision-makers, the
possible actions available to each actor and the rules prescribing the game [54]. The finite
set of players in this model consists of the manufacturer (M), the retailer (R) and the third-
party logistics service provider (3P). The characteristics of each player will be described next,
resembling their network structures for collection and focusing on their maximisation intentions.
The game will then be solved playing for the level of collection rate. The manufacturer acts as
the Stackelberg leader having the greatest market power compared to the other two collecting
agents. Therefore, the manufacturer’s optimal collection rate is fulfilled first followed by the
retailer and the third-party as part of the rules of the game.
The game itself has to be characterised to apply the techniques of game theory to the competition
between the three independent decision-makers. The game classifies as a three-person game,
since it is made up of three different players. The possibility of collaboration between two
players increases as soon as a third player is added. That is why, the main focus of n-person
game theory lies in the dynamics of formation or disintegration of coalitions as well as the
corresponding payoffs [95]. Even though this game is modelled as a situation of conflict in
competing over the number of used products available for collection first, the players might
benefit from a collaboration as their interests are not of total conflict. Taking the cost structure
of the payoff function into account, the opportunity to lower product prices and increase demand
27
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is available through collecting as many returns as possible. Therefore, increasing the return rate
in the non-cooperative or cooperative version of the game can affect the overall profit of a channel
member in a positive way.
The question that will be addressed in this project is what reverse channel structure is best
for the collection of used products. This question will be answered from the decentralised view
of every player in the game. Besides testing the stability, different scenarios will be covered
to evaluate the results in various environments. Additionally, special attention will be given
to the manufacturer’s perspective as the manufacturer will most likely be confronted with the
responsibility for the recovery processes by legislation. If the manufacturer has to maximise the
amount of collection, which reverse channel should be chosen?
There are several assumptions that need to be made to enable the analysis of the game. These
assumptions will be explained in Section 3.1 to describe the market environment in which the
game takes place. The profit per returned unit is highly dependent on the cost of collection. This
cost of collection varies significantly among the players. The reverse logistics network of each
player is responsible for the collection of returns from customers and the transport to recovery
facilities. The network choice is the most crucial component of closed-loop supply chain design,
since transport cost influences the economic viability of product recovery to the largest extend.
The number of re-manufactured products and the correlating profits are determined by the
quantity of collected products [1, 30]. That is why, the collection structure of each player will be
detailed in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 the corresponding payoff functions will be introduced and
the influences of the cost of collection will be pointed out. In conclusion of the methodology, the
game is solved for a benchmark scenario in Section 3.4 to illustrate the competitive situation of
a non-cooperative game.
3.1 Market mechanisms
In this section the assumptions that are applied to characterise the market mechanisms are
presented. These mechanisms help to focus on the main conclusions of the study. As the primary
goal of this project is to investigate the consequences of different reverse channel structures, the
following specifications will help to create an environment for possible investigations.
The game will include three different reverse channel structures modelled by three different
players. Each player has a specific payoff function. Profit is derived from revenue minus cost
and thus both components have to be defined. Therefore, Assumption 1 and Assumption 2
specify the manner in which revenue can be earned, while Assumption 3 and 4 deal with the
cost arising from the collection effort. General rules on how the search for an optimal collection
rate proceeds between the three players are introduced by Assumption 5 and Assumption 6.
Finally, the modelling of reverse logistics as a game will result in the competition for an optimal
collection rate between the three different players.
Assumption 1:
The demand of the price per unit p is given by D(p) = φ − βp, where φ and β are positive
parameters and φ > βcm with cm describing the cost of manufacturing a product [73].
With this assumption the demand is modelled as a linear downward sloping function. This means
that profit is achieved by the price per product times the amount of products sold. However, a
saturation of demand occurs after a certain amount of time that products have been released.
Assumption 2:
Re-manufacturing used products directly saves manufacturing costs, since manufacturing a new
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product cm is more expensive than recovering a returned good cr, i.e. cm > cr [74].
The manufacturer has incorporated a recovery opportunity into the existing manufacturing
process to be able to produce a new product from recovered material or return directly. A
higher product return rate is strictly preferred over a lower rate with this assumption. Not
only selling new products, but also selling used products back to the manufacturer for recovery
can be a source of income for a player. Uncertainty lies in the usability of returned products,
due to different application possibilities. This uncertainty in the quality of the return results
in a reduction of incentives to invest in collection as the benefit from the investment might be
lower [73].
Assumption 3:
The collection rate of returns from customers is described by the reverse channel performance
Θ. This performance denotes a fraction of the products re-manufactured from returns, i.e.
0 ≤ Θ ≤ 1. The investment in collection activities, denoted by I, describes the product collection
effort as a function of Θ [74].
The collecting agents’ promotional activities stimulate customers to return their products for
re-manufacturing resulting in the response Θ. There are no direct financial offers given to the
customers, thus the model focuses on the channel behaviour of the agents, while the customers
only react to new product prices. Reverse logistics as well as the investment in collection leads
to the cost of collection. The diminishing return on the investment is represented by the cost
structure Θ =
√
I/R, where R is a scaling parameter. Consequently, the average unit cost of
manufacturing is c = cm(1−Θ) + crΘ. If the unit cost saving from recovery is described by ∆
with ∆ = cm − cr. These assumptions lead to an average unit cost given by cm −Θ∆ [73, 74].
Assumption 4:
The scaling parameter R is sufficiently large to satisfy the condition that Θ < 1 [73].
Re-manufacturing all products from returns is not economically viable. Therefore, this assump-
tion ensures that the cost of re-manufacturing are high enough. The economic law of diminishing
returns on investment states that if one input in the manufacturing of a unit is increased but
all other inputs are held at a fixed level, a point where additions to the input result in smaller
or even diminishing increase in output will be reached eventually. A classical example of this
law is that a farmer finds a specified number of workers yield the maximum output per labourer
on his land. The combination of land and work is less efficient if he hires more labourers, since
the proportional increase of overall output is smaller than the expansion of workforce. There-
fore, the output per labourer would decline. Unless the technique of manufacturing is changed
additionally, this law holds true for any manufacturing process [19].
The company has to make expenses on advertising to make customers aware of the possibility
of recycling end-of life products. Even if the collection is carried out by one of the three collect-
ing agents, the connection between customer and company has to be arranged. Advertisement
for the collection of used products can be seen as a starting point of the entire collection pro-
cess. Therefore, according to Savaskan et al. [73], the diminishing return on investment I is
characterised by
I = R Θ2. (3.1)
The scaling parameter R has to be large enough to prevent the manufacturing of all products
from returns as stated in Assumption 3, R has to satisfy
4 R > [(φ− βcm) + β(∆− CD)](∆− CD), (3.2)
where CD is the reverse logistics cost per unit and the right-hand side of the condition resembles
the maximum savings contribution of re-manufacturing with Θ = 1 describing the recovery of
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all products. In addition, each collecting agents has a different rate of collection Θ to compete
over and a different scaling parameter R as the proximity from the agent to the customer differs.
Response functions in advertising and operation literature use similar trade-offs as in the re-
manufacturing context. In advertising, response models for the retention of customers and prod-
uct awareness are applied to describe the relationship amongst the components of the model.
An optimal advertising strategy is determined by a market situation in which two companies
compete over customers with the help of advertisement. Thereby, advertising expenditures for
closed-loop strategies are proportional to spendings in open-loop advertising where players can-
not observe the play of competitors and the square of the opponent’s actual market share [33].
With the introduction of a new product, product awareness needs to arise from potential cus-
tomers. A companies’ optimal advertising and pricing strategy is determined by the signal the
product price sends to the customers defined by the level of investment [96]. The operation
models use specific investment functions describing the interrelations to investigate on possibil-
ities for the improvement of processes and lot sizing by investing in reduction of set-up cost and
quality improvement. There is a connection between quality and lot sizing as processes produc-
ing large amounts can be faulty each time another unit is produced. An extra cost for re-work of
defective units has to be incurred, resulting in an incentive to produce smaller lots with higher
quality units. This is leading to a specific form of investment cost function [66]. In dynamic
process improvement, the immediate return on investment is the expected net value of reducing
operating costs if no additional investments are made. The last chance policy determines an
optimal amount to invest for maximising the return on investment. Therefore, it is optimal to
invest in process improvement if a positive amount is invested with the last chance policy [25].
Assumption 5:
All agents have the same access to information while trying to optimise their objective func-
tion [73].
Information asymmetry might result in inefficiencies and risk that can be controlled with the
help of this assumption. Therefore, it creates an equal information base for every agent to
optimise its performance. None of the players has an advantage over the competitors when it
comes to information.
Assumption 6:
The manufacturer has enough channel power to act as a Stackelberg leader over the retailer and
the third-party [73].
Even though it is preferable to collect a high rate of returns, the rate cannot exceed its upper
bound of 100%, due to the third assumption. Therefore, the manufacturer gets to decide first
how many returns to collect leaving the retailer and third party to compete.
Taking these assumptions into consideration for the general market model, different scenarios
can be modelled from this foundation. Nevertheless, changing these assumptions may lead to
completely different results.
3.2 Reverse logistics cost function
The cost of collection is a function composed of reverse logistics cost and investment cost. The
investment cost I is the incentive that allows effective collection of returns from customers.
The reverse logistics cost CD is the cost of transporting used products to the manufacturer for
recovery purposes. A function of the return rate of used products characterises the total cost
of collection C(Θ). It is given by C(Θ) = CD(Θ)D(p) + I. The cost of investment I has been
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described in the assumptions for the market mechanisms. Especially the cost components of the
reverse logistics are crucial to this project. Therefore, the reverse logistics cost functions are
defined in detail for each collecting agent in the following sections [73].
Reverse logistics networks facilitate the collection of returns from customers in the market area
and the transport to the manufacturer’s recovery facility. For each of the three different collecting
agents, there are three different designs of reverse logistics network. A careful design and control
of the collection network is crucial in closed-loop supply chains, since transport cost influences
the economic viability of re-manufacturing to a large extend [30]. That is why, different methods
of transport, economies of scale in transport and a methodology to approximate logistics cost
will be discussed next. Finally, the reverse logistics cost function per player is derived.
3.2.1 Different methods of transport
Two methods of transport, one for direct shipping and one for multiple stop collection, are
examined for one agent collecting units via trucks from many customers. The objective of eco-
nomic order quantity (EOQ) models is to minimise the sum of inventory carrying and ordering
cost. Key factors in these formulas are customer supply and density, transport cost per distance
as well as value of items and charges for inventory carrying. The analysis of the two collec-
tion methods will illustrate the differences in the reverse logistics network design of the three
agents [10].
In direct shipping, units are shipped directly from one customer to the manufacturer’s recovery
facility. Evaluating the trade-offs between transport and inventory cost per unit, a function for
shipment size specifies an optimal lot size and thus defines the minimum transport cost per unit.
For every collection trip to a single customer, the cost components of loading, transporting and
unloading determine the transport cost per unit. The decrease in transport cost per unit with
shipment size reflects the economies of scale in shipping. Let
KL be the cost per stop at a customer (loading cost),
KU be the cost to dispatch a vehicle and stop at the service facility (unloading cost),
T be the transport cost per distance per unit,
` be the distance between customer and service facility, and
S be the lot size.
The direct shipping transport cost per unit TD is thus calculated by
TD =
KL + 2T `+KU
S
. (3.3)
The inventory cost in reverse logistics is represented by a holding cost. That is why, the holding
cost per unit depends on time spend waiting at the customer, lead time of the recovery and the
time spend before further treatments of the return at the recovery facility. The average time to
form a shipment of size S is determined by the supply of returns, since products reach their end
of life independent from scheduled pick up times. Therefore, each unit that is part of a shipment
waits at average half this time before being shipped. If the recovery of used products is carried
out at a constant rate, the average time to empty a truck is also dependent on the lot size per
return rate. After arrival at the recovery facility, a unit waits half this time on average again.
Let
r be the holding cost rate,
Θ be the return rate of used products, and
U be the transit time.
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The direct shipping holding cost per unit HD is then calculated as
HD = r
(
S
2Θ
+ U +
S
2Θ
)
. (3.4)
Large volume shipments reduce transport cost but raise inventory cost, as inventory cost per
unit increases linearly with shipment size. An optimal lot size of a shipment S∗ is given by
minimising the first-order conditions of the total cost (TD +HD). Therefore, let
V be the vehicle capacity, and
Smax be the accumulation capacity of a collection point.
An optimal size of a shipment S∗ in direct shipment is then given by
S∗ = min
(√
(KL + g T `+KU )
(
Θ
h
)
, V, Smax
)
. (3.5)
An optimal shipment size S∗ does not necessarily need to be a full truck load. In reality, linear
assumptions on shipping cost only hold true if S = V . With S < V economies of scale have
to be considered [8, 10]. According to Beullens et al. [8], in reverse logistics the value of a unit
largely exceeds the transport cost, thus in many cases S∗ = Smax. Vehicles that are able to
access the road infrastructures leading directly to customers cannot handle the large volumes
of returns required to make the collection profitable. This issue limits the success of recycling,
especially when transport is carried out via direct shipments.
The cost of direct shipping increases when a fixed number of returns is collected among many
customers with smaller than the EOQ per vehicle. Lower volumes per collection point per
trip are possible, if a vehicle makes multiple stops per collection. Therefore, the market area is
divided up into subregions forming individual service areas. Each service region defines a unique
group of customers providing the basis for defining an optimal quantity of units per truck load.
A tour with multiple stops per collection is also called a milk-run and combines the three stages
of line-haul, local and back-haul transport. The line-haul defines the unloaded travel from the
service facility to the nearest customer. In this case, a one-way haul beginning with an empty
truck is described. The travel between the first and the last customer stop on the tour is part of
the local transport. The back-haul is the loaded travel from the last customer stop back to the
service facility that forms the end of a tour. Line-haul and back-haul equations similar to direct
shipping are applied and local transport cost is added to analyse the transport cost. The results
of Burns et al. [10] on the investigation in the EOQ of milk-runs reveal that trucks should always
be despatched full. Therefore, the average distance per stop is a function that is described by
the Euclidean distance `(x) between the service facility and the centre of the service region x
served by a fully loaded vehicle for line-haul and back-haul. Additionally, the point density in
x determines the local collection distance ρ(x). This function, that is depend on the location,
slowly varies in x within the overall market area A containing a total of n collection points. It
follows that the average milk-run transport cost per unit M as a function of x may be calculated
as
M(x) =
KL
S
+
KU
V
+ T
(
2 `(x)
V
+
√
1/3
S
√
ρ(x)
)
. (3.6)
Integration over the market area A gives MA. Therefore, the average milk-run transport cost
per unit MA becomes
MA =
KL
S
+
KU
V
+ T
(
2 I1
V
+
√
1/3 I2
S
)
, (3.7)
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.2. Reverse logistics cost function 33
with I1 =
1
n
∫
A ρ(x)`(x)dx and I2 =
1
n
∫
A ρ(x)
1
2 dx.
The holding time in a milk-run is extended by the transit time of local transport UL. The units
collected at the first stop do not incur transit time, while at the last stop of the route they get
full transit time. This results in an average of UL/2 for all units. The additional transit time
of local transport UL is appended to the transit time U of direct shipment in equation (3.4).
Assuming that time is related to distance for integration over the market area, the average
milk-run holding cost per unit HM is given by
HM = r
(
S
Θ
+ b I1 +
√
1/3 l I2
S
)
, (3.8)
where b is the constant expressing the average speed on the back-haul trip and l on the local
collection tour.
An optimal lot size S∗ in milk-run collection is calculated by minimising the first-order conditions
of the total cost (M +HM ) leading to
S∗ = min
(√(
KL +
√
1/3T I2
)(Θ
h
)
, V, Smax
)
. (3.9)
The average total cost per unit in milk-run collection is a function of the point density ρ that is
continuous and decreases monotonously [8].
Multiple stops per tour often reduce the cost of collection compared to direct shipping. Direct
shipping is only cheaper for lower ρ, h,KU , ` and the better the correlation between vehicle and
accumulation capacity of the collection point. Therefore, balancing between transport cost and
service aspects due to the lower value of the returns becomes important [8, 10].
The three collecting agents have different network designs. The manufacturer can only choose
between direct shipping and milk-run transport. Due to generally lower transport cost with
multi-stop vehicles the manufacturer only uses milk-runs in the collection channel. The retailer
as well as the third party can combine the two transport modes to exhaust the advantages
of each option. The retail stores of the retailer can be used as collection hubs to combine
the returns collected by milk-run tours in the service regions to direct shipments towards the
manufacturer’s recovery facility. In contrast to the third-party, the retailer is bound to the use
of already installed stores as consolidation points. The third-party is relatively free in choosing
consolidation points due to the possibility of combination of collection with other clients. That
is why, the third-party can choose an optimal size of a collection area and thereby reduce the
transport cost of collection. The reverse logistics per collecting agent is described in detail next.
The number of re-manufactured products is determined by the quantity of collected returns. This
quantity is expressed by the collection rate Θ that lies in the interval [0, 1]. As re-manufacturing
leads to a direct saving in manufacturing cost in this model, it is favourable to collect as many
returns as possible taking the costs related to operating a reverse channel into consideration.
Savaskan et al. [73] use an acquisition cost per unit CA to describe the reverse logistics cost of
each channel. This acquisition cost can be seen as a fixed payment for each returned product.
In this case, no consolidation of goods takes place and thus the reverse logistics cost can be
computed with equation (3.3) as in direct shipments, assuming the acquisition cost to be an
average cost per transport per unit. As the reverse logistics cost is dependent on the return rate,
CA(Θ) depicts an increasing linear function. The only difference between the three collecting
agents lies in the level of acquisition cost per unit. With decreasing distance to the customer the
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acquisition cost per unit diminishes as the transport effort is reduced. Therefore, the relation
between the acquisition cost of the different collection channels M, R and 3P, represented by
the superscripts before the cost, is resembled by MCA >
RCA >
3PCA.
3.2.2 Economies of scale in transport
Direct shipment is not always the cheapest mode of transport. Additionally, the acquisition
cost does not resemble any economies of scale. Baumgartner et al. [7] point out that ignoring
economies of scale and transport frequencies can result in significantly higher cost. The most
common scale economy effects in supply chain modelling are scale economies with transport
distance and scale economies with transport quantity. The cost-capacity factor will be taken
into account at a later stage of the reverse logistics cost formulation.
The correlation between transport cost and distance is defined to consider the effect of distance
on cost in a realistic way. This correlation is expressed as a cost function per distance per
transported unit. The cost function is convex and monotone increasing with distance. There is
a non-direct proportional increase in rates with distance, due to the possibility of distributing
the transport cost over greater distance. In an analysis of several cost generators in forwarding
by Forkenbrock [32] the unit cost shows a decreasing tendency over the total travel length. Based
on the data of the forwarder in the analysis of Forkenbrock [32], Vieira et al. [90] established
a cost variation model that represents the economies of scales with distance. The result is a
correctional factor Ψ` that can be applied to cost per distance to condition the transport cost.
Therefore, let
`max be the maximum distance between two entities of a supply chain,
` be the distance between the facilities that are analysed,
α`, η` be the parameters to fit the real data used, and
z be the parameter that describes non-considerable variations of the cost-ratio.
The correction factor for distance can then be expressed dimensionless by
Ψ` = η` e
α`
(
`
`max
)
+ z . (3.10)
The variations of the correctional factor Ψ`, with the data represented by Forkenbrock [32] where
the maximum distance is `max = 200 km, z = 0.8, η` = 0.214 and α` = −2.8 are illustrated in
Figure 3.1 [90].
The plot in Figure 3.1 shows that the smaller the difference of the distance between two facil-
ities and the maximum distance, the smaller the correctional factor becomes. Therefore, the
correctional factor strives towards z. This results in a convex function for the variations of the
correctional factor Ψ` with distance. The distribution of cost over distance will be applied to the
reverse logistics cost in this model when comparing scenarios with different market area sizes.
The size of a shipment is denoted by V , thus Vmax denotes a full truck load. For a defined section
of the transport distance, units are collected with identical vehicles that are capable of carrying
full truck loads. The concept of an unit can be redefined if different types of returns are moved
through a collection system as an unit can be either of volume or of weight and Vmax can be
the vehicle’s volume or weight capacity. This makes the maximum freight volume or weight of
a vehicle independent of the mixture of return types forming the load. Whenever a multiple of
Vmax is reached or exceeded by sending very large shipments, a new truck is dispatched resulting
in a jump of transportation cost. An operating truck is insensitive to the shipments it carries,
thus the steps of the transport cost curve are rather flat. Nevertheless, sub-additivity ensures
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Figure 3.1: A plot of the variation of the correctional factor Ψ` with distance. Source: [90]
that sending shipments in parts does not reduce transport cost. The largest size of vehicles that
can still accommodate the local roads should be used as the minimum transport cost that is a
decreasing function of Vmax [13].
The existence of economies of scale with quantities is emphasised in Lapierre et al. [53] by
increasing the shipment size to a maximum. This cost variation is defined as a non-linear function
of volume due to discounts with increasing quantities. Taking a maximum limit into account,
the transport frequencies are considered indirectly. The minimisation of shipments results in the
lowest cost achievable. The model formulation will condition the transport frequencies to find
the lowest cost. Vieira et al. [90] use the analysis in Lapierre et al. [53] to create a correctional
factor Ψq for transport quantities. Let
q be the quantity of the transported product,
qmax be the maximum truck capacity for the product, and
αq, ηq be the parameters to fit the real data used.
The dimensionless correction factor for quantity may then be expressed as
Ψq = ηq + αq ln
(
q
qmax
)
. (3.11)
Using the case study data of Lapierre et al. [53] with qmax = 3 000 units, ηq = 0.2815 and
αq = 0.134, the variation of the correctional factor Ψq with the transported quantities is displayed
in Figure 3.2. As the difference between maximum truck capacity and transported volume
diminishes, the correctional factor with quantities reduces to a minimum until reaching αq.
3.2.3 Continuous approximation methodology
In this section, the reverse logistics cost function per collecting agent will be modelled to resemble
the coherences introduced. Therefore, the continuous approximation methodology, proposed by
Newell and further developed by Daganzo [13], will be applied to describe the components of
reverse logistics cost and generate non-linearity through economies of scale. The continuous
approximation approach is a fairly simple but effective alternative in logistics network design
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Figure 3.2: A plot of the variation of the correctional factor Ψq with quantities. Source: [90]
to receive general insights into the economics of logistics systems and the preferability of each
strategy under different design options. The impact of critical parameters can be revealed based
on analytical arguments to draw conclusions on the behaviour of real-world systems.
The continuous approximation methodology provides a way to derive approximate logistics cost
per unit. The representation of demand by a continuous density function over the service area
instead of a concentration of demand in specific locations is the key element of this approach. In
the case of reverse logistics, the demand of products is converted into the function for the supply
of returns. If the density is constant or only slowly varying across the service area, logistic cost
can be approximated by appropriately chosen averages that can be expressed as simple functions
with a limited number of parameters. The second assumption, namely that the facility that is
closest would always be chosen to make the collection effort, leads to facilities with equal-sized
non-overlapping service areas that serve the market area. Fixed costs associated with operating
facilities in the service area as well as variable cost for coordination and transport activities
are carefully assessed. The continuous approximation approach estimates the cost accurately
and the decomposition principle holds true, if the sum of costs over non-overlapping regions can
express the total cost and these cost components are only dependent on the decisions made in
their regions. By integrating over the whole service area, the total logistics cost are obtained
and divided by the total number of units to find an average cost per unit [1, 13, 28, 30, 93].
A comparison of alternative modelling approaches over a numerical example was executed by
Fleischmann et al. [30]. The comparison reveals that the models show similar results in logis-
tics cost. The example contrasts the results of deterministic mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) approaches, stochastic mixed integer linear modelling approaches and the continuous
approximation methodology. Stochastic MILPs incorporate the aspect of uncertainty explic-
itly, while deterministic MILPs address uncertainty with the evaluation of different scenarios.
The best solution obtained in a deterministic MILP and stochastic MILP only differs within a
few percentages. Nevertheless, both MILP approaches have limited capabilities for sensitivity
analyses and do not make the interrelations between different parameters explicit. The continu-
ous approximation, on the other hand, is an approach that effectively reveals the interrelations
in comparison to the theoretically more powerful but computationally more demanding MILP
approaches. Therefore, the continuous approximation approach is chosen to model the reverse
logistics cost in this thesis.
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In reverse logistics it can be assumed that the supply of returns does not change rapidly. Whether
products are returned can be influenced to a large extend by the promotional activities of the
collecting agent. The density function of returns can be described as ρ = ϕΘ, with ϕ ∈ [0, 1]
describing the density constant over the market area. The analysis of the reverse logistics cost
must include the fixed cost associated with operating a collection facility as well as the variable
cost related to transport and coordination activities. Depending on the mode of transport being
used, this transport cost component can have different characteristics [1].
Analysing the fixed cost component first, each service facility operates in a circular area with a
radius that defines the magnitude of this area. The density of returns inside the facilities’ service
area reflects the total number of collected used products. An annualised fixed cost represents the
necessary expenditures to operate a service facility [1, 30]. This cost component does not vary
with volume, because the service facility needs to be able to cover seasonal variations as well as
temporary capacity peaks. However, the fixed cost of operation can vary between different sizes
of service areas. The smaller the service area, the lower the operational requirements towards
the facility. Hence, less cost is associated with operating the service facility for a smaller area
than a larger area [34].
Over the service area A the annualised fixed cost of operating a service facility F is denoted as
the annualised fixed cost per service facility per unit f given by
f =
F
Aρ
. (3.12)
In this model, f differs per player since every player operates in a service area of a different size.
The manufacturer only uses one service facility that is the manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, the
coordination and handling of the returned products requires additional expenditures. Therefore,
part of the operational cost of the plant is assigned to the reverse logistics function of the
manufacturer. For the retailer every retail store can be used as a service facility for collecting
returns. The cost that occurs while carrying out the collection effort in a part of the retail
store is associated with the retailer’s reverse logistics cost. In general, this cost is assigned to
smaller service areas as the market area is divided up between the retail stores. The third-party
can make use of synergy effects with other clients but still needs to be able to service the entire
market area of the manufacturer and thus takes the fixed cost of operating terminals into account
when calculating the reverse logistics cost per unit. The cost of serving the whole market area
is generally higher than the cost of serving only part of it.
The variable cost component consisting of transport and coordination between the customer,
the service facilities and the manufacturer is analysed secondly. The transport cost per player
is dependent on the service areas of the facilities involved in the collection process. In the
immediate vicinity of customers only smaller vehicles such as delivery vans can be used due to
smaller roads, whereas easier access and consolidation at the service facilities enables the use
of larger trucks to carry returns to the manufacturer’s recovery facility. The combination of
the benefits of direct shipment and multiple-stop transport results in a minimum of transport
cost [1, 30].
Due to the limited accessibility of customer collection points, milk-runs are incorporated to reach
customers. The line-haul distance between the service facility and the start and end of a pick-up
tour and the sum of the distances between two consecutive points of collection are assessed next.
According to Newell et al. [64], the service area is divided into ring-radial zones with nearly
rectangular pick-up areas where customers are located. A single vehicle route is optimised
starting and ending at the centre of the service area where the facility is located. The pick-up
areas near the centre are more wedge-shaped, whereas on the edge of the area the pick-up areas
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are approximately rectangular shaped. The customers are assumed to lie on a fine rectangular
grid of roads. A ring-radial grid may be used to access the collection areas, but the tours that
lead directly to the customers are mostly on the fine rectangular grid. A possibility to depict
the zoning of a service facilities’ area is displayed in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: A possible zoning of a facilities’ service area. Source: [64]
An example of a tour through one of the approximately rectangular shaped pick-up zones is
illustrated in Figure 3.4. Assuming full truck load per collecting vehicle in this zone, the number
of customers O in this pick-up zone of length L and width 2w is approximately
O = 2wLρ. (3.13)
The shortest closed tour connecting uniformly and independently distributed customers O in a
pick-up area A is described by the average tour distance d given by d ∼= k
√
O A with constant k
being set to the value 0.75 based on simulation experiments. This holds true for a distance given
in the Euclidean and in the square grid metric. In this project the square grid metric is used as
a more realistic approach to find the shortest connection, since streets routes have to pass the
buildings in an area and cannot go straight to the destination [9, 14].
Taking the dimensions of a rectangular shaped pick-up area into consideration, as shown in
Figure 3.4, the length of a tour as a function of w is estimated by dividing the rectangle into two
parts of width w. On the way out of the pick-up zone, the customers are visited in increasing
order of the coordinate x along the length L and on the way back to the facility in decreasing
order of the coordinate x [64].
In a ring-radial road network as shown in Figure 3.3 the zones would be elongated to the radial
direction, so that the total tour length can be divided up into the sum of the longitudinal (radial)
and the transverse (ring) parts. Figure 3.5 gives a closer look at a strip of width w with an
infinitely length and randomly but uniformly scattered points with point density ρ per area.
A path connects all points that resemble customers in the area. The expected total length of
the tour is given by the number of points multiplied with the distance between two consecutive
points. If X denotes the random distance between two consecutive points along the width w,
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Figure 3.4: An example of a tour in a pick-up zone. Source: [64]
Figure 3.5: A possible strip with width w. Source: [64]
then the probability that the points are at least at a distance x apart is given by
Pr{X > x} =
(
1− x
w
)2
with 0 ≤ x ≤ w , (3.14)
because X has the same distribution as the distance of two random points on a line segment.
Integrating over the interval [0, w] leads to w/3 that denotes the average transverse tour distance.
Along an indefinite length of the strip, Y describes the random distance between two consecutive
points with the probability that these points are at least y apart given by
Pr{Y > y} = e−wρy with y ≥ 0 . (3.15)
A Poisson counting process with rate wρ is applied, because the positions of these points lie
along the side of the strip and are completely random. The longitudinal tour distance that
is needed to traverse the pick-up zone is described by wρ−1 after integrating over the interval
[0, w] [72]. Hence, the average local tour distance per customer dL of the rectangle in Figure 3.4
is denoted by the sum of the average transverse and longitudinal tour distance for the square
grid metric calculated by
dL =
w
3
+
1
wρ
. (3.16)
With a large w the transverse distance becomes longer, but the the longitudinal distance per
customer becomes shorter as the width of the rectangle increases. The right balance can be
found by identifying an optimal width w∗ that minimises the average local tour distance per
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customer. For the optimal width w∗ =
√
3/ρ, equation (3.16) gives a dimensionless local travel
distance per point as
dL =
√
1
3ρ
. (3.17)
With this information, the average local tour distance per customer dL that is independent of
the line-haul distance together with T , the transport cost of a vehicle, forms the vehicle routing
cost. According to Daganzo [14] and Newell et al. [64] the vehicle routing cost per unit MR is
calculated as
MR = T
√
1
3ρ
. (3.18)
The distance between the service facility and the start and end point of a pick-up tour is
dependent on the size of the area the facility serves. The average distance ` to the service
facility can generally be obtained by integration over a service area with 2ρpix customers that
are at a distance x from the service facility. Therefore, the average distance ` is calculated as
` =
1
ρpir2
∫ r
0
x(2ρpix)dx =
2
3
r . (3.19)
The average distance for line-haul and back-haul together with the transport cost of a vehicle T
per maximum truck capacity V generates the second part of the multiple-stop transport. The
total milk-run transport cost between customer and service facility per unit MC results from
the sum of this part and the vehicle routing cost and is given by
MC =
4
3
√
pi
√
A
T
V
ρ+ T
√
1
3ρ
. (3.20)
Direct shipments from the service facility to the manufacturer are introduced for the retailer
and the third-party, due to the consolidation effects of the service facilities. The line-haul cost is
obtained in the same way as the second part of the milk-run transport cost. However, the easier
accessibility of the service facilities allows the introduction of vehicles with higher transport
capacities and correspondingly lower mileage cost. Therefore, the cost for direct shipments
between service facility and manufacturer per unit TC , assuming full truck loads, becomes
TC = 2 `
t
v
ρ . (3.21)
3.2.4 Reverse logistics cost per player
With the help of equations (3.12), (3.20) and (3.21), the variable component of the reverse
logistics cost can be approximated. The following section is used to describe the characteristics
of each player’s network, since each player has an individual reverse logistics network. The
reverse logistics function per collecting agent is obtained with the help of these characteristics.
The manufacturer uses a part of the manufacturing plant to perform the recovery processes in
this model. Additionally, the plant carries out the coordination and handling associated with
the collection of used products. Hence, the fixed cost of operating the facility that is assigned
to the coordination and handling of returns is part of the manufacturer’s reverse logistics cost
function. Only smaller vans with the corresponding volume capacity and mileage cost are
installed, since the accessibility of the collection points is limited. Milk-runs are introduced as the
main transport mode, due to the difficulty in matching vehicle capacity with the accumulation
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at the collection points and the necessity of flexible reaction to changing parameters. The sum
of these specifications leads to the non-linear reverse logistics cost per unit of the manufacturer
MCN that is given by
MCN =
FM
AM ρM
+ 2 `
T
V
ρM + T
√
1
3ρM
. (3.22)
Plotting this function over all possible values of Θ ∈ [0, 1] results in Figure 3.6. It can be
observed that function (3.22) is continuous and convex resembling economies of scale in quantity
as illustrated in Figure 3.2. For generalisation, Figure 3.6 is dimensionless in the distance
that covers the market area. Nevertheless, if the distance would vary, the conclusions drawn
from Figure 3.1 about economies of scale in distance would be reflected in a similar way. The
manufacturer is only able to reach customers up to a certain density. This density ϕM determines
the quantity of returns that can be collected through the manufacturer’s network and thereby
conditions ρ = ϕΘ. It is assumed that the manufacturer does not reach as many customers as
the retailer or the third-party. Therefore, the manufacturer can only collect up to 30% of the
overall collection volume in this model.
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Figure 3.6: The non-linear reverse logistics cost function of M, R and 3P.
The retailer uses the retail stores as consolidation hubs to ship used products to the manu-
facturer’s recovery facility. Each retail store serves within a service area defining a piece of
the overall market area that is supplied with the manufacturer’s products. The fixed cost of
operating a retail store, that is assigned to the consolidation of returns, is part of the reverse
logistics cost of the retailer. By using the retail stores as consolidation hubs, only the tour
between customers to the service area is carried out via milk-run transport with smaller vans.
Direct shipments with higher capacity vehicles cover the distance between the retail stores and
the manufacturer’s recovery plant. The back-haul transport from the retail store to the recovery
facility can be used to return the used products to the manufacturer, since there is already an
existing transport network to supply the retailer with the manufacturer’s products. That is
why, only the transport cost from the retail store to the manufacturer is included in the second
part of the transport cost. Additionally, the retailer is closer to the customers and thus has a
higher density ϕR that results in more returns expressed by ρR. It is assumed that the retailer’s
customer density can reach up to 50% of the used products overall in this model. The descrip-
tion of the retailer’s logistics network defines the non-linear reverse logistics cost per unit of the
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retailer RCN that is given by
RCN =
FR
AR ρR
+
4
3
√
pi
√
AR
T
V
ρR + T
√
1
3ρR
+ `
t
v
ρR . (3.23)
Additionally, Figure 3.6 shows the retailer’s reverse logistics cost RCD, plotted over all values
of the return rate. Similar observations as for the manufacturer can be made regarding the
shape of function (3.23). However, the reverse logistics cost of the retailer are generally lower
than those of the manufacturer resembling the relation between the acquisition cost of the three
players.
The third-party logistics service provider has the greatest flexibility in using network structures
with consolidation hubs to minimise transport cost. According to Fleischmann et al. [28] there
exists an optimal size of service area that can be derived from the first-order conditions of the
annualised fixed cost of an operation in equation (3.12) and the cost of milk-run transport in
equation (3.20). This optimal service area A∗3P is calculated as
A∗3P =
(
3
√
pi F3P V
2T ρ3P
)2/3
. (3.24)
The equation compares the cost of operating the consolidation hub with the transport cost
assigned to the milk-runs and thereby defines an optimal service area. The third-party uses this
equation as an indication on the number of consolidation hubs necessary to serve the market
area. An optimal service area is configured according to the maximum, since the service facility
has to be able to handle the maximum of available returns in the service area. Therefore, the
fixed price F3P does not change with area but an optimal service area A
∗
3P changes. Comparable
to the retailer, the third-party uses low capacity vehicles to ship returns via milk-runs from the
customer to the hubs and high capacity vehicles to supply the manufacturer via direct shipments
with used products. Line-haul and back-haul are included in the direct shipment cost from the
consolidation hub to the manufacturer’s recovery facility, since a transport network between
the third-party and the manufacturer does not exist. Out of the three collecting agents, the
third-party is not only the one that has the most flexible network structure, but can also reach
the most customers during the collection process due to its high density in ϕ3P , that determines
ρ3P . The customer density of the third-party is assumed to reach the height 80% in this model.
The characterisation of the third-parties’ logistical structures leads to the non-linear reverse
logistics cost per unit of the third-party 3PCN that is calculated as
3PCN =
F3P
A∗3P ρ3P
+
4
3
√
pi
√
AR
T
V
ρ3P + T
√
1
3ρ3P
+ 2 `
t
v
ρ3P . (3.25)
Figure 3.6 shows the non-linear reverse logistics cost 3PCN for the scale effects described. Com-
pared to the reverse logistics cost of the manufacturer and the retailer, the cost of the third-party
is not only the lowest, but also benefits the most from the economies of scales as the third-party
can define an optimal service area.
It is not realistic to assign a fixed cost of operating a facility independently of its capacity,
since the total number of returns to be served by a facility is dependent on its capacity. Hence,
the cost of opening a facility is a function of its capacity κi [90]. As soon as the capacity
limit of a facility is reached, a new facility needs to be opened up to handle the overhead
returns. Therefore, whenever a facility reaches its limits a jump occurs in the reverse logistics
cost function, due to adding the fixed cost of operating an additional facility. That is why, the
reverse logistics cost function per player becomes discontinuous.
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For the manufacturer, the introduction of a capacity limit κM leads to equation 3.26 that
describes M’s reverse logistics cost function calculated as
MCD =
FM/(AM/κM )
AM ρM
⌈
AM ρM
κM
⌉
+ 2 `
T
V
ρM + T
√
1
3ρM
. (3.26)
The equation plotted over all possible values of the return rate Θ ∈ [0, 1] results in Figure 3.7.
As the manufacturing plant reaches the capacity limit, the facility has to be extended. This
extension leads to a jump at κM in the reverse logistics function. Therefore, the reverse logistics
function of the manufacturer is not only non-linear but also discontinuous.
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Figure 3.7: The non-linear and discontinuous reverse logistics cost function of the manufacturer.
The retailer has a lower capacity limit per service facility. As there are more than one service
facility inside the manufacturer’s market area the overall capacity of all retail stores is compa-
rable to the capacity of the manufacturer’s recovery facility. Equation 3.27 shows the manner in
which the retailer’s reverse logistics cost is computed with the introduction of a capacity limit
per service facility κR given by
RCD =
FR/(AR/κR)
AR ρR
⌈
AR ρR
κR
⌉
+
4
3
√
pi
√
AR
T
V
ρR + T
√
1
3ρR
+ `
t
v
ρR . (3.27)
Plotting the output of this equation over the possible rates of return results in the plot given
in Figure 3.8. This plot of the non-linear and discontinuous reverse logistics cost function of
the retailer allows to draw a conclusion that is comparable to the manufacturer’s function.
Nevertheless, the lower capacity limit leads to a higher frequency of jumps in the scope of the
collection.
Not only the manufacturer and the retailer are facing a capacity limit of their service facility, but
also the third-party has to deal with the limit κ3P . The capacity limit per facility is smaller than
the manufacturer’s, but the joint capacity of all consolidation hubs is comparable. Equation 3.28
describes the third parties’ reverse logistics cost function calculated as
3PCD =
F3P /(A
∗
3P /κ3P )
A∗3P ρ3P
⌈
A∗3P ρ3P
κ3P
⌉
+
4
3
√
pi
√
AR
T
V
ρ3P + T
√
1
3ρ3P
+ 2 `
t
v
ρ3P . (3.28)
The output of this equation is plotted over Θ ∈ [0, 1] to illustrate the non-linear and discontinu-
ous reverse logistics cost, leading to Figure 3.9. The jumps in the function are evenly distributed,
due to the flexibility in the optimal size of the third-parties’ service area.
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Figure 3.8: The non-linear and discontinuous reverse logistics cost function of the retailer.
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Figure 3.9: The non-linear and discontinuous reverse logistics cost function of the third-party.
With the introduction of non-linearity and discontinuity of the reverse logistic cost, the formu-
lation becomes more realistic. However, the complexity increases as well. This fact leads to a
request for simulation to enable the analysis of the overall model and the interaction between
the players in different market scenarios.
3.3 Payoff functions
Every player in this model has an individual payoff function that determines the profit. The
profit is derived from revenue minus cost. With linear reverse logistics cost the profit functions
are concave in their decision variables. That is why, the optimality of these decision variables is
defined by first-order conditions [73]. With the introduction of player-specific reverse logistics
cost CD that is non-linear and discontinuous, an optimal rate of returns Θi per player i has to
be re-defined with the help of the more advanced payoff functions. The modified reverse logistics
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cost introduces a customer density ϕi specific to each player i that changes Θi to ρi according
to ρ = ϕΘ. Additionally, the equations (3.26) – (3.28) of the reverse logistics cost are included
in the payoff functions of all players. However, the payoff function per player remains concave
in the decision variables. Therefore, the optimality can still be retrieved from the first-order
conditions.
3.3.1 The manufacturer’s payoff
The manufacturer wants to maximise profit by setting the wholesale price w and deciding on
the rate of collecting returns. The installations needed to produce products that are released
into the market as well as to recover products that have been collected are available at the
manufacturer’s manufacturing plant. The choice on whether to repair or disassemble a used
product depends on the condition of the return. However, the modular design of the product
makes recovery easy. Additionally, the materials used to manufacture a product are valuable. In
the forward channel the products are distributed via a network of retail stores. The collection of
used products in the reverse channel can be carried out by the manufacturer or subcontracted
to a retailer or a third-party providing the collection service. Using the parameters described in
the market mechanisms of Section 3.1 and a linear MCA, let
w be the wholesale price per unit,
RM be the scaling parameter of M per unit, and
MCA be the acquisition cost of M per unit.
The objective function of the manufacturer according to Savaskan et al. [73] can be stated as
max
ΘM
MΠ =
φ− βw
2
[w − cm + ΘM∆]−RMΘ2M −MCAΘM
φ− βw
2
. (3.29)
In case of the manufacturer being the collecting agent, the linear acquisition cost leads to a
concave payoff function that is shown in Figure 3.10(a). The payoff function of the manufacturer,
illustrated in Figure 3.10(b), results from exchanging the linear acquisition cost constant MCA in
equation (3.29) with the non-linear and discontinuous reverse logistics cost function MCD(ΘM )
from equation (3.26).
The unique best response wholesale price w can be obtained according to Savaskan et al. [73]
by deriving the first-order condition of equation (3.29) given by
w =
φ+ βcm
2β
− (∆−
MCA)
2(φ− βcm)
2[8RM − β(∆−MCA)2] . (3.30)
Even with changing reverse logistics cost through different return rates, the wholesale price
always converges towards the same value. Therefore, the payoff function of the manufacturer
changes insignificantly by including a varying w in comparison to a stable wholesale price.
Additionally, wholesale prices do not change drastically during a sales season. Therefore, the
model works with a set wholesale price w that is deducted by including the linear reverse logistics
cost MCA in equation (3.30).
3.3.2 The retailer’s payoff
Deciding on the collection rate and setting the retail price p, the retailer tries to maximise
profits. The retailer buys products to a given wholesale price from the manufacturer in the
forward supply chain. After undertaking the collecting process in the reverse supply chain, the
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(a) M’s payoff with linear RL cost MCA
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(b) M’s payoff with discontinuous RL cost MCD
Figure 3.10: The payoff function of the manufacturer with changing RL cost.
retailer sells the used products back in exchange for a transfer price bR. The transfer price is
determined by the manufacturer. This payment functions as a compensation for the retailer’s
collection effort. Let
p be the retail price per unit,
bR be the transfer price of R per unit,
RR be the scaling parameter of R per unit, and
RCA be the acquisition cost of R per unit.
If RCA is linear, the objective function of the retailer may be calculated according to Savaskan
et al. [73] as
max
ΘR
RΠ = (φ− β p)(p− w) + bR ΘR(φ− βp)−RR Θ2R − RCAΘR(φ− βp) . (3.31)
The linear acquisition cost leads to Figure 3.11(a). The payoff function of the retailer including
the non-linear and discontinuous reverse logistics cost function RCD(ΘR) from equation (3.27)
is plotted in Figure 3.11(b).
The retailer’s unique best response retail price p can be obtained according to Savaskan et al.
[73] by deriving the first-order condition of equation (3.31) that is given by
p =
(
φ+ β[w − (bR − RCA)ΘR]
)
2β
. (3.32)
If the retail price is modelled to correspond to changing collection, neither the payoff function
with linear nor non-linear and discontinuous reverse logistics function changes significantly.
Therefore, p will be modelled as an optimal retail price defined in equation (3.32). Additionally,
it encourages the retailer to collect as many returns as possible, according to the observations
of Savaskan et al. [73], if the transfer price bR = ∆, the unit cost saving from recovery.
3.3.3 The third-parties’ payoff
The third-party wants to get subcontracted by the manufacturer to carry out the collection of
returns and thereby maximise profits influenced to a large extend by the transfer price b3P that
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(a) R’s payoff with linear RL cost RCA
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(b) R’s payoff with discontinuous RL cost RCD
Figure 3.11: The payoff function of the retailer with changing RL cost.
is determined by the manufacturer. Besides the possible contractual relationship to perform the
collection, there is no other existing incorporation of the third-party into the manufacturer’s
network. The third-parties’ existing logistics network and synergy effects with other clients
lower the transport cost of the third-party to a minimum. Let
b3P be the transfer price of 3P per unit,
R3P be the scaling parameter of 3P per unit, and
3PCA be the acquisition cost of 3P per unit.
If the acquisition price 3PCA is linear, the objective function of the third-party, according to
Savaskan et al. [73], is given by
max
Θ3P
3PΠ = b3P Θ3P (φ− β p)−R3P Θ23P − 3PCA Θ3P (φ− β p) . (3.33)
The objective function of the third party can be plotted over all possible values of the collection
rate. With linear acquisition cost 3PCA the function leads to Figure 3.12(a), whereas with non-
linear and discontinuous reverse logistics cost function 3PCD(Θ3P ) from equation (3.28) results
in Figure 3.12(b).
For the third-party the transfer price is to an large extend dependent on the reverse logistics
cost the manufacturer would have to pay to carry out the collection. Therefore, Savaskan et al.
[73] formulated an optimal transfer price b3P in their observations given by
b3P =
(∆ + MCA)
2
. (3.34)
Additionally, if the reverse logistics cost of the manufacturer is greater than the cost saving
per unit ∆, the manufacturer would pay half the savings to the third-party. This ensures
that the transfer price b3P stays positive. The special shape of the reverse logistics cost func-
tion 3PCD(Θ3P ) in Figure 3.12(b) is a result of the influence of the transfer price b3P .
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(a) 3P’s payoff with linear RL cost 3PCA
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(b) 3P’s payoff with discontinuous RL cost 3PCD
Figure 3.12: The payoff function of the third-party with changing RL cost.
3.4 Playing the game
Every player i chooses the amount of collection described by the return rate Θi, since the three
players compete over the return rate to maximise their overall profits. A benchmark scenario
featuring this situation with the non-linear and discontinuous reverse logistics cost for each actor
is simulated.
This section makes use of numerical analysis to simulate the situation of conflict. Therefore,
algorithms are applied to imitate the player’s behaviour. With the help of numerical analysis,
the solution of the mathematical model developed in the previous sections is approximated by
the production of numbers [68]. The three players i compete over the return rate Θi of used
products to maximise the individual profit. That is why, the game is modelled as a three-
person non-cooperative game in the first place. The cost of collection influences the deduction
of payoffs primarily. This cost leads to non-linear and discontinuous functions for different values
of the return rate, since it is modelled individually for each player. Each player has an optimal
collection rate that results in the player’s highest payoff. Every player tries to reach an optimal
collection rate to achieve th highest payoff, even when starting with a random collection rate.
An optimal location point of the collection rate Θ is sought-after return rates in an one-
dimensional range. The payoff functions per player with continuous cost of collection are concave
resulting in a unique optimum per player. The golden ratio search is a technique with zero vari-
ance that is applied to find these optima [65]. Therefore, given an unimodal function ψ(X) of
a continuous variable X defined on the closed interval [0, Ln], the golden ratio search is used to
find the maximum of every player’s payoff and thus identifies the stable points of the game. At
each step of the search technique the uncertainty is reduced by constant λ. The golden ratio
search is a limiting form of the Fibonacci search based on the fact that the constant λ is given
by
λ = lim
n→∞
Fn
Fn+1
=
√
5− 1
2
≈ 0.618034 , (3.35)
where Fn and Fn+1 are successive terms of the Fibonacci sequence. Therefore, the golden ratio
search is a simple way to optimise a unimodal function [92].
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.4. Playing the game 49
The golden ratio search proceeds to maximise the unimodal function ψ(X) on the interval
[X1, X2]. Therefore, ψ(X3) and ψ(X4) are computed for evaluation in a first step. The search
technique obtains function values for point triplets that form a golden ratio, the evaluation
points are given by
X3 = X2 − λ(X2 −X1) (3.36)
and
X4 = X1 + λ(X2 −X1) . (3.37)
The new interval reduced by constant λ is defined by a comparison between the values of ψ(X3)
and ψ(X4). If ψ(X3) > ψ(X4), the interval (X4, X2] is discarded. The remaining interval
is [X1, X4], where X4 is replaced by X2 and the new points of evaluation are X3 and a newly
computed X4 with the use of equation (3.37). The interval [X1, X3) is cut out, if ψ(X3) < ψ(X4).
Within the remaining interval [X3, X2] the value X3 is replaced by X1. The new points of
evaluation are then X4 and a newly calculated X3 using equation (3.36). The steps of comparison
and update of the intervals are repeated until the desired accuracy is attained. With this
procedure, the search technique guarantees that each evaluation of the function ψ(X) brackets
the maximum to an interval that is λ-times the size of the preceding interval [67].
Choosing a random value for X and using this value as one of the limits of the interval in which
ψ(X) is evaluated, proofs that the search technique ends in the equilibrium point of the game.
That is why, initialising the search with one limit randomly chosen and then performing the
golden ratio technique results in Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1: The golden ratio search.
Input : The payoff for different values of the return rate Θ per player i.
Output: The maximum payoff attainable at a stable return rate Θ per player i.
Initialise cm, φ, β, ∆, w, p, bR, b3P ,
MCN ,
RCN ,
3PCN , RM , RR, R3P ;1
Find a random value for Θ per player i;2
Calculate payoff for Θ as [0, random, 1] per player i;3
Identify interval limits k, l;4
if Payoff of golden ratio in [0, random] > Payoff of golden ratio in [1, random] then5
Set interval [0, random] to [k, l];6
else Set interval [random, 1] to [k, l]7
end8
Identify new interval limits m,n;9
Initialise count← 0, stop count == 3, stopped← False;10
while not stopped do11
if Payoff for m > for n then12
Set l to n;13
else Set k to m;14
end15
if No change in payoffs then16
count+ 1;17
else count == 0;18
end19
if count == stop count then20
stopped == True;21
end22
end23
The cost of collection analysed in Section 3.2 is directly reflected in the payoff functions described
in Section 3.3. The concave payoff function resulting from a continuous cost of collection can
easily be searched for its maximum with the golden ratio technique. With the introduction of
the discontinuous reverse logistics cost function, the golden ration search is not applicable any
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longer as it only works with continuous functions. That is why, with the function ψ(X) turning
discontinuous, ψ(X) needs to be divided up into positive intervals. Within these intervals the
function is continuous. Therefore, the golden ratio search becomes applicable again.
The interactions between the three players is now simulated in the game of a manufacturer pro-
ducing electronic equipment. The parameters applied to model the game situation are according
to Savaskan et al. [73] for the market mechanisms and according to Fleischmann et al. [30] for
the reverse logistics cost.
The parameters that describe the game situation are aligned with the assumptions made in
Section 3.1. Taken from Savaskan et al. [73], the demand function for the product is linear
downward sloping. A real-world product example could be the single-use cameras of Kodak.
Retailers that also develop films, send the single-use cameras back to Eastman Kodak Company,
where the company uses up to 76% of a used camera for the manufacturing fo a new one.
Similar collection activities are undertaken by Canon for print and copy cartridges. However,
the general term of electronic equipment is used to describe the product in the simulation to
keep the example as universally applicable as possible. Based on Atasu et al. [3] the parameters
are chosen to resemble economies and diseconomies of scale. In Table 3.1 all parameters with
regards to the market environment are defined.
Description Parameter Numerical example
Cost of manufacturing a new product cm e 0.5
Cost savings from the re-use per unit ∆ e 0.2
Wholesale price per unit w e 1.08
Retail price per unit p e 1.37
Downward sloping linear demand function with
Positive parameter 1 φ 0.5
Positive parameter 2 β 0.3
Scaling parameter per unit for
Manufacturer RM 0.08
Retailer RR 0.04
Third-party R3P 0.02
Table 3.1: The parameter settings for the market mechanisms in the benchmark scenario.
In 2004, Fleischmann et al. [30] illustrate recycling processes by using the numerical example of
an electronic equipment manufacturer adapted from Fleischmann et al. [29] in 2001. For example,
OEMs like Canon or Xerox re-manufacture and re-sell used copiers that had been collected from
the customers. Using the same equipment for manufacturing and re-manufacturing the recovery
process is carried out at the plant of the OEM. The modular design of the copiers allow the re-
use of product parts. Additionally, the recovery of printers is another real-world example. This
example will again make use of the general example of electronic equipment as a product to allow
conclusions that are applicable in various environments. The plant of the OEM is located in
Europe. The logistics network is designed around the plant as its centre. It is assumed that the
manufacturer serves retailers in 20 major European cities leading to approximately two retailers
per 100 km. The inhabitants living within the service area of a retailer create a proportional
demand at each retailer. The volume of returned used products is in turn proportional to the
volume of sales. The contribution margin of the returns is assumed to be sufficient for the
products to be re-manufactured.
Parameters that Fleischmann et al. [30] do not address explicitly are approximated in alignment
with the given information. The customer density is approximated in compliance with the
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amount of customers reached by a collecting agent through the agent’s logistics network. The
parameters of Fleischmann et al. [30] are scaled down to work in the same dimensions and to
be on the same level as the parameters of Savaskan et al. [73]. The cost part of the operation
that is responsible for the recycling activities forms the fixed cost per facility, since the focus lies
on the reverse supply chain. The capacity per service facility is aligned with the overall market
area. All parameters used to compute the reverse logistics cost per player are listed in Table 3.2.
Description Parameter Numerical example
Transport cost per km per unit
Customer - Service facility T e 0.005
Service facility - Manufacturer t e 0.012
Volume per truck
Customer - Service facility V 200 m3
Service facility - Manufacturer v 800 m3
Customer density in service area
Manufacturer ρM 0.3
Retailer ρR 0.5
Third-party ρ3P 0.8
Fixed cost per service facility
Manufacturer FM e 500 000
Retailer FR e 8 750
Third-party F3P e 1 000
Capacity per service facility
Manufacturer κM 500 000 m
3
Retailer κM 25 000 m
3
Third-party κM 18 000 m
3
Avg. distance to the manufacturer ` 1 000 km
Table 3.2: The parameter settings for reverse logistics cost in the benchmark scenario.
The steps to identify the equilibrium points per player are described next. Not only one concave
payoff function per player, but each concave payoff function per interval per player has to be
included to successfully apply the golden ration search technique.
First of all, the maximum of each interval is found and compared using the Algorithm 3.2. Each
interval is searched for positive payoffs. It is assumed that each player would reduce its collection
effort before choosing an increase, as it is less costly to use less resources than to invest more.
Therefore, if no positive values are found within the interval, the search moves one interval to
the left.
Secondly, every maximum of an interval that is found by applying Algorithm 3.2 is used to ap-
proximate an envelope function that connects all optimal collection rates and the corresponding
payoffs. Every member in a given family of curves is tangent to an envelope curve. A general
example describes a family of circles with radius R. Each centre of a circle lies on another circle
with radius G. The envelope of this family of circles is then described by a bigger circle of
radius G + R and a smaller circle of radius |G− R|. A parameter o usually defines the familiy
of curves. Intersection occurs between members that differ by a small amount of δo. As δo
converges towards zero the locus of the points of intersection form the envelope. Taking the
partial derivative with respect to o, equating to zero and eliminating o denotes the function that
describes the envelope [60]. The function is described by polynomial approximation, since some
points of the envelope function are already known through the maxima. The estimation process
of a value y′ of the function f(x) for a value x′ that for example lies between x1 and x2 is called
interpolation[61].
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Algorithm 3.2: The golden ratio search for discontinuous collection cost.
Input : The payoff for different values of the return rate Θ per player i.
Output: The maximum payoff attainable at a stable return rate Θ per player i.
Initialise cm, φ, β, ∆, w, p, bR, b3P ,
MCD,
RCD,
3PCD, RM , RR, R3P ϕM , ϕR, ϕ3P , FM , FR, F3P ,1
κM , κR, κ3P , AM , AR, A3P , T, t, V, v l, r;2
Find a random value for Θ per player i;3
Identify interval ending and beginning ;4
Initialise False;5
while not stop do6
if payoff of ending random < 0 then7
Set ending of interval to random− 1;8
else Stop = True;9
end10
end11
Initialise False;12
Set beginning to ending −0.9998;13
while not stop do14
if payoff of beginning random < 0 then15
Set beginning of interval to random+ 0.0001;16
else Stop = True;17
end18
end19
Calculate payoff for tau as beginning and ending of interval per player i;20
Identify interval limits k, l;21
if Payoff of golden ratio in [0, random] > Payoff of golden ratio in [1, random] then22
Set interval [0, random] to [k, l];23
else Set interval [random, 1] to [k, l]24
end25
Identify new interval limits m,n;26
Initialise count, stop count, False;27
while not stopped do28
if Payoff for m > for n then29
Set l to n;30
else Set k to m;31
end32
if No change in payoffs then33
count+ 1;34
else count == 0;35
end36
if count == stop count then37
stopped == True;38
end39
end40
Approximating a function f(x) over an interval (A,B) with the help of a simpler function like
the polynomial g(x) is a branch of numerical analysis. The approximation tries to keep the error
between f(x) − g(x) over the interval (A,B) as small as possible. Known values yi = f(xi) at
points x0, x1, x2 . . . xn provide the basis for the approximation. At these points g(x) is chosen to
give a zero error. Making the error at intermediate x values as small as possible, can be achieved
by piece-wise fitting polynomials Pj to subintervals of (A,B). This results in matching nodes
between Pj(xj) and f(xi) as well as first derivatives of these functions at the nodes. Splines are
piecewise fitted polynomials that pass through nodes and whose first derivatives agree at these
nodes [59]. In the computer application, the least-squares metric is used to fit the data values
of an optimal return rate of a polynomial of degree 2.
Finally, the interval between the highest payoff obtained by Algorithm 3.2 and the maximum of
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the envelope functions per player is evaluated with the help of the golden ratio technique in its
standard form. Therefore, Algorithm 3.1 can be used to find an optimal return rate with the
highest corresponding payoff as a result of this three-step procedure.
3.4.1 Non-cooperative game with highest payoff per unit
In a first evaluation, the highest payoff per unit per player with the corresponding return rate
per player is determined. The rate of returns Θ cannot exceed a total of 100%. The benchmark
model of the game incorporating the parameters described previously, leads to the results of
the highest payoff per unit per player represented in Table 3.3. The highest payoff per unit of
the manufacturer is e 0.04441 achieved through the corresponding return rate of 47% specific to
the manufacturer. The manufacturer has a collection density of 30% and thus collects approx-
imately 14% of the total volume of returns available in the market area. The retailer returns
approximately 21% of used products, because the retailer’s highest payoff per unit of e 0.02453 is
achieved at a collection rate of 42% with a customer density of 50%. The collection rate specific
to the third-party of 27% leads to the third parties’ highest payoff per unit of e 0.00065. With
the highest density of all players of 80%, the third party collects 21% of all returns available
to the market area as well. The sum of all return rates results in a total of 56%. Therefore,
each player can aim for the collection rate with the highest payoff per unit as the 100% is not
exceeded in this non-cooperative version of the benchmark scenario.
Manufacturer Retailer Third-party
Player specific return rate 47% 42% 27%
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.02453 e 0.00065
Proportion of returns 14% 21% 21%
Table 3.3: The player’s highest payoff per unit in the benchmark scenario.
With the help of Algorithm 3.1 searching the optima per player between the highest payoff per
unit obtained with the maximum of the envelope function and Algorithm 3.2, the game can be
simulated as depicted in Figure 3.13. This simulation shows the convergence towards the same
results that have been discussed and displayed in Table 3.3. In this specific case, the retailer
and the third-party have the same proportion on the rate of returns.
3.4.2 Non-cooperative game with highest payoff over the entire market area
So far, all of results focused on the payoffs per unit. What if this concentration shifts towards
the profit achievable in the entire market area with a certain price per unit at a specific rate?
For the general mathematical model that answers this question let
Pi be the payoff per unit of player i,
ui be the units attainable to player i in the specific interval, and
Θi be the variable that describes the rate of return of player i in the specific interval.
Then the maximum payoff per market area can be calculated by
max
∑
PiuiΘi . (3.38)
According to the payoff function per unit of the manufacturer in Figure 3.10(b) there are four
different intervals the manufacturer could operate in. The sum of all payoffs per unit is highest
in interval four, where the manufacturer specific rate of collection is at 85% translating to
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 Chapter 3. Modelling reverse logistics as a game
Manufacturer Retailer Third-party
Player specific return rate 85% 85% 27%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 66 617.57 e 986.21
Proportion of returns 26% 42% 21%
Table 3.4: The player’s highest payoff per area in benchmark scenario.
26% of the entire market area. Therefore, the highest payoff results in e 75 704.15 per area
for the manufacturer. For the retailer, operating in seven different intervals, as displayed in
Figure 3.11(b), the highest payoff per area is computed in interval seven. In this interval, the
specific collection rate is at 85% for the retailer, comparable to the manufacturer. The 42% of
collection in the market area leads to a payoff of e 66 617.57 per area for the retailer. Both
players move away from their highest payoff per unit to receive an even higher payoff per area
with more returns collected to a lower level of payoff per unit. However, the third-party has five
profitable intervals corresponding to Figure 3.12(b). Therefore, the collection within the third
interval keeps achieving the highest payoff for the third-party. That is why, the third-parties’
specific rate of collection stays at 27% or 21% overall collection rate for the entire market area.
The third-party receives a payoff per area of e 986.21 in the third interval. Even though, the
third-party would achieve a slightly higher payoff per area if the collection would be carried out
in the sixth interval, it is unlikely that the third-party would open up two new facilities, making
a loss, before opening up service facility number six and thus increasing the payoff. Additionally,
the third-party collecting 38% in interval six would exceed the collection rate limit of 100% for
all players. However, the manufacturer would collect up to the preferred return rate first as
being the Stackelberg leader. It is assumed that the retailer has a greater market power than
the third-party, because the retailer invests more in advertising for the collection reflected by
a higher scaling parameter. Therefore, the retailer would collect up to the preferred collection
level as well. This leaves the third-party with the collection in interval three. As illustrated in
Table 3.4, all collection rates summed up result in 89% and thus do not exceed the 100%-limit.
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Figure 3.13: The simulation of the benchmark scenario.
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Sensitivity and scenario analysis
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The non-cooperative game is analysed with regards to stability of the parameters as well as the
outcomes in different scenarios. Therefore, the parameters originating from Savaskan et al. [73]
and Fleischmann et al. [30] are changed slightly. A sensitivity analysis is carried out on the
parameters that describe the categories customer density, transport and fixed cost of operating
a service facility. Different scenarios with focus on the logistics network of the players as well as
the influence of a small or a large market area are evaluated in the scenario analysis.
4.1 Sensitivity of the parameters
The effect of changes per parameter in the market environment determines how sensitive the
payoffs in the game are to the input. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis assesses the robustness
of results in regards to applied data and uncertain assumptions [48]. The question of what
happens to an optimal solution if the coefficients of the non-linear and discontinuous problem
vary is investigated with the help of this analysis. In answering this question not only the results
of changes in conditions, but also the possibilities of influencing the game become apparent [79].
The sensitivity analysis becomes a crucial part in the methodology because the status of an
optimal solution in the game cannot be understood correctly without it. Fiacco [24] demonstrates
with the following example that even the solution of very simple mathematical problems differ
slightly or drastically for minor perturbations within the parameters. The problem
min ε x (4.1)
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subject tox ≥ −1 (4.2)
is solved by x(ε) = −1 if ε > 0, x(ε) as any chosen value in [−1,∞) if ε = 0 or with no finite
solution for ε < 0. An optimal objective function value of this problem has no lower bound
for the values of ε and is given by f∗(ε) = −ε, 0. Therefore, even with small variations of ε
the solution of the problem can be finite and unique, unbounded or solved by infinitely many
solutions. That is why, an overview of techniques in non-linear programming are presented
that provides conditions under which solutions well-behave locally and solution properties are
estimated as functions of parameters. Differences in the optimal objective function value with
variations in a parameter that appears in the right-hand side of the constraints are usually
analysed through the theory of point-to-set-maps. “A point-to-set-map Ω from a set X into a
set Y is a map which associates a subset of Y with each point of X . Equivalently, Ω can be
viewed as a function from the set X into the power set 2Y” [47, p. 591]. Analysing the rate
of change for an optimal value function at a solution point leads to the stability properties of
this function. There are several forms of implicit function theorems that deal with the problem
of solving equations of the form φ(x, y) = 0 in terms of x and y that are applied in functional
analysis. There are also approaches that obtain bounds of parametric solutions and errors to
not only address the continuity or differential properties of an optimal value [24].
The three groups of parameters that can influence the outcome of the game primarily are density,
variable and fixed cost. The sensitivity of the objective functions is analysed per parameter in
which each of these components is slightly altered. The new results are then compared to the
outcome of the benchmark scenario to draw conclusions about the influence of each component
for the purpose of the analysis.
4.1.1 Changes in customer density
The changes in customer density parameters are analysed first. In manufacturing, a high density
can involve access to a greater pool of resources or customers. In consumption, an increase in
density can lead to a higher accessibility in goods and services. Not only shorter distances, but
also the increase in access points favours a high density. Therefore, benefits can be derived from
the decreasing cost of accessing different features with increasing density [69]. In the original
model of the game, the density differs for each player. The underlying assumption is that
within a specific market area the density of customers that can be reached through the different
collecting agents is the highest for the third-party followed by the retailer and the lowest for
the manufacturer. A reason lies in the difference of the logistical networks of the players. For
example, customers of Dell wait several days to get their product, since Dell manufactures and
distributes directly. On the other side, Hewlett Packard distributes products indirectly through
retailers. Therefore, customers of Hewlett Packard are able to get their product immediately
from the store [11]. The density levels of the different players were set in accordance with
these examples and logical reasoning, since there is no exact data available. Therefore, the
third-parties’ customer density is set to 80%, resembling the dense network that is used to serve
not only one but various clients and thus reaching the most customers. A network with 50%
customer density that is influenced by the structure of the retail stores is made available to
the retailer. The manufacturer only has the network available that had been created solely for
collection purposes. Therefore, the density of the manufacturer’s network is set to the lowest
level of 30%. Not only a sensitivity, but also a scenario analysis is performed next to experiment
with the level of the customer density parameters.
An increase in 1%, followed by 5% and 10% is inflicted on each of the collecting agents. Compared
to the benchmark scenario, the payoff per unit and area per player does not change unless the
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volume of returns exceeds the capacity of the service facilities. The individual collection rates
decrease with an increase in customer density. These changes are displayed in Table 4.1. The
manufacturer and the retailer steadily decrease their individual collection rate. With an increase
in customer density by 1% and 10% the manufacturer decreases the player specific return rate by
approximately 1% and 12% respectively. The retailer decreases the player specific return rate by
approximately 7% with the retailer’s customer density is set to 60%. However, the third-party
obtains a lower payoff per unit as well as a lower payoff per area with an increase in customer
density while the rate of collection rises. The number of service facilities the third-party has
to open up is dependent on the customer density. Therefore, a higher customer density might
induce the opening of a new facility allocating more fixed cost to the returns. This explains the
variations in payoff of the third-party with a changing density.
Benchmark Density +1% Density +5% Density +10%
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.04441 e 0.04441 e 0.04441
Player specific return rate 47% 46% 40% 35%
Proportion of returns 14% 14% 14% 14%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 75 704.15 e 75 704.15 e 80 225.66
Player specific return rate 85% 83% 73% 71%
Proportion of returns 26% 26% 26% 28%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02453 e 0.02453 e 0.02453
Player specific return rate 42% 42% 39% 35%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 66 617.57 e 66 617.57 e 72 729.65
Player specific return rate 85% 83% 77% 83%
Proportion of returns 42% 42% 42% 50%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00063 e 0.00053 e 0.00050
Player specific return rate 27% 26% 26% 35%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 22% 32%
Max. payoff per area e 986.21 e 949.71 e 822.43 e 672.51
Player specific return rate 27% 26% 26% 25%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 22% 22%
Table 4.1: The effects of an increasing customer density on the payoff and return rate per player.
The densities are decreased by 1%, 5% and 10% in the second step. The decrease in customer
density leads to an increase in player specific return rate as displayed in Table 4.2. Unless the
number of returns exceed the service facilities’ capacity, the payoff per unit stays the same for
all players. The manufacturer and the retailer experience an increase in their collection rates by
approximately 24% and 11% for a decreasing density of 10%. The manufacturer has to collect
all the returns obtainable for the density of 71% to ensure reaching the highest payoff per area.
Additionally, the retailer has to collect 53% for the highest payoff per area.The third-parties’
payoff per unit as well as the payoff per area increases with a changing individual return rate.
Therefore, the third-party benefits from the low collection rates of the manufacturer and the
third-party.
In conclusion, the third-party is effected the most by changes in customer density. Changes result
in differences in collection rate and payoff, since the network of the third-party is influenced by
the customer density. Therefore, the customer density of the third-party needs to be defined
precisely while setting up this model. The manufacturer and the retailer are more flexible when
it comes to the choice of the right customer density. Even though the individual collection rate is
influenced, the maximum payoff per unit and per area only varies if the service facilities cannot
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Benchmark Density −1% Density −5% Density −10%
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.04441 e 0.04441 e 0.04441
Player specific return rate 47% 49% 57% 71%
Proportion of returns 14% 14% 14% 14%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 75 704.15 e 65 191.34 e 44 403.69
Player specific return rate 85% 88% 79% 71%
Proportion of returns 26% 26% 21% 14%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02453 e 0.02453 e 0.02453
Player specific return rate 42% 43% 47% 53%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 58 005.46 e 58 005.46 e 51 538.53
Player specific return rate 85% 72% 79% 77%
Proportion of returns 42% 35% 35% 31%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00070 e 0.00075 e 0.00088
Player specific return rate 27% 26% 26% 36%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 20% 28%
Max. payoff per area e 986.21 e 1 076.78 e 1 046.17 e 1 586.55
Player specific return rate 27% 49% 26% 36%
Proportion of returns 21% 39% 22% 25%
Table 4.2: The effects of a decreasing customer density on the payoff and return rate per player.
cope with the volume of returns. In general, the higher the customer density, the more returns
can be collected resulting in an increase in payoff per player.
4.1.2 Changes in transport cost
The variable component of the cost of collection that is charged for transport activities is influ-
enced by the fuel price. What happens if the fuel price increases or decreases by 1%, 5% and
10% due to changes in the economy? All effects will be compared to the benchmark scenario
in Section 3.4 with milk-run transport cost of e 0.005 per km per unit and a direct shipment
transport cost of e 0.012 per km per unit to draw conclusions and adapt the configuration of the
model. The cost of collection is dependent on the distance travelled and thus the fuel price as
well as the truck capacity. The low-volume truck that carries out the milk-run transport charges
e 0.000025 per unit when fully loaded. The high-volume truck is used for direct shipments with
full-truck load and assigns e 0.000015 to every unit. The cost of milk-run and direct shipment
transport determine the variable part of the cost of collection.
An increase of 1% in fuel price would result in a cost for milk-run transport of e 0.00505 and of
e 0.01212 for direct shipment. The price of fuel rising by 5% and 10% results in e 0.00525 and
e 0.0126 as well as e 0.0055 and e 0.0132 for milk-run and direct shipment respectively. The
effects of the different steps of increasing fuel price are displayed in Table 4.3. With a rising
fuel price, the payoff per player per unit as well as per area decreases. The rate of collection
to obtain the highest payoff per player stays at a constant level. However, the third-party has
to adjust the rate of return more vividly, since the logistics network of the third-party strongly
depends on the balance between cost of opening up a new service facility and transport cost.
Illustrated in Figure 4.1(b), the manufacturer’s highest payoff per unit decreases by e 0.00013,
while the payoff per area is e 562.03 with an increase in fuel price of 10%. The retailer’s highest
payoff per unit, depicted in Figure 4.2(b), as well as the payoff per area decreases by e 0.0001
and e 415 respectively. The 10% increase leads to a decrease of e 0.00014 for the third-parties’
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(a) M’s payoff in benchmark
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(b) M’s payoff with fuel +10%
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(c) M’s payoff with fuel −10%
Figure 4.1: The effect of a changing fuel price on M’s payoff per unit.
highest payoff per unit, illustrated in Figure 4.3(b), and e 190.33 for the payoff per area.
Benchmark Fuel +1% Fuel +5% Fuel +10%
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.04439 e 0.04434 e 0.04428
Player specific return rate 47% 47% 47% 47%
Proportion of returns 14% 14% 14% 14%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 75 647.71 e 75 422.50 e 75 142.12
Player specific return rate 85% 85% 85% 85%
Proportion of returns 26% 26% 26% 26%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02452 e 0.02448 e 0.02443
Player specific return rate 42% 42% 42% 42%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 66 576.07 e 66 410.07 e 66 202.57
Player specific return rate 85% 85% 85% 85%
Proportion of returns 42% 42% 42% 42%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00064 e 0.00057 e 0.00051
Player specific return rate 27% 27% 28% 27%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 22% 22%
Max. payoff per area e 986.21 e 968.50 e 892.42 e 795.88
Player specific return rate 27% 27% 28% 27%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 22% 22%
Table 4.3: The effects of an increasing fuel price on the payoff and return rate per player.
A decreasing fuel price by 1%, 5% and 10% results in a milk-run transport cost of e 0.00495,
e 0.00475 and e 0.0045 respectively. Additionally, the direct shipment cost decreases by 1% to
e 0.01188, by 5% to e 0.0114 and by 10% to e 0.0108. A decrease in fuel price lowers the cost of
transport directly. That is why, the players’ payoffs per unit as well as per area increase as shown
in Table 4.4. The collection rate per player of the manufacturer and the retailer is not influenced
by the fuel price. Depicted in Figure 4.1(c), the manufacturer increases the highest payoff by
e 0.00013 per unit if the fuel price decreases by 10%. Additionally, the manufacturer’s payoff
per area is e 567.15 higher than before. The retailer’s payoff per unit increases by e 0.00011
as well as the payoff per area rises by e 414.99. The changes in the retailer’s payoff per unit
are displayed in Figure 4.2(c). The adaptation of the number of service facilities according to
the changing transport cost is responsible for the third-parties’ variation in return rate resulting
in an increase of payoff per area of e 154.43 in the 10%-example. The payoff per unit of the
third-party increases steadily with a decreasing fuel price. Illustrated in Figure 4.3(c), the third-
parties’ payoff per unit increases by e 0.00015 with a 10% fuel price decrease. Therefore, the
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Figure 4.2: The effect of a changing fuel price on R’s payoff per unit.
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(c) 3P’s payoff with fuel −10%
Figure 4.3: The effect of a changing fuel price on 3P’s payoff per unit.
decrease in fuel price mirrors the observations on the increase in fuel price for all players. The
lower the fuel price, the higher the payoffs per player.
Benchmark Fuel −1% Fuel −5% Fuel −10%
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.04442 e 0.04447 e 0.04454
Player specific return rate 47% 47% 47% 47%
Proportion of returns 14% 14% 14% 14%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 75 760.63 e 75 987.08 e 76 271.30
Player specific return rate 85% 85% 85% 85%
Proportion of returns 26% 26% 26% 26%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02454 e 0.02458 e 0.02464
Player specific return rate 42% 42% 42% 42%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 66 659.07 e 66 825.06 e 67 032.56
Player specific return rate 85% 85% 85% 85%
Proportion of returns 42% 42% 42% 42%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00068 e 0.00073 e 0.00080
Player specific return rate 27% 26% 26% 25%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 20%
Max. payoff per area e 986.21 e 993.91 e 1 061.69 e 1 140.64
Player specific return rate 27% 26% 26% 28%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 23%
Table 4.4: The effects of a decreasing fuel price on the payoff and return rate per player.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.1. Sensitivity of the parameters 63
A changing fuel price influences the cost of transport for both transport options, milk-run
transport and direct shipping, and for every player directly. It is significant to initialise a valid
transport cost to the model, since it changes the level of payoff per player. With an increase in
fuel price the highest payoffs attainable are lower compared to the benchmark scenario, while
with a decrease in fuel price the payoffs rise. For the manufacturer and the retailer, the rates of
collection to achieve the highest payoff stay constant. However, the third-party decides on the
number of service facilities by balancing out operational cost and transport cost. Therefore, it
is crucial for the third-party to work with accurate fuel prices to be able to design an optimal
logistics network.
4.1.3 Changes in fixed cost
The effects caused by changes in fixed cost is analysed as a third aspect. The annualised fixed
cost for operating a facility are aligned with Fleischmann et al. [30], namely that the cost for
operating the part of the facility that is carrying out the collection is included in the reverse
logistics cost.
The manufacturer as well as the retailer have an existing network structure that is suitable for
their forward supply chains. That is why, the location of the service facilities, the plant for the
manufacturer and the retail stores for the retailer, are at fixed locations. What would happen
if the price of land increases in the area where these service facilities are located? A reason for
the increase of land price can be found in opportunity costs due to limited space. Additionally,
the land price can rise due to favourable developments like for example an upgrade of the
infrastructure in the surrounding area. The effects of increasing land price for a specific area
is negligible for the third-party, since the third-parties’ network is flexible in the locations of
service facilities. The two scenarios in which the land price of the manufacturer and the land
price of the retailer change are investigated. The manufacturer’s land price will increase by 1%,
5% and 10% from e 500 000 in the benchmark scenario. Afterwards, the manufacturer’s land
price will be decreased by 1% to 10% to further analyse the sensitivity of a changing fixed cost.
A similar example will increase and decrease the annualised fixed cost of operating the service
facility of the retailer from e 8 750 in the benchmark scenario.
The increase and decrease in price of the manufacturer’s land does not only influence the manu-
facturer, but also the third-party. The third-parties’ payoff function is also effected by changes,
since the transfer price b3P , that the third-party receives for collecting a unit, depends on the
reverse logistics cost the manufacturer would pay if the unit was collected in the manufacturer’s
channel. The coherence of the two functions is described in equation (3.34).
In the first case, the manufacturer’s land price increases and thus the fixed cost of operating the
recovery facility is e 505 000 for a 1%, e 525 000 for a 5% and e 550 000 for a 10% increase. The
effects of the increase in land price are listed in Table 4.5. With an increase in land price of 10%,
the manufacturer’s payoff per unit decreases by e 0.00063. The decrease in payoff per unit is
illustrated in Figure 4.4(b). However, the 10% increase in the manufacturer’s land price results
in an increase of e 787.11 in the payoff per area. The manufacturer increasing the collection
rate due to the decreasing payoff per unit is responsible for this increase. The retailer’s payoff
or collection rate is not influenced by the increase in land price of the manufacturer in the non-
cooperative game. Even though the manufacturer’s payoff per unit decreases, the third-parties’s
payoff per unit increases as displayed in Figure 4.4(e). The increase in fixed cost benefits the
third-party, since the manufacturer is willing to subcontract the collection effort for a higher b3P
to the third-party as the cost to collect a unit becomes more expensive for the manufacturer.
The higher transfer price outweighs the cost of collection and thus results in an increase in
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(f) 3P’s payoff with land −10%
Figure 4.4: The effects of a changing land price of M on the payoff per unit of M and 3P.
the third-parties’ payoff per unit. Therefore, a 10% increase in the manufacturer’s land price
leads to an increase in the third-parties’ payoff per unit and payoff per area by e 0.00012 and
e 179.55 respectively. In conclusion, an increase in the manufacturer’s fixed cost does not only
influence the highest payoff per unit attainable for the manufacturer negatively, it also benefits
the collection channel of the third-party. Nevertheless, an increase in return rate does lead to
higher payoffs per area for the manufacturer.
Benchmark M’s land+1% M’s land +5% M’s land +10%
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.04434 e 0.04409 e 0.04378
Player specific return rate 47% 47% 47% 47%
Proportion of returns 14% 14% 14% 14%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 75 790.07 e 76 117.33 e 76 491.26
Player specific return rate 85% 86% 87% 88%
Proportion of returns 26% 26% 26% 26%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00066 e 0.00071 e 0.00077
Player specific return rate 27% 27% 27% 27%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 986.21 e 1 004.17 e 1 075.98 e 1 165.76
Player specific return rate 27% 27% 27% 27%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Table 4.5: The effects of an increasing land price of M on the payoff and return rate per player.
Decreasing the manufacturer’s land price reduces the fixed cost of operating the re-manufacturing
facility by 1% to e 495 000, by 5% to e 475 000 and by 10% to e 450 000. The manufacturer’s
payoff per unit increases by e 0.00062 as illustrated in Figure 4.4(c) with a land price decreasing
by 10%. Additionally, the payoff per area of the manufacturer is decreased by e 957.3 with
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this change as the return rate is lowered. Further effects of changes are displayed in Table 4.6.
Depicted in Figure 4.4(f), the decreasing land price does not have any positive effects on the
third-parties’ payoff function. The decrease in the manufacturer’s land price by 10% decreases
the third-parties’ payoff per unit and area by by e 0.00012 and e 179.54 respectively. The
observations correlate with the insights gained from the increase in land price.
Benchmark M’s land−1% M’s land −5% M’s land −10%
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.04447 e 0.04472 e 0.04503
Player specific return rate 47% 47% 47% 47%
Proportion of returns 14% 14% 14% 14%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 75 616.52 e 75 248.52 e 74 746.85
Player specific return rate 85% 85% 84% 83%
Proportion of returns 26% 26% 25% 25%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00064 e 0.00059 e 0.00053
Player specific return rate 27% 27% 27% 27%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 986.21 e 968.26 e 896.44 e 806.67
Player specific return rate 27% 27% 27% 27%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Table 4.6: The effects of a decreasing land price of M on the payoff and return rate per player.
In the second case, the retailer’s cost of operating the service facility is increased by a rise in
land price. The fixed cost of the retailer of e 8 750 is increased by 1% to e 8 838, by 5% to
e 9 188 and by 10% to e 9 625. This increase only effects the retailer in the non-cooperative
game. The changes are illustrated in Table 4.7. A 10% increase in land price decreases the
retailer’s payoff to e 0.00022 per unit, depicted in Figure 4.5(b), and e 771.2 per area, since the
return rate stays constant.
Benchmark R’s land+1% R’s land +5% R’s land +10%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02451 e 0.02442 e 0.02431
Player specific return rate 42% 42% 42% 42%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 66 540.01 e 66 231.53 e 65 846.37
Player specific return rate 85% 85% 85% 85%
Proportion of returns 42% 42% 42% 42%
Table 4.7: The effects of an increasing land price of R on the payoff and return rate per player.
A decreasing land price results in a decreasing cost of operating the service facility of the
retailer. Therefore, the retailer’s fixed cost is decreased by 1%, 5% and 10% resulting in e 8 663,
e 8 313 and e 7 875 respectively. The changes in the highest attainable payoff of the retailer are
described in Table 4.8. Resembling the conclusions drawn from the increase in land price, a 10%
decrease causes the the retailer’s payoff per unit to rise bye 0.00022. This increase is illustrated
in Figure 4.5(c). The retailer’s payoff per area increases by e 771.19 with the retailer’s land
price by decreasing 10% and a constant return rate.
Illustrated in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, the shape of the payoff functions per unit of the man-
ufacturer and the retailer change in the level of payoff attainable. An increase in land price
of the manufacturer might increase the transfer price for the third-party, since the collection
through the third-party becomes more economic. Nevertheless, an increase in land price of the
manufacturer or the retailer causes a decrease in the highest payoff per unit. Comparing the
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Figure 4.5: The effects of a changing land price of R on the payoff per unit of R.
Benchmark R’s land−1% R’s land −5% R’s land −10%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02455 e 0.02464 e 0.02475
Player specific return rate 42% 42% 42% 42%
Proportion of returns 21% 21% 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 66 694.25 e 67 002.72 e 67 388.76
Player specific return rate 85% 85% 85% 85%
Proportion of returns 42% 42% 42% 42%
Table 4.8: The effects of a decreasing land price of R on the payoff and return rate per player.
observation of the retailer’s payoff reduction to the manufacturer’s, the decrease in the highest
payoff per unit is less drastic for the retailer. However, in terms of the highest payoff per area
the levels of the manufacturer increase with a rise and changing return rate while the retailer
decreases with an increase in land price and a constant return rate. Additionally, a decrease in
the manufacturer’s land price results in a decrease in payoff per area with a decreasing collecting
rate, while the retailer’s decrease in land price results in an increase of the highest payoff per
area at a constant collection rate. In the non-cooperative version of the game, the changes in
land price only effect the player whose fixed cost varies. The fixed cost influences the attainable
level of payoff and should thus be chosen carefully to set up a valid model.
4.2 The parameters in different scenarios
Scenario compared to sensitivity analysis does not only investigate what happens to the outcome
of the model if one parameter is changed slightly, but it evaluates what happens if several
parameters forming a specific scenario are changed. Significant changes in processes or the
environment are evaluated with the help of scenarios. While in scenario planning a variety
of possible future scenarios is created to make strategic decisions, this project will make use
of scenario analysis to investigate the effects on the model in changing market environments.
Especially uncertainties in the business itself or the surrounding environment are used to create
scenarios [62].
The benchmark scenario matches a payoff function with every player to determine the player’s
highest payoff. What happens if the customer density is the same for every player? Are there
still differences between the collection channels of the players due to slightly different logistics
networks? Additionally, the market area size is changed. How would this change influence the
payoff function of each player? Will economies of scale be reached within a smaller market area?
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Will diseconomies of scale evolve in a larger market area? Four different scenarios are generated,
to answer these questions.
4.2.1 Scenario 1: A high customer density
The question arises on how the benchmark scenario would change, if all players would have
the same density parameter. What conclusions can be drawn about the coherence between the
collecting effort and the customer density? Every player will be assigned with the same density
to answer this question. The extreme case of a 100%-density is evaluated by comparison to the
benchmark scenario. Therefore, every collecting agent can reach 100% of the customers within
the predefined service area.
A possible scenario could be a collection of returns carried out in Austria, Europe. The popu-
lation density, describing the number of people in relation to the size of area occupied by these
people, is approximately 100% for Austria [84]. All players will be assumed to be able to reach
every customer in this area in the generation of this scenario. Therefore, the customer density
of each player is set to 100%. Even though Austria’s market size is smaller and the land price
is slightly higher, all parameters except for the customer density will be set to the levels of the
benchmark scenario. Thereby, this scenario focuses on the influence of customer density to the
logistics networks of the different players.
Comparing the outcome for the individual density and the density of 100% for each player leads
to the following results. The manufacturer’s individual density is 30% in the benchmark scenario
that is lower than 100%. In Figure 4.6(d) compared to Figure 4.6(a), the manufacturer is still
able to obtain a positive payoff for return rates that are greater than 30% up to approximately
82%. For higher collection efforts the payoffs would not be economically viable. The effort of
collection needs to be at 47% for the individual density to reach the manufacturer’s highest payoff
of e 0.04441 per unit. This is visualized by Figure 4.6(a). Additionally, Figure 4.6(d) depicts
that the individual collection effort of 14% has to be undertaken with a 100%-density to reach the
maximum payoff per unit. The density of 100% is higher than the retailer’s individual density
of 50% in the benchmark scenario. Even with a return rate of approximately 97% the retailer
can still attain a positive payoff according to Figure 4.6(e) when compared to the benchmark
scenario in Figure 4.6(b). The highest payoff of e 0.02453 per unit in the benchmark scenario
is achieved by an individual collection effort of 42%. This payoff per unit can also be obtained
by 21% in the 100%-scenario as shown in Figure 4.6(e). The third-parties’ individual density is
given by 80% in the benchmark scenario. Therefore, the collection effort is higher in the case
of the 100%-density-scenario. Figure 4.6(f) compared to Figure 4.6(c) depicts that there are
greater chances for the third-party to generate a positive payoff with similar densities per player
than with individual densities. With a density of 100% the highest payoff of e 0.00035 per unit,
that is significantly lower than the e 0.00065 per unit in the benchmark scenario, is attained by
the specific collection effort of 28%. The third-parties’ logistics network seems to adapt better
to the slightly lower customer density of the benchmark scenario. Table 4.9 summarises that
the higher the density, the lower the collection effort needed to achieve the highest payoff per
unit for each player.
Table 4.9 does not only show the highest payoff per unit of each player but also displays the
highest payoff per area for each collecting agent. The manufacturer shows similar results for the
payoff per area as observed for the payoff per unit. As the density increases the highest payoff
per area rises by almost a half, while the collection effort decreases by 35% in the 100%-scenario.
The conclusion drawn for the manufacturer also applies to the retailer. With a rising density,
the effort of collection decreases. Besides, the highest payoff per area of the retailer increases
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(f) 3P’s payoff with 100% density
Figure 4.6: The effects of a 100% customer density on the payoff per unit per player.
Benchmark 100%-density
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.04441
Player specific return rate 47% 14%
Proportion of returns 14% 14%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 106 705.44
Player specific return rate 85% 50%
Proportion of returns 26% 50%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02453
Player specific return rate 42% 21%
Proportion of returns 21% 21%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 72 729.65
Player specific return rate 85% 50%
Proportion of returns 42% 50%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00035
Player specific return rate 27% 28%
Proportion of returns 21% 28%
Max. payoff per area e 986.21 –
Player specific return rate 27% –
Proportion of returns 21% –
Table 4.9: The effects of a 100% customer density on the return rate and payoff per player.
by e 6 112.08. The third-parties’ payoff per unit decreases from the 80%- to the 100%-scenario.
In the 100%-scenario, the third-party is not able to collect any more since the manufacturer
collects 50% as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer follows up to collect the remaining 50%.
Considering Figure 4.7 and comparing the players against each other, every player’s specific
return rate changes, when the density of all players equally rises to 100%. The manufacturer
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Figure 4.7: The player specific return rate with a 100% customer density.
and the retailer do not have to put as much effort into the collection as in the benchmark
scenario to reach the highest payoff per area that increases. However, the third-party is not able
to collect at all in the 100%-scenario. A change in density has great effects on all players as the
individual densities are generally lower. With 100% customer density amongst all players, the
collection rates of the manufacturer and the retailer converge towards a similar level.
4.2.2 Scenario 2: A low customer density
In the second scenario, the extreme case of a 10% customer density is evaluated and compared
to the benchmark scenario. The collection could be carried out in Norway, Europe as a possi-
ble example for this scenario. For Norway, the population density is approximately 10% [84].
Therefore, customers are sparely scattered over the market area. Fuel and land price are slightly
higher, but to focus on the influence of the customer density, these parameters are set to the
level of the benchmark scenario.
The collection for a customer density of 10% is not profitable for the third-party. Neither the
payoff per unit nor per area would lead to positive results. Therefore, the third-party is excluded
from further comparison.
The manufacturer’s payoff per unit with the individual customer density compared to the payoff
resulting from the 10%-density is illustrated in Figure 4.8(a) and Figure 4.8(c). Not only the
player specific collection rate and thus the shape of the payoff function changes drastically,
but also the manufacturer’s payoff per unit decreases by e 0.00002 as listed in Table 4.10. The
individual customer density leads to the payoff per unit for the retailer described in Figure 4.8(b).
Compared to the payoff per unit for the 10%-density, the highest payoff drops by e 0.001.
Additionally, the collection rate of the retailer increases significantly changing the payoff to the
function depicted in Figure 4.8(d).
The player specific collection rate increases for the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s highest
payoff per area. However, the highest payoff per area attainable are significantly lower than in
the benchmark scenario. Therefore, Figure 4.9 does not describe the differences in player specific
collection rate, but the changes in the level of payoff per area. The manufacturer’s payoff per
area decreases with the customer density of 10% by e 53 509.94. The retailer’s payoff per area
decreases by e 54 851.56 comparable to the manufacturer’s loss.
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Figure 4.8: The effects of a 10% customer density on the payoff per unit per player M and R.
Benchmark 10%-density
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.04439
Player specific return rate 47% 71%
Proportion of returns 14% 7%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 22 194.21
Player specific return rate 85% 71%
Proportion of returns 26% 7%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02353
Player specific return rate 42% 71%
Proportion of returns 21% 7%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 11 766.01
Player specific return rate 85% 71%
Proportion of returns 42% 7%
Table 4.10: The effects of a 10% customer density on the return rate and payoff per player.
The loss of payoff per area are drastic to both, the manufacturer and the retailer. The third-
party cannot even carry out a profitable collection in the deserted area of the scenario. The
importance of the customer density to the profitability of the collection channel is emphasised.
4.2.3 Scenario 3: A small market area
The average distance ` to the manufacturer’s recovery facility is reduced from 1 000 km in the
benchmark scenario to 200 km to emulate a scenario with a small market area. This change
reduces the original market area with a radius of 1 500 km to a market area with a radius of
300 km. A market area with this radius could be located in Germany, Europe for example. The
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.2. The parameters in different scenarios 71
M R
0
2
4
6
8
·104
P
ay
o
ff
p
er
a
re
a
in
e
Benchmark
10%-density
Figure 4.9: The payoff per area with a 10% customer density.
fuel price of Germany compared to the average fuel price of the market area in the European
region of the benchmark scenario is approximated to be 5% higher. Therefore, the milk-run cost
is set to e 0.00525 and the direct shipment cost to e 0.0126 [36]. The land price is estimated
to be at approximately the same level as in the benchmark scenario [82]. Nevertheless, the
smaller market area results in a lower capacity of the service facilities. The manufacturer has
a capacity of 50 000 and the retailer of 12 500. That is why, the cost of operation for the
service facilities decrease to e 50 000 for the manufacturer and e 6 250 for the retailer. The
third-parties’ logistics network is flexible with changes and thus has a fixed cost of operating
a service facility of e 1 000 while the capacity is set to 25 000. This information serves as a
framework to generate the scenario of a small market area. Comparing the benchmark scenario
with the small market area-scenario shows drastic changes in the payoff functions of the players.
In the benchmark scenario in Figure 4.10(a) the manufacturer has to extend the facility four
times, whereas within the smaller market area shown in Figure 4.10(d) there are only two exten-
sions necessary, due to a smaller volume of products available for collection. Similar observations
can be made comparing the retailer’s payoff functions in Figure 4.10(b) and Figure 4.10(e). With
the market area size of approximately 282 743 km2 the retailer has four retail stores available
to carry out collections instead of 20 for the market area size of approximately 7 068 583 km2 in
the benchmark scenario. A significant difference shows the payoff function of the third-party.
Whereas in the benchmark scenario in Figure 4.10(c) the third-party makes use of 28 facilities, in
the scenario with ` = 200 km the third-party occupies only two service facilities to gain positive
payoffs.
The maximum payoffs attainable and the rate of returns necessary to reach the optimum are
listed in Table 4.11. For the manufacturer and the retailer the maximum payoffs are notably
lower with a decrease in market size. In the ` = 200 km-scenario the manufacturer’s payoff per
unit reduces by approximately 20%. However, the manufacturer’s individual collection effort
that is necessary to collect the optimum rises by 12%. The rate of collection specific to the
retailer drops by 7% and the highest payoff per unit reduces by approximately 22%. In terms
of the payoff per area, the highest payoff attainable drops drastically by approximately 98% for
the manufacturer with a slightly lower return rate assigned to the payoff and by approximately
97% for the retailer with a decreasing collection rate. On the contrary, the decrease in market
area size benefits the third-party as the third-parties’ figures already imply. With an increasing
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(d) M’s payoff with ` = 200 km
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(f) 3P’s payoff with ` = 200 km
Figure 4.10: The effects of a decreasing market area size on the payoff per unit per player.
Benchmark ` = 200 km
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.03529
Player specific return rate 47% 59%
Proportion of returns 14% 18%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 1 764.31
Player specific return rate 85% 59%
Proportion of returns 26% 18%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.01906
Player specific return rate 42% 35%
Proportion of returns 21% 18%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 1 851.35
Player specific return rate 85% 71%
Proportion of returns 42% 35%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00228
Player specific return rate 27% 44%
Proportion of returns 21% 35%
Max payoff per area e 986.21 e 278.45
Player specific return rate 27% 55%
Proportion of returns 21% 44%
Table 4.11: The effects of a decreasing market area size on the return rate and payoff per player.
effort of collection by 17% the highest payoff per unit of the third-party more than triples to the
value of e 0.00228. Nevertheless, the payoff per area is approximately 72% lower than in the
benchmark scenario. The rate of collection increases slightly for the third-party in both cases.
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(f) 3P’s payoff with ` = 1 800 km
Figure 4.11: The effects of an increasing market area size on the payoff per unit per player.
4.2.4 Scenario 4: A large market area
In the fourth scenario, the average distance to the manufacturer is extended to 1 800 km. The
original market area grows to a new market area with an extended radius of 2 700 km. An
example for this scenario could be a market area in the USA. The fuel price in the USA is
notably lower and is approximated to be 50% less than in the European benchmark scenario.
This results in e 0.0025 for the milk-run and e 0.006 for the direct shipping cost [37]. Even
though the market area is larger, the land price in the industrial areas are higher [83]. With
the larger market area, the capacity of the manufacturer’s service facility increases to 5 000 000,
the retailer’s to 140 000 and the third-parties’ to 56 900. The fixed cost of operating a service
facility of the third-party is set to e 1 000, due to flexibility of location. The increase in capacity
together with the higher land price in the industrial areas of the US leads to e 5 000 000 for the
manufacturer and e 34 750 for the retailer for the cost of operating their service facility. The
larger market area shows great changes in the level of payoff achievable for each player when
compared to the benchmark scenario.
With the larger market area in Figure 4.11(d) the manufacturer has only one interval in which
positive payoffs can be achieved, instead of the four in the benchmark scenario. The extended
market area has now a size of approximately 22 902 210 km2 resulting in 36 retail stores that
serve as service facilities for the retailer. Comparing the retailer’s payoff function per unit in
Figure 4.11(b) and Figure 4.11(e), the shape of the function differs, because there are only two
positive intervals in the scenario with a large market area. Nevertheless, the drop in payoff per
unit is less extreme compared to the scenario that reduces the market area. The third-party has
six positive intervals to operate in. This drastic change in the third-parties payoff function per
unit is illustrated in Figure 4.11(f). Additionally, the highest payoff per unit of the third-party
increases as the third-party makes use of 56 service facilities in the flexible logistics network
available to the third-party.
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Benchmark ` = 1 800 km
Manufacturer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.04441 e 0.03072
Player specific return rate 47% 73%
Proportion of returns 14% 22%
Max. payoff per area e 75 704.15 e 153 581.51
Player specific return rate 85% 73%
Proportion of returns 26% 22%
Retailer’s
Max. payoff per unit e 0.02453 e 0.02224
Player specific return rate 42% 44%
Proportion of returns 21% 22%
Max. payoff per area e 66 617.57 e 178 061.47
Player specific return rate 85% 77%
Proportion of returns 42% 38%
Third-parties’
Max. payoff per unit e 0.00065 e 0.00232
Player specific return rate 27% 49%
Proportion of returns 21% 39%
Max payoff per area e 986.21 e 20 831.04
Player specific return rate 27% 49%
Proportion of returns 21% 39%
Table 4.12: The effects of an increasing market area size on the return rate and payoff per player.
In the ` = 1 800 km-scenario the manufacturer’s highest payoff per unit decreases by approxi-
mately 31% while the effort in collection increases up to 73% to reach this payoff. Nevertheless,
the payoff per area of the manufacturer rises to e 153 581.51 accompanying a collection rate
closer to the one of the benchmark scenario. The retailer’s payoff per unit is not reduced as
drastically as in the ` = 200 km-scenario, but it drops by approximately 9% featuring an only
a slight increase in collection rate compared to the benchmark scenario. However, a higher
collection effort results in an increased payoff per area of e 178 061.47 that is even higher than
the manufacturer’s payoff per area. At the same time, the third-party benefits greatly from
an extending market area size. While the collection effort increases, the maximum payoff per
unit achievable rises to e 0.00232. Additionally, with an increasing collection rate the payoff
per area exceeds the one from the benchmark scenario by approximately 20 times. With the
manufacturer collecting 21%, the retailer 38% and the third-party collecting 39% to achieve the
highest payoff per area, the limit of 100% collectable units is not exceeded.
4.3 Conclusions and arising questions
This section summarises the conclusions that can be drawn from the scenarios analysed. Sec-
tion 4.1 and Section 4.2 do not only show interesting conclusions within the scope of investigation,
but also give an outlook on further extensions to this study.
The changes in density illustrated in Section 4.1.1 show that with a higher density, the collection
effort to reach the highest payoff is lower. Having the highest density by maintaining the best
developed logistics network, the third-party benefits from this correlation. Both, manufacturer
and retailer could lower the rates of collection significantly, if they where able to make use of
a logistics network that could reach more customers through a higher density. In Section 4.1.2
the changes in fuel price directly influencing the transport cost have the strongest influence on
the player’s highest payoffs. With a rising fuel price, the highest payoff per unit and per area of
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each player decreases. Especially the third-party is influenced by changes, since the third-party
decides on the number of service facilities by balancing out the fixed cost of operating a facility
and the transport cost. The changes in fixed cost described in Section 4.1.3 mainly influence the
manufacturer and the retailer, since they are using service facilities with predefined locations.
Economies of scale are no longer applicable as the number of returns has to be distributed
over a higher level of operation cost. Therefore, the higher the land price influencing the cost
of operating a service facility, the lower the highest payoff achievable for the manufacturer
or the retailer. Only the third-party is effected positively, because the transfer price is directly
influenced by the rising reverse logistics cost of the manufacturer. The higher the reverse logistics
cost of the manufacturer, the more likely the manufacturer subcontracts the collection task to
a partner.
The scenarios with high and low customer density in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2 show that
the customer density does not only influence how much effort each player has to put into the
collection of returns, but also emphasis the influence of the customer density on the payoff per
area of the players. Therefore, the third-party incorporating the highest customer density, due
to the flexible logistics network, has an advantage over the other two players. A smaller or larger
market size as described in the scenario analysis of Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.2.4 favours the
collection in the third-parties’ channel, but also the retailer. This can be an advantage but also
a shortcoming of the network flexibility the third-party is able to provide. On the contrary, the
service facilities of the retailer and the manufacturer are fixed in number and location and thus
it is more difficult for them to balance out economies of scale that cannot be fully obtained.
Nevertheless, the retailer benefits from the proximity to the customers.
In general, reasons for these developments can be found in the evolving economies and dis-
economies of scale. On the one hand, the third-party profits from synergy effects with other
clients. Therefore, with extending market size the third-party can still fully exhibit economies
of scale. Especially with a reduction in the size of the market area, this flexibility favours the
third-party. On the other hand, with a shirking market area the manufacturer and the retailer
are not able to exploit the cost saving potential of economies of scales resulting in a reduction
of their profits. Diseconomies of scale originating in the extension of the market area influences
their level of payoff per unit negatively. However, economies of scale in the payoff of the overall
market area still leads to profits in the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s channel.
The profits obtained by the manufacturer and the retailer are significantly higher than those
of the third-party. However, the fact that third-parties usually have a great variety of clients
needs to be taken into account. The third-parties’ advantage lies in the possibility to deploy
synergy effects between different clients. Therefore, the collection of used products can become
a profitable business for a third-party.
The collection of returns cannot only be encouraged by economic motives but also by legislative
forces. What would happen if certain levels of the overall collection rate would be demanded by
law? Would some form of cooperation between the players evolve to jointly reach the mandated
levels? As players would probably not change there “winning strategy” without good reasons,
possible tools the legislation could utilise to enforce cooperation amongst the different collecting
agents need to be evaluated in addition. The possibility of cooperation between the three
collecting agents will be discussed to extend the model of the game.
Most legislations claim responsibility for returns from the manufacturers of the product. There-
fore, the possibilities of cooperation are further explored from a manufacturer’s point of view.
The case in which the manufacturer should carry out the collection as well as the case in which
the collection should be subcontracted to either the retailer or the third-party will be examined
in detail. Additionally, possible incentives to motivate the collecting partners will be reviewed.
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In the first extension of the game, the cooperation is caused by legislation introducing laws to
enable a certain level of collection. This case will make use of the highest payoff per player in
the overall collection area to analyse the situation of conflict.
So far the used products available for collection had been more than enough for each player to
collect an optimal number, resulting in the highest payoff for each player. Except for one situa-
tion where the return rate was slightly exceeded within a large market area, no cooperation was
needed between the three individual decision-makers to reach their highest payoffs as evaluated
in Chapter 4. However, what happens if external influences demands the recovery of a certain
rate of used products? An example of such a scenario is laws due to the WEEE directive. The
waste stream caused by electronic equipment such as mobile phones and computers is one of the
fastest growing ones in Europe. The WEEE directive introduces streams for collection and aims
at increasing the recycling of the used products [22]. The question arising is whether players are
willing to cooperate under the influence of directives demanding a certain collection rate?
5.1 Tools of the legislative
The question a collecting agent is facing when it comes to externally demanded collection rates
is whether to cooperate with other players or to work alone. In this game, a player has the
options to not cooperate, cooperate with one or cooperate with both players. As there was no
motivation to cooperate between the players so far, a threat is introduced by external influences.
The legislative wants as many returns as possible to reach environmental goals. For example, the
European Commission [21] states in the legislative proposals on waste that it wants to recycle
65% of the municipal waste by 2030. For packaging waste the target is to recycle 75% by 2030.
Additionally, the landfill should be reduced to a maximum of 10% of municipal waste. The goal is
77
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to incentive manufacturers to bring products on the market that including the opportunity to be
recovered or recycled. These goals could be manifested in laws opposed on the different players.
In most cases there are certain percentages in collection that a legislative aims for. If these
percentages in collection are not met, the legislative places a fine on the responsible collecting
agents. Therefore, the influence of two different fine models on cooperation, one incorporating
an absolute fine and another one working with a percentage fine, will be tested next.
In the benchmark scenario the player’s revenue and cost of the individual payoff functions are
listed in Table 5.1. This will be the basis of the numerical example used to analyse the impact
of the fine models on cooperation between the players.
Manufacturer Retailer Third-party
Revenue e 100 620.36 e 100 095.71 e 4 878.12
Cost e 24 916.21 e 33 478.14 e 3 891.91
Payoff e 75 704.15 e 66 617.57 e 986.21
Table 5.1: Revenue, cost and payoff per player in the benchmark scenario.
5.1.1 Absolute fine
In the first case, absolute fines are imposed on the players. The first stage is a fine of e 900
for not collecting 70% of the returns available. The second stage demands a e 100-fine for not
meeting the 90% rate of collection. Aiming for a higher return rate than 90% is not realistic,
since all used products would have to find their way back from the customers in the case of
a 100% return. The levels of collection are set in alignment with the legislative proposals on
waste of the European Commission [21]. The absolute fine is set to a level that still allows
the third-party a profitable collection in the benchmark scenario. A sensitivity analysis on the
absolute fine is carried out next, to validate this setting.
There are four possible combinations of coalitions described through four different coalition
options. The first one is that the manufacturer works alone and the retailer cooperates with
the third-party. The manufacturer and the third-party cooperating and collecting against the
retailer is a second option. The third option is described by the third-party carrying out the
collection alone with the manufacturer and the retailer working together. Finally, all players
form the grand coalition working together against an empty coalition. This is the last option
and hence number four.
The characteristic function form is deducted for each player to estimate the strength of possible
coalitions amongst players. It is set as a lower bound to the payoff each player can reach. If a
player would gain less than this value by joining a coalition, the decision-maker should rather
play alone. The characteristic function form is determined by the maximin value of each player.
The values of the four options are listed in Table 5.2, where v(P) describes the grand coalition
and v(Ø) the empty coalition. All other combinations are specified by the characteristic function
form v including the participants of a coalition in the specific option. Thereby, the combination
of M cooperating with R or 3P as well as the cooperation between R and 3P are evaluated.
In the benchmark scenario described in Section 3.4.2, the manufacturer collects 26%, the retailer
42% and the third-party 21% of the amount of used products available for return. Together,
they collect 89% of returns in the overall market area. Therefore, if the players want to reach
the pre-described rate of 70%, the players have to form a grand coalition. Nevertheless, this will
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Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
v(M) e 74 804.15 v(R) e 65 717.57 v(3P ) e 86.21 v(P) e 143 207.93
v(R, 3P ) e 66 703.78 v(M, 3P ) e 75 790.36 v(M,R) e 141 421.71 v(Ø) e 0.00
Table 5.2: The cooperation options between the three players induced by an absolute fine.
still not allow them to overstep the 90%-mark. Yet the players are able to distribute the fine of
the first stage amongst each other to gain the highest payoff possible under these conditions.
In Section 2.2.2, it is stated that the Core of a game in characteristic function form is defined
by all imputations that are not dominated by any other imputation through another coalition.
Therefore, the Core of the benchmark scenario is calculated by
M ≥ e 74 804.15, (5.1a)
R ≥ e 65 717.57, (5.1b)
3P ≥ e 86.21, (5.1c)
M +R ≥ e 141 421.71, (5.1d)
M + 3P ≥ e 75 790.36, (5.1e)
R+ 3P ≥ e 66 703.78 and (5.1f)
M +R+ 3P = e 143 207.93. (5.1g)
Inserting equation (5.1f) in equation (5.1g) results in
M ≤ e 76 504.15 (5.2)
and equation (5.1e) in equation (5.1g) gives
R ≤ e 67 417.57. (5.3)
This leads to the Core of the benchmark scenario defined by
{(M,R,e 143 207.93− 3P )|e 74 804.15 ≤M ≤ e 76 504.15
e 65 717.57 ≤ R ≤ e 67 417.57}. (5.4)
The problem of this solution is that the Core has too many imputations to evaluate the best
solution. Therefore, the Shapley value of the benchmark scenario is calculated as an alternative
solution approach to distribute the payoffs fairly between the participating players of a coalition.
The Shapley value per player is calculated by applying equation (2.6) to the benchmark scenario.
Therefore, the manufacturer’s Shapley value is given by
φM =
1
3
v(M) +
1
6
(v(M,R)− v(R)) + 1
6
(v(M, 3P )− v(3P )) + 1
3
(v(P)− v(R, 3P ))
= e 75 670.81.
(5.5)
The Shapley value of the retailer is calculated as
φR =
1
3
v(R) +
1
6
(v(M,R)− v(M)) + 1
6
(v(R, 3P )− v(3P )) + 1
3
(v(P)− v(M, 3P ))
= e 66 584.23.
(5.6)
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Finally, the third-parties’ Shapley value is given by
φ3P =
1
3
v(3P ) +
1
6
(v(M, 3P )− v(M)) + 1
6
(v(R, 3P )− v(R)) + 1
3
(v(P)− v(M,R))
= e 952.88.
(5.7)
The ratio between the Shapley vector and the original payoff per player is compared to decide
whether the Shapley value distributes the payoffs fairly amongst the participating players of a
coalition with the help of
M =
e 75 670.81
e 75 704.15
= 0.9996 R =
e 66 584.23
e 66 617.57
= 0.9995 3P =
e 952.88
e 986.21
= 0.9662. (5.8)
The comparison proves a fair distribution of payoffs as all ratios are closely together. In general,
all players attain a higher payoff from cooperating with their opponents in the benchmark
scenario with fines introduced by external influences.
What would happen, if only two of the players cooperate, even though it would not allow them
to overstep the predefined collection rate of 70%? Would the distribution of the fine as well as
joint payoffs be preferable to a cooperation in the grand coalition? The two possible choices
each player can make is either to cooperate with one of the opponents (Option 2 (a) or 2 (b))
or to carry out the collection alone (Option 1). All options are described by M, R or 3P and are
listed in Table 5.3.
Manufacturer Retailer Third-Party
Option 1
v(M) e 74 804.15 v(R) e 65 717.57 v(3P ) e 86.21
Option 2
(a) v(M,R) e 141 421.71 (a) v(R,M) e 141 421.71 (a) v(3P,M) e 75 790.36
(b) v(M, 3P ) e 75 790.36 (b) v(R, 3P ) e 67 234.78 (b) v(3P,R) e 67 234.78
Table 5.3: The cooperation options between two players induced by an absolute fine.
The manufacturer and the retailer cooperating in the benchmark scenario with a perspective of
the entire market area as in Section 3.4.2 will reach 68%. The manufacturer and the third-party
cooperating will collect up to 47% of the used products available in the market area. Additionally,
a cooperation between the third-party and the retailer will collect 63% of the returns. The fine
of e 900 is imposed on the players, since the lower limit of 70% is not exceeded. However, the
retailer can encourage the third-party to collect up to 29% by splitting the additional cost of
collection of e 269. Thereby, the retailer and the third-party collect 71% collectively and thus
only have to pay the e 100-fine. This results in the retailer and the third-party paying e 369 for
their coalition. Splitting extra cost is not a feasible option for the manufacturer. Additionally,
it is not possible to split the cost between the retailer and the third-party in the three-player
coalition, since it would lower the manufacturer’s payoff.
Depending on the choice of coalition option, the Core of the players is either determined by
M ≥ e 74 804.15, (5.9a)
R ≥ e 65 717.57, (5.9b)
M +R = e 141 421.71, (5.9c)
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or by
M ≥ e 74 804.15, (5.10a)
3P ≥ e 86.21, (5.10b)
M + 3P = e 75 790.36, (5.10c)
or, finally, by
R ≥ e 65 717.57, (5.11a)
3P ≥ e 86.21, (5.11b)
R+ 3P = e 67 234.78. (5.11c)
With the help of equation (5.9a) – (5.9c) when cooperating with the retailer or by equa-
tion (5.10a) – (5.10c) when cooperating with the third-party, the manufacturer’s Core would
be denoted by {e 74 804.15 ≤ M ≤ e 75 704.15}. The Core of the retailer when working to-
gether with the manufacturer described by equation (5.9a) – (5.9c) would be determined by
{e 65 717.57 ≤ R ≤ e 66 617.56}, while working together with the third-party as in equa-
tion (5.11a) – (5.11c) would lead to the retailer’s Core of {e 65 717.57 ≤ R ≤ e 67 148.57}.
Additionally, the third-parties’ Core that can be attained through cooperation with the manu-
facturer is defined by {e 86.21 ≤ 3P ≤ e 986.21} and with the retailer described by {e 86.21 ≤
3P ≤ e 1 517.21}. The upper bound of each player’s Core represents the highest payoff per
player in the original scenario. As in the benchmark scenario with cooperation between three
players, the Core of each player has many imputations. The Shapley values for each player will
be evaluated in addition, since it is difficult to select one imputation from the Core.
The Shapley value of the manufacturer cooperating with either the retailer or the third-party is
given by
φM2p =
1
2
v(M) +
1
2
(v(M,R)− v(R)) or
=
1
2
v(M) +
1
2
(v(M, 3P )− v(3P ))
= e 75 254.15.
(5.12)
Cooperating with the manufacturer, the retailer’s Shapley value is calculated by
φR2p =
1
2
v(R) +
1
2
(v(R,M)− v(M))
= e 66 167.57,
(5.13)
whereas cooperating with the third-party, the Shapley value of the retailer is given by
φR2p =
1
2
v(R) +
1
2
(v(R, 3P )− v(3P ))
= e 66 433.07.
(5.14)
Finally, the third-parties’ Shapley value cooperating with the manufacturer is calculated as
φ3P2p =
1
2
v(3P ) +
1
2
(v(3P,M)− v(M))
= e 536.21,
(5.15)
while the cooperation with the retailer leads to the Shapley value of the third-party given by
φ3P2p =
1
2
v(3P ) +
1
2
(v(3P,R)− v(R))
= e 801.71.
(5.16)
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Comparing the Shapley values of two-player-cooperations obtained in equation (5.12) for the
manufacturer, equations (5.13) and (5.14) for the retailer and equations (5.15) and (5.16) for the
third-party to the Shapley values of the cooperation amongst all three players in equation (5.5)
– (5.7), the three-player cooperations reach higher levels of profit than the two-player ones.
Therefore, each player attains the highest payoff that is comparable to the highest payoff per
area of the benchmark scenario in the non-cooperative game within the three-player cooperation.
That is why, the cooperation of all three players will be analysed further.
The sensitivity of the introduced fines for not reaching a certain level of collection rate are
analysed in the following. The size of the fines for not meeting certain collection rates were
chosen by setting fines to levels that do not exceed the highest payoff of the third-party with the
lowest payoff amongst all players. This assumption ensures that the collection of returns stays
profitable for all players. First of all, the absolute fine is increased by 1%, then by 5% and finally
by 10% to analyse changes in the model. This will result in fines higher than the profit of the
third-party. Afterwards, the fines will be lowered by 1%, 5% and 10% to investigate the effects
that decreasing fines have on the formation of coalitions and the payoffs of their members.
A rise by 1% would cause the fines to increase to e 909 for not reaching a 70% collection rate
and to e 101 for not reaching the 90%-level. Besides, the fines would increase to e 945 and e 990
for less than 70% in the 5%- and 10%-scenario respectively. For less than 90% of the overall
collection rate in the 5%-scenario the fines would increase to e 105 and in the 10%-scenario to
e 110. For the three-player cooperation, Table 5.4 shows the Shapley value per player. Only
the highest Shapley value is displayed for the two-player cooperation. The manufacturer, the
retailer and the third-party get a lower payoff with an increase in fines. With an increase of 10%,
all player’s payoffs decrease by e 3.33 in comparison to the benchmark. A similar phenomenon
can be observed in the scenario where two players cooperate. The manufacturer that is directly
influenced by the increase in fine looses e 45, while the retailer’s and the third-parties’ Shapley
value decreases by e 5 in the +10%-example. Additionally, the characteristic function form of
the third-party reveals that collection is no longer profitable for a non-cooperating third-party
if the fine is increasing.
Benchmark Fine +1% Fine +5% Fine +10% Fine -1% Fine -5% Fine -10%
3-player
M 75 670.81 75 670.48 75 669.15 75 667.48 75 671.15 75 672.48 75 674.15
R 66 584.23 66 583.90 66 582.57 66 580.90 66 584.57 66 585.90 66 587.57
3P 952.88 952.55 951.21 949.55 953.22 954.55 956.21
2-player
M 75 254.15 75 249.65 75 231.65 75 209.15 75 258.65 75 276.65 75 299.15
R 66 433.07 66 432.57 66 430.57 66 428.07 66 433.57 66 435.57 66 438.07
3P 801.71 801.21 799.21 796.71 802.21 804.21 806.71
1-player
M 74 804.15 74 795.15 74 759.15 74 714.15 74 813.15 74 849.15 74 894.15
R 65 717.57 65 708.57 65 672.57 65 627.57 65 726.57 65 762.57 65 807.57
3P 86.21 77.21 41.21 −3.79 95.21 131.21 176.21
Table 5.4: The sensitivity analysis on the absolute fines in e .
Table 5.4 does not only illustrate what happens if fines increase, but also the effect of a decrease
in the absolute fine. Similar percentages are used in this extension. The absolute fine dropping
by 10% results in e 810 in the first stage and leads to e 90 in the second stage of the fine. In
addition, a change of 5% leads to e 855 as well as e 95 for the first and the second stage of a
decreasing absolute fine. The 1% decrease results in a e 891- and e 99-fine. The effects of a
drop in fines is mirrored to an increase in fines. The payoff per player increases by e 3.34 for
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.1. Tools of the legislative 83
each player that cooperates in the three-player cooperation in the 10%-scenario. If cooperation
between two players is taking place, the manufacturer’s payoff is e 45 and the retailer’s and
the third-parties’ payoff is e 5 higher than in the 10%-scenario. Additionally, the collection of
the third-party stays profitable with and without cooperation. In conclusion, a valid level of
absolute fine is necessary for the simulation of the model as it influences the payoff of each player
directly. In some cases, the absolute fine can determine if a player has to cooperate to keep the
collection profitable.
5.1.2 Percentage fine
What would happen if the fine was not absolute but a certain percentage of the players’ payoffs?
Especially comparing the influence of the absolute fine on the manufacturer and retailer to the
third-party, reveals that the absolute fine has the greatest impact on the third-party. The overall
payoff from collection is not as great as the payoff of the manufacturer and the retailer, since the
third-party has the opportunity to work with different clients. Nevertheless, imposing a fine that
is a certain percentage of the player’s payoff might be a fairer way to encourage cooperation
through external influences. Would the likeliness of cooperation increase even further? The
second fine model imposes a 50%-fine of the player’s payoff for not reaching 70% of collection
rate and 30% for not obtaining 90% of the returns of all used products. This system is comparable
to tax, for example, where a certain percentage gets subtracted from an employee’s salary. The
different stages of the fine are comparable to the absolute fine model, while the setting of the
percentage levels is validated in a sensitivity analysis.
The options of cooperation are similar to the system with absolute fines. The players have four
options, listed in Table 5.5, to cooperate with one opponent or form the grand coalition v(P)
that confronts the empty coalition v(Ø). In general, the strength of the coalitions defined by
their characteristic function forms are weaker when compared to the absolute fine system. Only
the third-party benefits as the fine deducted is smaller in this case. For the manufacturer and
the retailer the fines payable are higher. Especially the characteristic function form of the grand
coalition drops by e 42 892.38.
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
v(M) e 37 852.07 v(R) e 33 308.78 v(3P ) e 493.11 v(P) e 100 315.55
v(R, 3P ) e 33 801.89 v(M, 3P ) e 38 345.18 v(M,R) e 71 160.86 v(Ø) e 0.00
Table 5.5: The cooperation options between three players induced by a percentage fine.
The Core of a game in the benchmark scenario with the percentage fine model is calculated by
M ≥ e 37 852.07, (5.17a)
R ≥ e 33 308.78, (5.17b)
3P ≥ e 493.11, (5.17c)
M +R ≥ e 71 160.86, (5.17d)
M + 3P ≥ e 38 345.18, (5.17e)
R+ 3P ≥ e 33 801.89 and (5.17f)
M +R+ 3P = e 100 315.55. (5.17g)
Equation (5.17f) inserted in equation (5.17g) gives
M ≤ e 66 513.66 (5.18)
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and equation (5.17e) substituted in equation (5.17g) results in
R ≤ e 61 970.37. (5.19)
This leads to the Core of the benchmark scenario defined by
{(M,R,e 100 315.55− 3P )|e 37 852.07 ≤M ≤ e 66 513.66
e 33 308.78 ≤ R ≤ e 61 970.37}. (5.20)
The Shapley value will be deducted for the case with the percentage fines, since the Core did not
assign distinct results to the different cooperation options. The manufacturer’s Shapley value is
calculated in the same way as the one with absolute fines. Therefore, it is given by
φM =
1
3
v(M) +
1
6
(v(M,R)− v(R)) + 1
6
(v(M, 3P )− v(3P )) + 1
3
(v(P)− v(R, 3P ))
= e 47 405.94.
(5.21)
The retailer’s Shapley value is calculated similarly and follows as
φR =
1
3
v(R) +
1
6
(v(M,R)− v(M)) + 1
6
(v(R, 3P )− v(3P )) + 1
3
(v(P)− v(M, 3P ))
= e 42 862.65.
(5.22)
Additionally, the Shapley value of the third-party is given by
φ3P =
1
3
v(3P ) +
1
6
(v(M, 3P )− v(M)) + 1
6
(v(R, 3P )− v(R)) + 1
3
(v(P)− v(M,R))
= e 10 046.97.
(5.23)
Except for the third-parties’, all Shapley values are lower then in the previous scenario. There-
fore, the question arises whether the distribution of the payoffs amongst the players is fairer or
not. This question is addressed by comparing the payoff of each player without cooperation to
the Shapley value per player by
M =
e 47 405.94
e 75 704.15
= 0.6262 R =
e 42 862.65
e 66 617.57
= 0.6434 3P =
e 10 046.97
e 986.21
= 10.1875. (5.24)
It is clear from expression (5.24) that the Shapley value of the percentage fine does not distribute
payoffs fairer than the absolute fine. The third-party benefits more from a cooperation than in
the absolute fine model.
For the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party it is more profitable to cooperate in the
grand coalition than to play alone. Cooperation between two players will be investigated with
percentage fines for all possible cooperation options to deepen the conclusions. The constellation
of cooperation is similar to the model with absolute fines. The players can either play alone
(Option 1) or cooperate with the first or second opponent (Option 2(a) or 2(b)) as described
in Table 5.6, while the retailer and the third-party split the cost of the third-parties’ additional
collection effort.
Therefore, the Shapley value of the manufacturer cooperating with either the retailer or the
third-party is deducted by
φM2p =
1
2
v(M) +
1
2
(v(M,R)− v(R)) or
=
1
2
v(M) +
1
2
(v(M, 3P )− v(3P ))
= e 37 852.07.
(5.25)
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Manufacturer Retailer Third-Party
Option 1
v(M) e 37 852.07 v(R) e 33 308.78 v(3P ) e 493.11
Option 2
(a) v(M,R) e 71 160.86 (a) v(R,M) e 71 160.86 (a) v(3P,M) e 38 345.18
(b) v(M, 3P ) e 38 345.18 (b) v(R, 3P ) e 47 134.35 (b) v(3P,R) e 47 134.35
Table 5.6: The cooperation options between two players induced by a percentage fine.
The retailer’s Shapley value cooperating with the manufacturer is calculated as
φR2p =
1
2
v(R) +
1
2
(v(R,M)− v(M))
= e 33 308.78,
(5.26)
while the Shapley value of the cooperation with the third-party is given by
φR2p =
1
2
v(R) +
1
2
(v(R, 3P )− v(3P ))
= e 39 975.01.
(5.27)
The Shapley value of the third-party that cooperates with the manufacturer is calculated as
φ3P2p =
1
2
v(3P ) +
1
2
(v(3P,M)− v(M)) or
=
1
2
v(3P ) +
1
2
(v(3P,R)− v(R))
= e 493.11,
(5.28)
while the third-parties’ Shapley value of the cooperation with the retailer is deducted by
φ3P2p =
1
2
v(3P ) +
1
2
(v(3P,R)− v(R))
= e 7 159.33.
(5.29)
In all three cases of cooperation with the manufacturer, the cooperation amongst two players
gives the same result as for each player carrying out the collection alone. This is a special case
of the percentage fine model. The equal distribution of the fine does not benefit cooperation in
a two-player scenario. Only if the retailer and the third-party split the extra cost of overcoming
the 70%-fine, the value of the two-player cooperation differs.
The sensitivity of the percentage fine level is analysed with the same scenarios of 1%, 5% and
10% increase and decrease on the rate of the fine as in the sensitivity analysis of the absolute fine
model. A 1% increase of the 50%-fine for not reaching 70% collection rate leads to a 50.5%-fine,
while the 30%-fine for not reaching 90% changes to a 30.5%-fine. An increase of 5% results in a
fine of 52.5% and of 31.5%. Additionally, rising the fine by 5% leads to the first stage of 55% and
the second stage of 33% of the fine model. A 49.5%-fine and a 29.7%-fine, on the other hand,
results from a 1 % decrease as well as a 5% drop leads to a 47.5%-fine as well as a 28.5%-fine.
The decrease by 10% leads to fines of 45% and 27%. Displayed in Table 5.7 are the results of
this sensitivity analysis.
In the example with a 10% increase in the three-player cooperation, the manufacturer’s payoff
decreases by e 2 829.83 and the retailer’s payoff decreases by e 2 375.5. However, the third-
parties’ payoff increases by e 906.07. The 1% and 5% rise show the same developments but
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Benchmark Fee +1% Fee +5% Fee +10% Fee -1% Fee -5% Fee -10%
3-player
M 47 405.94 47 122.95 45 991.02 44 576.11 47 688.92 48 820.85 50 235.76
R 42 862.65 42 625.10 41 674.90 40 487.15 43 100.20 44 050.39 45 238.14
3P 10 046.97 10 137.58 10 500.01 10 953.04 9 956.36 9 593.93 9 140.89
2-player
M 37 852.07 37 473.55 35 959.47 34 066.87 38 230.59 39 744.68 41 637.28
R 39 975.01 39 709.93 38 649.61 37 324.21 40 240.09 41 300.41 42 625.82
3P 7 159.33 7 222.41 7 474.72 7 790.10 7 096.26 6 843.95 6 528.57
1-player
M 37 852.07 37 473.55 35 959.47 34 066.87 38 230.59 39 744.68 41 637.28
R 33 308.78 32 975.70 31 643.34 29 977.91 33 641.87 34 974.22 36 639.66
3P 493.11 488.17 468.45 505.42 498.04 517.76 542.42
Table 5.7: The sensitivity analysis on the percentage fines in e .
with smaller values. The payoff decrease of the third-party is contrary to the developments in
the absolute fine model. With two-player cooperation, the manufacturer loses e 1 892.6 with
the 5% increase and further e 1 892.6 with a change of 10%. A rise of 5% leads to a drop
of e 1 325.4 in the payoff of the retailer and further e 1 325.4 with 10%. Nevertheless, the
third-parties’ payoff increases by e 315.39 for a 5% and further e 315.38 for a 10% change. The
conclusions of the two-player cooperation are consistent with those of the absolute fine model.
The third-party benefits from cooperating with the other players. With an increase in fine, the
chances of cooperation increase and so does the third-parties’ payoff.
In the case of the percentage fines the decrease is consistent with the model with absolute fines.
The three-player cooperation leads to an increase in payoff for the manufacturer by e 2 829.92 for
a drop of 10% and by e 1 414.91 with a 5% decrease. The retailer also shows an increase in payoff
by e 2 375.49 for a 10% and by e 1 187.74 for a 5% change. Only the third-party experiences
a decrease of e 906.08 for the 10%- and a drop by e 453.04 in the 5%-scenario. Therefore, the
results of the increase in percentage fines are mirrored. With cooperation between two players,
the results are increasing showing similarities to the model with the absolute fine. A 10% drop
leads to an increase by e 3 785.21 for the manufacturer’s payoff. The retailer increases by
e 2 650.81 and the third-parties’ payoff decreases by e 630.76 in the −10%-case. Additionally,
the 1% and 5% decrease reveals a similar development but less significant changes in values.
Comparing the absolute fine and the percentage fine model reveals that the absolute fine is more
suitable to encourage cooperation amongst players. The percentage fine model already divides
the fine fairly among the participating agents. Therefore, players can gain less from cooperation.
Even though the amount of fines received is lower with the absolute fine, the primary goal to
collect as many returns a possible is enticed better with the help of the absolute fine model.
5.2 Sensitivity and scenarios of cooperation
The absolute fine has been chosen as an efficient tool to motivate players for cooperation amongst
each other. In addition, the cooperation between three players forming a grand coalition v(P)
proved to be the most beneficial form of coalition to all players. In Chapter 4 the environment
in which the collection takes place has been changed in the parameters of density, variable and
fixed cost. Additionally, the four different scenarios with a high customer density, a low customer
density, a small market area and a large market area have been analysed. The Shapley values
will be calculated for three- and two-player cooperations as well as for each player playing alone
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and compared to the benchmark scenario to evaluate if these changes affect the formation of
coalitions.
5.2.1 Sensitivity of the cooperations
The stability of the cooperations will be tested first. What will happen, if the customer density
of each player, the fuel price or the land price of either the manufacturer or the retailer will be
changed by ±1%, ±5% and ±10%? Does the formation of cooperation between the players stay
the same as in the benchmark scenario?
For all players, cooperating in the grand coalition results in the highest payoffs per area as
illustrated in Table 5.8. For the manufacturer and the retailer the payoff per area stays the
same for small changes in the customer density. However, changing the customer density does
affect the payoff of the third-party. An increase in customer density decreases the payoff per
area of the third-party obtained through the grand coalition. An increase in density by 10%
results in the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party exceeding the second stage of the
absolute fine. Additionally, the manufacturer and retailer as well as the third-party and retailer
exceed the first stage of the fine. Therefore, they can gain a higher payoff from the two-player
cooperation than from the grand coalition. The changes in customer density result in the third-
party having to cooperate to keep collections profitable. Trying to overcome the fine of not
collecting 90% in the case of −10% for example is not profitable, as the fine is smaller than the
burden of collecting more products that would have to be carried by the partners in the grand
coalition. In conclusion, the observations resemble the results obtained in Section 4.1.1.
Bench. Den. +1% Den. +5% Den. +10% Den. -1% Den. -5% Den. -10%
3-player
M 75 670.81 75 670.81 75 704.15 80 092.32 75 670.81 65 158.01 44 370.36
R 66 584.23 66 584.23 66 617.67 72 996.31 57 972.13 57 972.13 51 505.20
3P 952.88 916.38 822.43 539.18 981.34 1 012.83 1 553.22
2-player
M+R 75 254.15 75 254.14 75 254.15 80 175.66 75 254.15 64 741.34 43 953.69
M+3P 75 254.15 75 254.14 75 254.15 79 775.66 75 254.15 64 741.34 43 953.69
R+M 66 167.57 66 167.57 66 167.57 72 679.65 57 555.46 57 555.46 51 088.53
R+3P 66 433.07 66 527.24 66 356.94 72 679.65 57 924.41 57 735.00 51 088.53
3P+M 536.21 499.71 372.43 222.51 564.67 596.17 1 136.55
3P+R 801.71 859.39 561.81 622.51 933.62 775.70 1 136.55
1-player
M 74 804.15 74 804.14 74 804.15 79 325.66 74 804.15 64 291.34 43 503.69
R 65 717.57 65 717.57 65 717.57 71 829.65 57 105.46 57 105.46 50 638.53
3P 86.21 49.71 −77.57 −227.49 114.67 146.17 686.55
Table 5.8: The sensitivity analysis on changes in density with absolute fines in e .
With a change in transport cost due to an increasing fuel price, the manufacturer and the retailer
still collect as many returns as both players collect in the benchmark scenario. The third-party
increases the rate of collection slightly with a rising fuel price. Therefore, a cooperation in
the grand coalition allows the players to cross the 90%-limit. Nevertheless, with an increase in
transport cost, the Shapley value of all players decrease in every possible coalition option listed
in Table 5.9. Additionally, the third-party needs to cooperate to keep the collection economic. A
decrease in fuel price mirrors these results, thus leading to an increase in payoff for every player
compared to the benchmark scenario. All three collecting agents achieve the highest Shapley
value while operating in the grand coalition. Sharing the burden of exceeding the second stage
fine is profitable for the retailer and the third-party in some cases of the two-player coalition.
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Generally, the third-party is the collecting agent that is effected the most by changes in fuel
price. Thereby, the observation show consistency with the results from Section 4.1.2.
Bench. Fuel +1% Fuel +5% Fuel +10% Fuel -1% Fuel -5% Fuel -10%
3-player
M 75 670.81 75 614.38 75 422.50 75 142.12 75 727.29 75 953.74 76 271.30
R 66 584.23 66 542.74 66 410.07 66 202.57 66 625.73 66 791.73 67 032.56
3P 952.88 935.17 892.42 795.88 960.57 1 028.36 1 140.64
2-player
M+R 75 254.15 75 197.71 74 972.50 74 692.12 75 310.63 75 537.08 75 821.30
M+3P 75 254.15 75 197.71 74 972.50 74 692.12 75 310.63 75 537.08 75 821.30
R+M 66 167.57 66 126.07 65 960.07 65 752.57 66 209.07 66 375.06 66 582.56
R+3P 66 433.07 66 387.29 65 960.07 65 795.74 66 524.00 66 706.13 66 582.56
3P+M 536.21 518.50 442.42 277.21 543.91 611.69 690.64
3P+R 801.71 779.73 442.42 677.21 858.84 942.76 690.64
1-player
M 74 804.15 74 747.71 74 522.50 74 242.12 74 860.63 75 087.08 75 371.30
R 65 717.57 65 676.07 65 510.07 65 302.57 65 759.07 65 925.06 66 132.56
3P 86.21 68.50 −7.58 −104.12 93.91 161.69 240.64
Table 5.9: The sensitivity analysis on changes in fuel price with absolute fines in e .
The fixed cost is changed by increasing and decreasing the cost of operating the manufacturer’s
and the retailer’s facilities. In the case of an increase in facility cost of the manufacturer, the
payoff of the manufacturer is directly influenced and the payoff of the third-party indirectly. The
most profitable option of the manufacturer stays the collection as part of the grand coalition,
even though the Shapley value is higher with an increasing land price as illustrated in Table 5.10.
The manufacturer collects more returns, comparable to the observations in Chapter 4.1.3. With
a decrease in land price, the payoff of the manufacturer decreases as the collection effort of
the manufacturer is lower. The retailer is indirectly influenced through splitting the cost of
additional collection with the third-party in the two-player coalition. Nevertheless, for both
players the grand coalition stays the most profitable option.
Bench. M +1% M +5% M +10% M −1% M −5% M −10%
3-player
M 75 670.81 75 756.74 76 084.00 76 457.93 75 583.19 75 215.19 74 713.52
R 66 584.23 66 584.23 66 584.23 66 584.23 66 584.23 66 584.23 66 584.23
3P 952.88 970.83 1 042.65 1 132.42 934.92 863.11 773.33
2-player
M+R 75 254.15 75 340.07 75 667.33 76 041.26 75 166.52 74 798.52 74 296.85
M+3P 75 254.15 75 340.07 75 667.33 76 041.26 75 166.52 74 798.52 74 296.85
R+M 66 167.57 66 167.57 66 167.57 66 167.57 66 167.57 66 167.57 66 167.57
R+3P 66 433.07 66 436.06 66 448.03 66 463.00 66 430.07 66 518.85 66 237.06
3P+M 536.21 554.17 625.98 715.76 518.26 715.76 356.67
3P+R 801.71 822.66 906.45 1 011.19 780.76 797.72 426.16
1-player
M 74 804.15 74 890.07 75 217.33 75 591.26 74 716.52 74 348.52 73 846.85
R 65 717.57 65 717.57 65 717.57 65 717.57 65 717.57 65 717.57 65 717.57
3P 86.21 104.17 175.98 265.76 68.26 −3.56 −93.33
Table 5.10: The sensitivity analysis on changes in M’s land price absolute fines in e .
If the operating cost of the retailer increases, only the retailer is influenced directly. The results
are listed in Table 5.11. Additionally, all collection rates stay the same. The grand coalition
is the most profitable option again, even though the retailer looses some of the highest payoff.
With a decrease in fixed price, the highest payoff of the retailer increases and vice versa.
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Bench. R +1% R +5% R +10% R −1% R −5% R −10%
3-player
M 75 670.81 75 670.81 75 670.81 75 670.81 75 670.81 75 670.81 75 670.81
R 66 584.23 66 506.67 66 198.20 65 813.04 66 660.91 66 969.39 67 335.43
3P 952.88 952.88 952.88 952.88 952.88 952.88 952.88
2-player
M+R 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15
M+3P 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15 75 254.15
R+M 66 167.57 66 090.01 65 781.53 65 396.37 66 244.25 66 552.72 66 938.76
R+3P 66 433.07 66 355.51 66 047.03 65 661.87 66 509.75 66 818.22 67 204.26
3P+M 536.21 536.21 536.21 536.21 536.21 536.21 536.21
3P+R 801.71 801.71 801.71 801.71 801.71 801.71 801.71
1-player
M 74 804.15 74 804.15 74 804.15 74 804.15 74 804.15 74 804.15 74 804.15
R 65 717.57 65 640.01 65 331.53 64 946.37 65 794.25 66 102.72 66 488.76
3P 86.21 86.21 86.21 86.21 86.21 86.21 86.21
Table 5.11: The sensitivity analysis on changes in R’s land price absolute fines in e .
In conclusion, all results of the sensitivity analysis on the cooperation reflect the conclusions
from the non-cooperative game. Splitting the burden of a higher collection to get around the
second stage fine is profitable in most cases for the retailer and the third-party cooperation.
5.2.2 Cooperation in different scenarios
Secondly, the evaluation of the cooperations in the four different scenarios will be addressed.
Will the cooperations stay the same in the scenario with a high and a low customer density?
How will cooperations form if the market is located in a small country in Europe or in the
large market area of the USA? In Table 5.12 the four scenarios are compared to the benchmark
scenario.
Benchmark Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
3-player
M 75 670.81 – – 1 464.31 153 314.84
R 66 584.23 – – 1 951.35 178 194.81
3P 952.88 – – 378.45 20 964.38
2-player
M+R 75 254.15 106 705.44 21 744.21 1 314.31 153 131.51
M+3P 75 254.15 – – 1 314.31 153 131.51
R+M 66 167.57 72 729.65 11 316.01 1 401.35 177 611.47
R+3P 66 433.07 – – 1 801.35 178 011.47
3P+M 536.21 – – −171.55 20 381.04
3P+R 801.71 – – 228.45 20 781.04
1-player
M 74 804.15 105 805.44 21 294.21 864.31 152 681.51
R 65 717.57 71 829.65 10 866.01 951.35 177 161.47
3P 86.21 – – −621.55 19 931.04
Table 5.12: The scenario analysis on changes with absolute fines in e .
In the first two scenarios, the density of customers, that is influenced by the logistics network
of the collecting agent individual to each player, is changed. There are two different cases that
will be provided next. The density is set to 100% for every player in the first case. Compared
to the benchmark scenario, the manufacturer and the retailer collect 50%. There are no returns
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Figure 5.1: The proportion of returns per player with changing customer density.
available for the third-party. As depicted in Figure 5.1, the retailer and the manufacturer
jointly collecting overstep the 70%- and the 90%-collection limit and thus only have to pay no
fine in case of cooperation. The Shapley values of the two-player coalition are higher than the
characteristic function forms of each player. The collection effort decreases with an increase in
customer density for the manufacturer and the retailer.
In the second case that incorporates a 10% customer density, the manufacturer and the retailer
have very low levels of collection rates as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The third-party does not
collect at all, since even with cooperation it is not profitable for this player. The Shapley values
attained by cooperating in the two-player coalition between the manufacturer and the retailer
are significantly lower than in the benchmark scenario. However, the two-player coalitions leads
to higher results attainable than with each player carrying out the collection alone.
In the third and the fourth scenario, the market area size is changed. First the market is
located in a small area and then extended to a larger size. The market area of Scenario 3 has
a size of 300 km with a change in ` to 200 km. The manufacturer and the retailer lower their
collection effort to 18% and 35%, while the third-party increases the effort in collection to collect
44% of the returns available in the market area. The 70%-limit is exceeded by a cooperation
between the retailer and the third-party. All collection rates added up result in exceeding the
second stage of the fine model of 90%. The collection rates of the three players are depicted in
Figure 5.2. Nevertheless, the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party have significantly
lower characteristic function forms than in the original scenario. Especially for the third-party
and also for the manufacturer collection of returns is not profitable any more without cooperative
collection. The manufacturer’s, the retailer’s and the third-parties’ Shapley values decrease. The
grand coalition stays the most beneficial choice for all players.
An alternative to a shirking market area is proposed with the extended market area of Scenario
4 with a radius of 2700 km by changing ` to 1 800 km. Within the extended market area, the
manufacturer decreases collection compared to the benchmark scenario at a rate of 22% and the
retailer at 38%. The third-parties’ collection is the most profitable with a rate of 39%. This is
illustrated in Figure 5.2. Only the cooperation between retailer and the third-party does exceed
the lower collection limit in this case. All players experience an increase in Shapley value with
the extending market area. Therefore, the three-player cooperation is the most profitable for
the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party.
Changing scenarios and not only single parameters has great effects on the formation of a
coalitions. Additionally, in some scenarios, the collection is not profitable for the third-party
even with the possibility to cooperate.
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Figure 5.2: The proportion of returns per player with changing market size.
5.3 Conclusions on the cooperative case
A fine for not reaching a certain collection level is an effective tool of the legislative to motivate
individual decision-makers to cooperate and jointly collect the returns. A realistic way to impose
a fine on the collecting agents is to introduce a two-stage fine model. The first limit is set to
a level that can easily be achieved, sometimes even with two-player cooperation. The level of
the second limit is rather high and claims a collection of almost all used products available for
return. This second stage should not be set too high and only serve as a motivation for players to
collect even more returns by splitting the burden of the extra collection effort. The application
of the Shapley value gives a distinct and fair distribution of the fine and jointly achieved payoff
amongst all cooperation partners.
The comparison in Section 5.1 between an absolute and a percentage fine imposed on the col-
lecting agents if the predefined limits are not achieved, favours the introduction of an absolute
fine model. An absolute fine encourages the cooperation between the players to share the fine
and distribute the payoffs fairly amongst each other. The percentage fine demands a payment
that is already matchable to each player’s individual payoff. By analysing the level of the fine
it is observable that an increase and a decrease of the fine shows mirrored results in the Shap-
ley value. Therefore, the Shapley value distributes the fines and payoffs evenly amongst the
members of a coalition. Nevertheless, setting up a valid fine is crucial to the model.
The benchmark scenario reveals that the higher the absolute fine, the more the cooperation
amongst all three players becomes the most profitable option. In addition, cooperation between
two players is less likely to occur and no cooperation leaves each decision-maker with the lowest
payoff. In a three-player cooperation each player is able to obtain almost as much as if no fine
would be demanded.
In Section 5.2 the behaviour of the players in situations in which the customer density, the
variable and the fix cost are changing are evaluated. The results of this evaluation are consistent
with the conclusions from the non-cooperative version of the game. Additionally, Section 5.2.2
describes the influence of different scenarios on the formation of coalitions. The parameters
of the scenario are important to the collection rates and payoffs that can be obtained by each
player in a coalition.
The collection in the grand coalition is the most profitable option to all players. If legislative
imposes a fine for not collecting certain levels of returns, the grand coalition is the way to obtain
the highest payoff. Therefore, cooperation between individual decision-makers is an important
consideration to make reverse logistics profitable.
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In this chapter, the point of view will be changed to that of the manufacturer to evaluate which
channel is the most profitable to carry out the collection for the manufacturer. The situation of
conflict is analysed by evaluating the highest payoff per player in the overall collection area.
All collecting agents had been modelled as individual decision-makers up to this point. Therefore,
the point of view equals the collection agents. However, legislative often places the responsibility
for recovery processes into the hands of the manufacturer. For example, the WEEE directive
tries to establish manufacturer responsibility [20]. It encourages the design and manufacturing
of electrical and electronic equipment that takes repair, upgrade, re-use or recycling of used
products into account. The recycled material should be integrated into new products. At least
the collection of the returns should be financed by the manufacturers, to take on the respon-
sibility for the waste from their products. That is why, it is time to change the point of view
from each individual player to the manufacturer’s perspective. Is it possible to develop a form of
cooperation where the manufacturer, that is still responsible for the forward logistics, let another
collecting agent carry out the collection in the reverse channel? How do the payoff functions
need to change to allow a cooperation within the closed-loop supply chain? Additionally, what
would be an optimal channel choice of the manufacturer in the different scenarios? The following
sections will address these questions.
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6.1 Payoff functions from the manufacturer’s perspective
First of all, using the retailer’s or the third-parties’ collection channel, the manufacturer’s payoff
functions need to be re-defined. Afterwards, the payoff functions of the retailer and the third-
party are developed further to allow cooperation between the manufacturer and the collecting
partner.
6.1.1 The manufacturer using the retailer’s channel
In the collection channel of the retailer, the manufacturer’s objective function RΠM according
to Savaskan et al. [73] is given by
max RΠM = (φ− βp)[w − cm + ΘR∆]− bRΘR(φ− βp) . (6.1)
Applying bR = ∆ due to a collection contract between the manufacturer and the retailer, the
manufacturer’s profits increase constantly. A change in the wholesale price w or the cost of
re-manufacturing cm could influence the manufacturer’s profit per unit differently. However,
with an optimal wholesale price w the manufacturer’s profit, according to Savaskan et al. [73],
is calculated as
RΠM =
(φ− β cm)2/(8β)
1− β(∆−MCD)(bR −MCD)/(4RM ) . (6.2)
In the benchmark scenario, the profit per unit converges to approximately e 0.0515 for the
manufacturer’s highest payoff. The retailer’s objective function RΠ can be calculated by applying
equation (3.31). This leads to similar results as in Section 3.4.1.
6.1.2 The manufacturer using the third-parties’ channel
The manufacturer’s objective function in the third-parties’ collection channel 3PΠM , according
to Savaskan et al. [73], is given by
max 3PΠM = (φ− βp)[w − cm + Θ3P (∆− b3P )] . (6.3)
A collection contract between the third-party and the manufacturer leads to the application of
equation (3.34) as defined in Section 3.3. Therefore, the cost is incorporated directly. If the
transfer price equals the savings per unit from re-manufacturing, the profit per unit is only
influenced by the recovery cost and the wholesale price. According to Savaskan et al. [73] the
profit of the manufacturer with an optimal wholesale price w is given by
3PΠM =
(φ− β cm)2/(8β)
1− β(∆− b3P )(b3P −MCD)/(4RM ) . (6.4)
The third-parties’ payoff is given by equation (3.33). Therefore, the profit per unit is at a
constant level of approximately e 0.0511 in the benchmark scenario. The third-parties’ payoff
is given by equation (3.33). This payoff function leads to results as in Section 3.4.1, revealing
the third-parties’ highest payoff with the corresponding return rate.
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6.2 The manufacturer playing in the benchmark scenario
If the manufacturer’s profit per unit increases or stays the same in the benchmark scenario, it is
most likely that the highest payoff will be achieved within the channel that is able to collect the
most returns. However, the retailer as well as the third-party have an optimal rate of collection.
An optimal rate of collection is computed per area. In the collection channel of the retailer, an
optimal collection rate per area of the retailer would result in a payoff per area of e 154 664.44
for the manufacturer. This resembles the maximum volume of returns the retailer can collect
within the benchmark scenario. The third-parties’ optimal collection rate per area would result
in e 77 239.87 payoff per area for the manufacturer. Nevertheless, extending the collection up to
the third-parties’ limit of possible collections, the manufacturer could obtain up to e 265 455.39.
That is why, a one-time payment could be paid to the operator of each channel to encourage
the collecting agent to carry out further collections. This one-time payment could be seen as
an incentive to collect even beyond an optimal collection rate of the business partner’s channel,
yet keeping the collection profitable to the operator. In the benchmark scenario, the case of
the third-party could result in a higher payoff for the manufacturer when subcontracting the
collection.
6.2.1 The arbitration procedure between the manufacturer and the retailer
In the benchmark scenario, the retailer’s highest payoff per area is e 66 617.57 that is achieved
by collecting 42% of the returns available in the overall market area. This is the highest level
of collection the retailer can carry out. The manufacturer would gain e 154 664.44 when sub-
contracting the collection to the retailer. The new profit is e 78 960.29 higher than collecting
within the manufacturer’s own channel.
For the manufacturer, collection in the manufacturer’s channel or in the retailer’s channel is
possible. However, from the perspective of the retailer collecting in the manufacturer’s channel
is not a realistic option. The payoff resembles the manufacturer raising the collection up to the
maximum, while the retailer gaining payoff from the maximum collection rate. The manufacturer
and the retailer jointly collecting, enables the retailer to keep collecting the retailer’s optimal
payoff. The situation is illustrated in the following table.
R
Channel M Channel R
M
Channel M (e 75 704.15, e 0.00) (e 75 704.15, e 66 617.57)
Channel R (e 154 664.44, e 66 617.57) (e 154 664.44, e 66 617.57)
The procedure to find the arbitration pair for the two-player cooperation between manufacturer
and retailer, as described in Section 2.2.2, illustrates the payoff region in a Cartesian coordinate
system as in Figure 6.1. The maximin value of the manufacturer and the retailer are given by
e 154 664.44 and e 66 617.57 respectively. Both maximin values are incorporated in Figure 6.1.
All Pareto-optimal points that lie north-east of the maximin values form the bargaining set.
In this case, the bargaining set is the arbitration pair at point (e 154 664.44, e 66 617.57).
Furthermore, the manufacturer and the retailer are able to negotiate over the level of a side-
payment to promote future business relations for example.
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R
M
e 66 617.57
e 75 704.15 e 154 664.44
Figure 6.1: The region of cooperation between M and R.
6.2.2 The arbitration procedure between M and 3P
The highest payoff of the third-party is e 986.21, that is achieved by collecting 21% of the
used products in the market area. The third-party would loose e 22 282.39 by extending the
collection, thus making the collection up to the third-parties’ limit of 73% highly unlikely. The
manufacturer would have to pay e 22 538.96 to keep the third-parties’ collection profitable. This
would still leave the manufacturer with a profit of e 243 173.00 that is e 167 468.85 higher than
the collection in the manufacturer’s channel.
The manufacturer chooses whether to use the own collection channel or subcontract the third-
party. As the third-party has no choice of collecting within the manufacturer’s structures, the
third-party in the manufacturer’s channel describes what happens without cooperation between
the players. The normal collection effort is illustrated in the second option as the third-parties’
collection channel. In the following table the situation between the manufacturer and the third-
party is displayed.
3P
Channel M Channel 3P
M
Channel M (e 75 704.15, e 0.00) (e 75 704.15, e 986.21)
Channel 3P (e 265 455.39, e−22 282.39) (e 243 173.00, e 986.21)
The arbitration procedure between the manufacturer and the third-party results in the payoff
region in Figure 6.2.
3P
Me 986.21
e -22 282.39
e 75 704.15 e 243 173.00
e 265 455.39
Figure 6.2: The region of cooperation between M and 3P.
The maximin values for the manufacturer and the third-party are calculated in the next step.
The manufacturer’s payoff matrix is depicted as
(e 75 704.15) (e 75 704.15)
(e 265 455.39) (e 243 173.00)
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with Column 2 dominating Column 1. Therefore, the matrix of the manufacturer is reduced to
(e 75 704.15)
(e 243 173.00)
,
which leaves Row 1 being dominated by Row 2 and results in the manufacturer’s maximin value
of e 243 173.00. Additionally, the matrix of the third-party is illustrated by
(e 0.00) (e−22 282.39)
(e 986.21) (e 986.21)
.
Row 2 dominates Row 1 in this table, reducing the matrix to
(e 986.21) (e 986.21) .
Therefore, the arbitration pair of the cooperation between manufacturer and third-party is at
(e 243 173.00, e 986.21) again leaving room for future negotiations. This analysis investigates
on the cooperation possibilities arising from the benchmark scenario.
6.3 Different games from the manufacturer’s point of view
How would the possibilities of cooperation change, if the environment in which the collection
takes place changes? Does a change in one of the three parameters density, variable or fixed cost
benefit or harm the collecting agents? How would a change in the scenario affect the different
channels? An evaluation on these influences will focus on the manufacturer, as the payoffs for
the collection partners stay the same as in Chapter 4 due to the retailer’s and the third-parties’
maximin values.
6.3.1 The influence of single parameter changes
With a changing customer density the payoff of the manufacturer stays at a constant level until
the size of the facility is changed when collecting within the own channel. The results of this
analysis are described in Table 6.1. If the customer density increases, the payoff achievable by
the retailer is higher. If the density is decreased, the retailer’s payoff decreases accordingly. A
subcontract with the third-party leads to higher results with an increase in density, since the
manufacturer carries the loss from the third-parties’ channel while more returns are collected.
The third-parties’ channel collects the most returns, thus the highest profits are obtained from
subcontracting the third-party.
Bench. Den. +1% Den. +5% Den. +10% Den. -1% Den. -5% Den. -10%
Manu.
in M 75 704.15 75 704.14 75 704.15 80 225.66 75 704.15 65 191.34 44 403.69
in R 154 664.44 154 691.23 154 783.90 212 559.55 129 111.94 129 998.32 111 380.09
in 3P 243 173.00 259 070.97 252 499.45 247 326.97 241 021.16 239 859.56 231 859.75
Table 6.1: The sensitivity analysis on changes in density from M’s point of view in e .
Changes in the fuel price leading to variations in transport cost describes the second part of
the analysis resulting Table 6.2. The manufacturer carrying out the collection reduces the
payoff slowly while the fuel price rises. A decrease in fuel price leads to an increase of the
manufacturer’s payoff. Subcontracting the retailer or third-party shows similar results on the
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effect of fuel price as for the manufacturer collecting the own channel. The third-parties channel
seems to be the best option for the manufacturer. Though highly dependent on the transport
cost, the manufacturer obtains high payoffs while using the third-parties’ channel compared to
the other channel options.
Bench. Fuel +1% Fuel +5% Fuel +10% Fuel -1% Fuel -5% Fuel -10%
Manu.
in M 75 704.15 75 647.71 75 422.50 75 142.12 75 760.63 75 987.08 76 271.30
in R 154 664.44 154 658.88 154 636.74 154 609.31 154 670.01 154 692.39 154 720.60
in 3P 243 173.00 243 036.14 242 590.47 241 901.16 243 378.81 243 925.59 244 526.44
Table 6.2: The sensitivity analysis on changes in fuel price from M’s point of view in e .
The changes in fixed cost caused by changing land prices of the manufacturer influences the
manufacturer’s, the retailer’s and the third-parties’ channel, while changing the land prices of
the retailer only influences the retailer’s collection channel. Nevertheless, operating in the third-
parties’ channel leads to a similar payoff level as achieved in the benchmark scenario. Therefore,
subcontracting the third-party stays the most beneficial option of the manufacturer.
With an increase in land price of the manufacturer, subcontracting the third-party obtains
higher payoffs as the fixed cost of the manufacturer increases. A decreasing land price leads to
a decrease in the third-parties’ payoffs as well as a decrease in the manufacturer’s attainable
payoffs, since the manufacturer lowers the collection effort. The increase in land price of the
manufacturer results in an increase in payoff per area of the retailer and vice versa. Nevertheless,
subcontracting the third-party leads to higher payoffs per area in every scenario than any other
collection option.
Bench. M +1% M +5% M +10% M -1% M -5% M -10%
Manu.
in M 75 704.15 75 790.07 76 117.33 76 491.26 75 616.52 75 248.52 74 746.85
in R 154 664.44 154 640.83 154 548.28 154 436.81 154 688.23 154 785.29 154 910.88
in 3P 243 173.00 243 304.36 243 830.49 244 489.66 243 041.70 242 517.17 241 863.01
Table 6.3: The sensitivity analysis on changes in M’s land price from M’s point of view in e .
The manufacturer’s and the third-parties’ channels are not influenced by the change in fixed
cost of the retailer. Therefore, the manufacturer obtains the same payoffs as in the benchmark
scenario. Additionally, the changes in fixed cost of the retailer are too small to influence the
payoff per area if subcontracted by the manufacturer. Only the retailer experiences a decrease
or increase with changing land price within the own channel.
Bench. R +1% R +5% R +10% R -1% R -5% R -10%
Manu.
in R 154 664.44 154 664.44 154 664.44 154 664.44 154 664.44 154 664.44 154 664.44
Table 6.4: The sensitivity analysis on changes in R’s land price from M’s point of view in e .
The observations from the sensitivity analysis of the different channels through the manufac-
turer’s perspective are consistent with the analysis in the non-cooperative and cooperative ver-
sion of the game. Nevertheless, a change in a single parameter does influence the highest payoff
attainable for the manufacturer in every channel.
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6.3.2 The influence of changing scenarios
Four different scenarios showing the effects of a high customer density, a low customer density,
a small market area and a large market area on the channel choice of the manufacturer. The
results are listed in Table 6.5.
Bench. Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Manu.
in M 75 704.15 106 705.44 22 194.21 1 764.31 153 581.51
in R 154 664.44 180 029.52 25 837.89 5 155.74 471 640.94
in 3P 243 173.00 – 35 415.89 10 243.68 841 268.94
Table 6.5: The scenario analysis from M’s point of view in e .
Scenario 1 with a customer density of 100% for every collecting agent emphasises the importance
of this parameter. If all collecting agents would collect with the same density, the retailer would
be the best choice for the manufacturer. Compared to the manufacturer’s channel or the third-
parties’ channel, the manufacturer is able to obtain the highest profit with subcontracting the
retailer, because of the higher market power. In Scenario 2 the customer density is reduced to
a minimum of 10%. Although the manufacturer has to compensate for the third-parties’ losses
the collection via the third-party is the most profitable, due to low transport cost. Collecting
through the retailer is the best option. The small market area of Scenario 3 benefits the retailer’s
collection channel. Nevertheless, the highest payoff is attained by the third-party. In the fourth
scenario, the market area is extended. This development is most beneficial to the third-parties’
channel.
Benchmark Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
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Figure 6.3: The manufacturer’s profit in different scenarios.
The different scenarios show that the channel of the retailer can be the best choice if all players
have the same customer density. Nevertheless, the third-party is beneficial in most scenarios, as
pointed out by the sensitivity analysis and the benchmark scenario, since it can collect the most
returns due to the highest customer density. These observations are illustrated in Figure 6.3.
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6.4 Conclusions on the manufacturer’s point of view
In the benchmark scenario, the best choice for the manufacturer is to subcontract the collection
effort to the third-party. The third-party has the lowest logistics cost as well as the best collection
network. This is achieved through high flexibility of the network structure and synergy effects
with other clients. With support of the manufacturer through one-time payments, the third-
party is able to collect the highest rate of returns available on the market and still gain the
highest profit achievable, if collection was carried out alone. These conclusions are stable as
small changes in single parameters does not influence the choice of channel of the manufacturer.
However, depending on the scenario in which the collection takes place, the favour can turn
towards the retailer. If all players have the same level of density, the manufacturer achieves the
highest profits by subcontracting to the retailer, since the profit that the manufacturer gains
through the retailer’s channel is increasing. Especially, when the existing networks become more
important due to the proximity to the customer, the retailer is the best option. In changing
market sizes, on the other hand, the third-party is the best collection partner. The third-party
can deal better with the requirements of a changing market sizes, due to the flexibility of the
third-parties’ network. Additionally, the third-party with the highest customer density is able
to collect the highest level of returns.
The introduction of a fine by the legislative seems less probable with the manufacturer subcon-
tracting a collection partner. The collection rates of the individual decision-makers fluctuate
around 20% and 40%. With the manufacturer subcontracting the third-party in most scenarios,
the collection rate of 80% gets satisfied automatically.
Cooperation in the form of the manufacturer subcontracting the third-party and the retailer
might occur, when the legislative demands up to 90% of the used products to be returned. In a
cooperation between the retailer’s and the third-parties’ channel, the retailer could collect the
returns in the smaller areas around the retail stores and the third-party could carry out the
collection of the used products that are further away from the manufacturer’s recovery facility.
It is most likely that the manufacturer would accept a fine and still gain more than collecting
within the own channel. However, the fine might increase in this case.
In conclusion, an optimal collection channel from the manufacturer’s point of view has been
evaluated as an alternative form of cooperation if legislative calls the manufacturer to take
responsibility of the end-of-life products.
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A summary of the content of the thesis is provided in this chapter. Additionally, the achievement
of the six objectives is pointed out and the contributions of the thesis are stated. The conclusions
drawn in this chapter have three different aspects. The non-cooperative and the cooperative
version of the game that had been modelled and analysed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 are
compared briefly first. Secondly, the conclusions of this project and the current state of scientific
knowledge extracted from the papers in Section 2.3 will be aligned with the outcome of the
analysis with the changing perception in Chapter 6. The question of choosing an optimal reverse
channel structure are discussed for the benchmark scenario as the third aspect. Finally, ideas
for future research are given to complete the thesis.
7.1 Thesis summary
The concepts of forward and reverse logistics are introduced in the beginning of the thesis. Af-
terwards, the two-fold motivation – economic reasons and legislative regulations – are described.
The problem of how to choose an optimal reverse channel structure to collect used products is
identified as part of Chapter 1.
The basic understanding of the problem and the current state of scientific knowledge is provided
in Chapter 2. Therefore, a literature review is carried out. Not only general information on
CLSCs and game theory are given, but also the combination of the two topics is pointed out.
Reverse logistics is modelled using a game theory approach in Chapter 3. Therefore, the different
reverse channel structures form the different players of the game. The competition between these
players is illustrated by the simulation of the non-cooperative version of the game at the end of
Chapter 3.
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The stability of solutions is tested by changing single parameters at a time in the sensitivity
analysis of the game in Chapter 4. Additionally, different market scenarios in which the game
could possibly take place are investigated.
The thesis is further extended to not only provide insights into the non-cooperative, but also
into the cooperative version of the game. Therefore, cooperation is caused by external influences
in Chapter 5 and by a change in perspective to the manufacturer’s point of view in Chapter 6.
The stability of these versions as well as the influence of different market scenarios is analysed.
In Chapter 7 the non-cooperative and the cooperative version of the game are contrasted. Addi-
tionally, the observations of the thesis are compared to the current state of scientific knowledge
that was obtained in the literature review. The thesis is completed by an outlook on opportu-
nities for future studies on this topic.
7.2 The achievement of objectives
The following objectives were pursued throughout the thesis towards the aim of choosing an
optimal reverse channel.
Objective I: Perform a literature review on the current body of scientific knowledge.
Objective II: Model different reverse logistic options with a game theory approach.
Objective III: Test the stability of the modelled game.
Objective IV: Investigate different scenarios and versions of the modelled game.
Objective V: Interpret the results.
Objective VI: Draw conclusions on the choice of an optimal reverse logistics structure.
In fulfilment of Objective I, a literature review on the topics of closed-loop supply chains and
game theory was carried out in the second chapter. Thereby, papers that combine reverse
logistics with game theory approaches were investigated in particular. Objective II was achieved
by modelling the different reverse channel options and their specific networks as players of
the non-cooperative and cooperative version of a game. In fulfilment of Objective III and
IV a sensitivity and a scenario analysis was carried out. The stability of the solution of the
game subject to the parameters was investigated by changing one of the three most influential
parameters of transport cost – the customer density, the fuel price and the land price – at a time.
Additionally, the game was played in four different scenarios with a high customer density, a low
customer density, a small and a large market area. All results were interpreted in achievement
of Objective V. Finally, Objective VI is fulfilled by applying the conclusions of this thesis to
determine an optimal reverse channel structure in a benchmark scenario.
7.3 Thesis contributions
Two different comparisons, one between non-cooperative and cooperative games and the other
one between the state of the current scientific knowledge and the conclusions of this thesis are
presented. Additionally, the question of an optimal reverse channel structure will be discussed
for the benchmark scenario.
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7.3.1 Non-cooperative versus cooperative games
A comparison between the non-cooperative and the cooperative game is given, since these two
versions of the game are established in the thesis. The stability of the versions is evaluated.
Additionally, the versions will not only be compared in the benchmark scenario, but also in
other scenarios.
The economic optimality for the individual collecting agent is defined by the motivation to
engage into the reverse logistics business. If there was no prescribed collection rate, an optimal
choice of the players in the benchmark scenario would be to carry out the collection alone
to obtain the highest profit achievable in the market area. However, if legislation imposes a
fine on not reaching a certain collection rate serving as the second aspect of motivation, each
collecting agent could gain a higher payoff by operating in the grand coalition than carrying out
the collection alone as illustrated in Figure 7.1. Through cooperation, the manufacturer, the
retailer and the third-party would only get e 33.33 less than without external fines. Therefore,
the grand coalition would be the best choice for each player in the benchmark scenario with
fines imposed by legislation.
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Figure 7.1: The difference in payoff per area between the non-cooperative and cooperative version of
the game in the benchmark scenario with the introduction of absolute fines.
Both versions of the game have similar stabilities. A change in customer density influences
the individual collection rates of the manufacturer and the retailer in the non-cooperative and
cooperative game. Nevertheless, the third-party is influenced significantly by a change in density
as the logistics network is designed flexible to customer density, transport and fixed cost. In the
non-cooperative version of the game, a change in fuel price leading to a change in transport cost
causes a decrease in payoff for the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party accompanied by
a constant collection rate. The version of the game that is cooperative, shows similar results. For
each player, operating in the grand coalition is the most profitable option as the increase in cost
of transport can be balanced out by all players collectively. For the third-party it is important
to cooperate in this scenario to keep collection profitable. If the land price of the manufacturer
increases, the manufacturer’s payoffs increase due to higher collection rates. Nevertheless, the
third-parties’ payoffs increase with the manufacturer’s land price as the transfer price rises. If the
retailer’s land price increases, on the other hand, only the affected retailer’s channel becomes
less profitable than in the benchmark scenario of the non-cooperative game. Therefore, the
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affected player’s try to encourage the other players to cooperate in the grand coalition. The
grand coalition is likely to form, since it stays the most profitable option for every player in the
cooperative version.
The attention will be drawn towards various scenarios, due to the influence of the external setting
on an optimal solution. With all players incorporating the same high density, the manufacturer
and the retailer are able to expand their profits through collecting more returns in the non-
cooperative game. The third-party is not involved in the collection if all collecting agents
have a customer density of 100%. Especially the manufacturer profits from an increase in
customer density in the cooperative version of the game. However, if the customer density
decreases for all players to a very low level, the collection of the third-party is not economic
any more. Additionally, the payoffs of the manufacturer and the retailer decreases significantly,
while cooperation almost become inevitable to achieve the highest payoffs obtainable in this
scenario. The market size has a significant impact on the profit of the collecting agents. In the
non-cooperative game a shrinking market size lowers profits for all three players. However, the
decrease in payoff of the third-party is far less drastic than for the manufacturer and the retailer.
Similar observations can be made for an increase in market size. While the payoff of each player
rises rapidly, the third-party is able to increase its payoff the most while the manufacturer
doubles and the retailer triples their profits. The collection rates change accordingly. Compared
to the cooperative games, the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party obtain the highest
payoffs while collecting in the grand coalition. Therefore, the grand coalition is still most likely
to form. Nevertheless, the two-player cooperations almost lead to similar results for a large
market area. However, if the market area shrinks, especially the retailer and the third-party
have to cooperate in some form to keep the collection profitable.
In conclusion, the stability of the non-cooperative and the cooperative version of the game shows
similar results. In most cases of the cooperative game, the grand coalition is an optimal solution
to keep profits high even with changing scenarios. Therefore, it is important to implement
the idea of cooperation between different collecting options when designing a reverse logistics
structure.
7.3.2 Current scientific knowledge versus thesis conclusions
The cost of collection is similar to all three collecting agents in the papers reviewed in Chapter 2
that serve as a framework for this thesis. Even though the question of the importance of transport
cost is raised, none of the articles investigate further on the influence of reverse logistics cost
individual to each collecting agent on the choice of channel structure. However, most other
assumptions like the monopoly of the retailer, the non-existence of economies and diseconomies
of scale, the perfect substitution of products as well as the long-life cycle of products are lifted
in the development of research on this topic. That is why, the highly influential assumption on
the similarity of collection cost was introduced and evaluated in the course of this thesis.
Comparing the reverse logistics cost and the payoffs for the linear logistics cost applied by
Savaskan et al. [73] and the discontinuous and non-linear logistics cost established in this thesis
lead to different insights. In the benchmark scenario, the reverse logistics cost in Figure 7.2(a)
is lower for the linear model. The reverse logistics cost in the discontinuous model is higher
for every player, due to the introduction of different transport options resulting in economies
of scale and the influence of the cost necessary for operating the facilities. However, the man-
ufacturer’s reverse logistics cost is now the highest followed by the retailer and the third-party
incorporating the lowest cost. This leaves a more realistic picture on the reverse logistics cost,
since in the model of Savaskan et al. [73] the third-party, even though flexible in equipment
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and location, experienced the highest cost per unit. On the other hand, the change in payoff
function, illustrated in Figure 7.2(b) resembles the conclusions from Savaskan et al. [73] with
the manufacturer gaining the highest payoff followed by the retailer and the third-party still
earning the lowest profit per unit.
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Figure 7.2: The differences in RL cost and payoff per unit between the model of Savaskan et al. [73]
and the model developed in this thesis.
Especially with the change of perspective to the manufacturer’s point of view in Chapter 6,
the results of the thesis extend the results of the papers. However, the general conclusion that
closeness to the market is crucial to choose an optimal reverse channel structure stays consistent.
In various scenarios, not only the reverse logistics cost and payoff per unit, but also per area in
the form of cooperation amongst the manufacturer with either the retailer or the third-party is
investigated. In the benchmark scenario, the best choice is the third-party. Due to the cheapest
reverse logistics cost and the high customer density, the favour tips from the retailer as identified
in the papers, to the third-party. Even with small changes in single parameters, this conclusion
is valid. As for example with changes in fuel price increasing transport cost or rising fixed
cost due to high land prices, the third-party is the most attractive choice amongst all collecting
agents. Nevertheless, the retailer is the best choice in scenarios were the customer density is the
same amongst all players, either very high or very low. However, for a changing market size,
the third-party would be the collection partner of choice for the manufacturer. With the help of
these investigations, the thesis shifts perception towards the importance of the reverse logistics
cost in an optimal choice of the reverse channel structure.
7.3.3 An optimal reverse channel structure for the benchmark
Even though only the scenario prescribed by Savaskan et al. [73] and Fleischmann et al. [30] will
be used to evaluate this question, the three perspectives of the best choice in the non-cooperative
game, the cooperative game and from the manufacturer’s point of view will be addressed. The
focus lies on the two-fold motivation of economic profitability and compatibility with legislative
regulations to sum up the observations.
In the non-cooperative version of the benchmark scenario, every collecting agent has the oppor-
tunity to use the reverse logistics structure that belongs to the player. Therefore, each player can
only decide on the level of the collection rate. Looking at the payoff per unit, the manufacturer
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and the retailer would only engage with a low rate in the collecting efforts. The third-party
would collect slightly more returns. Comparing the payoff per unit, the manufacturer would be
able to achieve the highest profit, followed by the retailer and the third-party. The profit the
manufacturer and the retailer are making from selling new products explains this observation.
However, the third-party is able to achieve a profit, even without the sales of new products. With
a shift in focus from the payoff per unit to the payoff per area, the collection rates increase for the
manufacturer and the retailer in the benchmark scenario. The profit from selling new products
allows a larger number of returns being profitable in this case. That is also why the collection
rate of the third-party does not change. The manufacturer has the highest profit compared to
the payoffs per area of the retailer who has a higher payoff than the third-party. However, the
fact that the third-party can provide more than one client with the service of collecting returns
and thus make profit from different channels should be included into the comparison. Therefore,
it is shown that collecting returns can be a profitable business on its own.
In the cooperative version of the benchmark scenario, every collecting agent uses their own
reverse logistics structure, but is able to cooperate with opponents that use their collecting
options. The collecting agents need to return a certain percentage of the used products to
comply with legislative regulations. Therefore, it would be the most profitable option for each
collecting agent to cooperate collectively and form the grand coalition. Comparing the profit per
area, the manufacturer would gain the highest payoff, followed by the retailer and the third-party.
This resembles the conclusions drawn from the non-cooperative version of the game.
The perspective is shifted to the manufacturer’s point of view as the manufacturer is most
likely be held accountable by the legislative regulations for the collection of end-of-life products.
For the manufacturer it would be the best choice to select the third-party to carry out the
collection as the third-party has the highest customer density and thus is closest to the market.
Nevertheless, using the retailer as a collecting agent can also have a profit increasing effect. That
is why, the manufacturer should take a cooperation between the third-party and the retailer into
consideration while designing an optimal reverse channel structure.
In general, the level of the return rate or the extend of cooperation decides on an optimal reverse
channel structure. Therefore, the point of view determines the monetarily most profitable answer
to the problem evaluated in this thesis.
7.4 An outlook on future studies
The purpose of this thesis is to show that reverse logistics add value to a company. Especially
with the example of the third-party specialising on services for the collection of returns, the
profitability of this business is emphasized. With an increase of interest in environmental issues
and sustainable growth, legislative regulations about the collection of end-of-life products will be
introduced all over the world. Therefore, a company should take the benefits of reverse logistics
into consideration at an early stage of the product and supply chain design. Additionally, the
different versions and scenarios show that it does make sense for a company to start discussions
with different providers of collection services. The best solution can only be found by taking
market specifics into consideration, due to the differences in the reverse logistics structures of
the various providers and their ability to handle these challenges.
Future studies in this topic could apply the model developed in this thesis to a specific case to
broaden the research. Thereby, the general conclusions could be confirmed with real-world data.
Additionally, the possibilities to integrate forward and reverse logistics to a larger extend could
be taken into consideration with the implementation of the model in an actual case. Especially
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the level of customer density for each player and the differences in customer density between
the three players could be supported by actual data. The customer density is one of the most
important parameters in choosing a reverse channel and can tip the collection in favour of the
player with the highest customer density. Furthermore, the legislative regulations that set a
collection level and impose a fine for not achieving this level could be validated in an actual
case. The collection level as well as the fine are the most important parameters to incentivise
cooperation amongst the players.
The cost function could be further improved to deepen the research. In the case of the retailer
and the third-party, the level of transfer price could be adapted dynamically. Additionally, the
impact of the components of the cost of investment in the collection effort could be further
analysed. The assumption of the manufacturer taking the responsibility for the collection could
be shifted towards the customers. This could lead to changes in the transport cost as the
customer would then carry out the collection effort.
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